Courts presume that the General Assembly is aware of court decisions that construe state statutes or the constitution. The OLLS will update this web page quarterly to notify the General Assembly of such court decisions. Cases that may be of particular interest because they meet certain criteria have been summarized and are listed below in chronological order. Summaries for cases older than a year are available in an archive.
Holding: The Judicial Department may collect interest payments on a monthly basis, rather than annually pursuant to the statutory direction to collect interest on restitution at the rate of twelve percent per annum.
Case Summary: In June 2015, the Judicial Department issued a press release announcing it would begin calculating and assessing 1% interest monthly on restitution balances to ensure consistent and accurate application of the law across the state after a 2014 State Audit report noted that most judicial districts had not assessed or collected any interest since the legislature had enacted the restitution statute. Defendant sued, claiming the Judicial Department did not have the statutory authority to charge monthly interest because the plain language of the statute said otherwise by using the term "per annum". The Court of Appeals held that, although the General Assembly did not define the term "per annum" and there was no legislative history to help ascertain when interest should be collected, others jurisdictions have interpreted similar language to be intended only as a measure of the rate with respect to time and does not require the payment of interest annually. Additionally, if the General Assembly intended to limit interest payments to an annual basis, it would have done so as it did in other statutes. (For more information, contact Shelby Ross.)
Holding: The time value of money does not constitute reasonably equivalent value in an equity-type Ponzi scheme.
Case Summary: Taylor invested money in a Ponzi scheme run by Mueller. Their agreement did not provide any guaranteed rate of return or interest; rather, Taylor was to receive merely a portion of whatever profits might accrue. Taylor received several transfers of "profits" (in reality, merely subsequent investors' principal) from Mueller and later withdrew his entire principal, plus nearly half a million dollars profit. Then the enterprise was exposed as a scam. The trial court appointed Lewis as receiver, who sued to void the profit portion of the transfers to Taylor in order to return the money to investors who lost all of their principal.
Taylor argued that, under the "Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act" (CUFTA), he had given "reasonably equivalent value" to Mueller in the form of the time-value of the invested money, and therefore the transfers to him were not voidable. The trial court held for the receiver, and the court of appeals reversed.
The supreme court reversed again, observing that this is an issue of first impression in Colorado. The supreme court found that under CUFTA, the time value of money does not constitute reasonably equivalent value in an equity-type Ponzi scheme. The court contrasted a Ponzi scheme in which an investor has been guaranteed a minimum rate of return or interest; in these situations, a transfer of "profits" or interest satisfies an antecedent debt, which makes the investment of principal a reasonably equivalent value. In these types of Ponzi schemes, a transfer of "profits" or interest is a dollar-for-dollar forgiveness of a contractual debt; such transfers are not voidable. But in an equity-type Ponzi scheme, the innocent investor who profits can point to nothing under CUFTA that ties the false profit to "value" that was provided to the debtor. Because Taylor did not provide any reasonably equivalent value, Mueller's transfers to him of "profits" were voidable. (For more information, contact Thomas Morris.)
Holding: Semen does not constitute an "intimate part", defined in § 18-3-401 (2), for the purposes of establishing "sexual contact", defined in § 18-3-401 (4).
Case Summary: Defendant was convicted of sexual assault on a child (SAOC), sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust (SAOC-POT), and indecent exposure, based on testimony that defendant ejaculated into the hands of his foster children and then required the children to swallow the semen. To commit the crimes of SAOC and SAOC-POT, the defendant must have "sexual contact" with a child, which requires the knowing touching of the actor's or victim's "intimate parts". The term "intimate parts" is defined as "the external genitalia or the perineum or the anus or the buttocks or the pubes or the breast of any person." The Court of Appeals, applying the plain language of the statute, vacated the defendant's convictions for SAOC and SAOC-POT and held that semen does not constitute an "intimate part" of the defendant's body. (For more information, contact Shelby Ross.)
Holding: The statute that limits the survivability of a claim for punitive damages or penalties applies only after the death of the person against whom the punitive damages or penalties are claimed.
Case Summary: The plaintiff, Casper, sued his insurance company for the unreasonable delay or denial of insurance benefits. The jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. Casper died before the court entered a written and signed order, which also included an award of Casper's attorney fees and costs in the judgment. The insurance company argued that the attorney fees and costs could not be included in the computation of punitive damages and that the punitive damages claim did not survive Casper's death. The trial judge disagreed; the insurance company appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The insurance company sought review in the supreme court.
Previous case law, Kruse v. McKenna, 178 P.3d 1198 (Colo. 2008), held that the determination of whether a claim is assignable depends upon whether it survives the death of the person originally entitled to assert the claim. Kruse therefore intimated that the survival statute's limitation on penalties and punitive damages applies when either party dies. But the Supreme Court in Casper held that Kruse effectively ignored the plain meaning of survival statute's text, which states that punitive damages and penalties are only not available after the death of the person "against whom such punitive damages or penalties are claimed". Because it was the insurance company against whom the punitive damages were claimed but it was Casper who died, the survival statute did not apply, and to the extent that the Kruse decision failed to give meaning to the plain language of the survival statute, that decision was overruled. (For more information, contact Thomas Morris.)
Maralex Res., Inc. v. Colo. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 17CA0051 (March 22, 2018)
Holding: The court of appeals upheld the district court's determination that the Colorado oil and gas conservation commission's (COGCC) rule authorizing COGCC staff to inspect oil and gas properties without a warrant met the administrative search exemption to the constitutional warrant requirement.
Case Summary: The COGCC obtained and executed a warrant to search two oil and gas locations and, two weeks later, reinspected the locations without a warrant. The inspections revealed a number of violations of the COGCC's rules, and the COGCC issued an order finding violation against the oil and gas operator. The oil and gas operator and the surface property owner sought judicial review in district court, asserting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the COGCC's rule authorizing warrantless searches as a violation of the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court concluded that the inspection rule did not violate either the United States or the Colorado Constitution.
The court of appeals analyzed whether the COGCC's inspection rule met the administrative search exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. Applying a three-part test, the court of appeals determined that the COGCC's regulatory scheme provided a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant" based on findings that: (1) Oil and gas development is a closely regulated industry; (2) a requirement that the COGCC obtain a warrant for every inspection performed would frustrate the state's substantial interest in regulating oil and gas development; and (3) the COGCC enforced its inspection rule with sufficient certainty and regularity that members of the regulated community had a reduced expectation of privacy in the commercial premises inspected. The court of appeals concluded that the COGCC's inspection rule met the administrative search exemption to the constitutional warrant requirement.
The court of appeals also reviewed the surface property owner's separate constitutional challenge to the COGCC's inspection rule on grounds that the rule as applied to the surface property owner violated the constitutional warrant requirement and constituted a governmental taking. The court of appeals rejected the as-applied challenge to the warrantless search because the surface property owner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property where the surface property owner granted the operator an unlimited easement to the surface estate. The court declined to address the surface property owner's takings claim because it was raised in a perfunctory manner. (For more information, contact Jennifer Berman.)