Cases of Note
Courts presume that the General Assembly is aware of court decisions that construe state statutes or the constitution. The Office of Legislative Legal Services will update this page on an ongoing basis and email legislators quarterly to notify the General Assembly of such court decisions. Cases that may be of particular interest because they meet certain criteria have been summarized and are listed below in chronological order of decision date. Summaries for cases older than a year are available in the Cases of Note Archive.
League of Women Voters v. Brd. of Comm'rs, Colorado Supreme Court No. 23SC394 (February 24, 2025)
Holding: The Supreme Court held that the county‐commissioner redistricting statutes, §§ 30-10-306 to 306.4, C.R.S., (1) imply a private right of action; (2) confer standing on individual county voters and voter‐focused organizations to enforce those statutes; and (3) apply as mandatory duties to home rule counties. Accordingly, Weld County’s Board of County Commissioners must complete its commissioner‐district redistricting process in accordance with the county‐commissioner redistricting statutes in time for the 2026 election.
Case Summary: In March 2023, Weld County’s Board of County Commissioners (Board) approved a new county commissioner redistricting map without complying with the procedures set forth in sections §§ 30-10-306 to 306.4, C.R.S., (redistricting statutes) asserting that, as a home rule county, Weld County was exempt from the redistricting statutes. Two registered voters and two nonprofit organizations sued the Board, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Board to comply with the redistricting statutes. The district court granted summary judgment and, upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review.
On appeal, the Court first determined that although the redistricting statutes do not expressly create a private enforcement mechanism, the legislative history and statutory design of the redistricting statutes demonstrate an implicit right of action for the class the statutes were meant to protect—county voters—and that an implied civil remedy is consistent with the redistricting statutes’ purposes. Next, it held that the plaintiffs' deprivation of the procedural safeguards mandated by the redistricting statutes constituted an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest under established standing doctrine. Lastly, the Court rejected the Board's home rule exemption argument. The Court held that, while home rule charters govern a county's internal "structure," they do not displace statutorily required county "functions"—and redistricting duties are required county functions. The Court reversed only the portion of the district court's order permitting the continued use of the 2015 redistricting map, and remanded with instructions to require the Board to adopt a redistricting map that complies with the redistricting statutes for the 2026 county commissioner election.
People v. Mena, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA0563 (February 6, 2025)
Holding: Defendant was convicted of both unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child under § 18-3-404 (1.5) and sexual assault on a child under § 18-3-405 (1) for the identical conduct, but the potential penalty for unlawful sexual contact by coercion provides for a harsher penalty, namely requiring a mandatory prison sentence. Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, the conviction for unlawful contact by coercion must be vacated and the defendant sentenced for sexual assault on a child.
Case Summary: The defendant was found guilty of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child and of sexual assault on a child (SAOC). The defendant was charged and convicted under § 18-3-404 (1.5) of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child by the means set forth in § 18-3-402 (1)(d) because, at the time of the commission of the act, the victim was younger than fifteen years old and the defendant was more than four years older than the victim and was not the victim's spouse. Unlawful sexual contact is a class 4 felony that carries a mandatory prison sentence. The defendant was also charged and convicted of SAOC under § 18-3-405 because the defendant knowingly subjected another not his spouse to sexual contact and the victim was less than fifteen years of age and the defendant was at least four years older than the victim. SAOC is a class 4 felony but does not require a mandatory sentence of imprisonment.
Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, a defendant's rights are violated when two criminal statutes proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes that conduct more harshly. The court recognized that, as the defendant was charged in this case, SAOC and unlawful sexual contact both have the same age and relationship requirements. The only difference between the two is that SAOC requires sexual contact, while unlawful sexual contact can be accomplished either with unlawful sexual contact or upon the child exposing her intimate parts. Thus, the court found that, as applied to the defendant in this case, unlawful sexual contact prohibits either the exact same conduct or less egregious conduct as SAOC, but it carries a mandatory prison sentence, while the crime with the more egregious result, SAOC, does not. The court held that the disparate punishments for the defendant in this case for unlawful sexual contact and SAOC were a violation of the defendant's rights under Colorado's equal protection doctrine. (For more information, contact Conrad Imel.)
No on EE v. Beall, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA2245 (August 1, 2024)
Holding: The requirement in section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., that an issue committee disclose the identity of the registered agent of the entity paying for the communication on certain election-related communications distributed to the voting public is unconstitutional and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Case Summary: An issue committee, No on EE, was fined for failing to disclose certain information on election-related communications in violation of section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. As relevant to the case, section 1-45-108.3 requires an issue committee to disclose, on any covered communication supporting or opposing a ballot issue or ballot question that is distributed to the voting public, the name of the person paying for the communication and the name of the natural person who is the registered agent of the entity paying for the communication, if that entity is not a natural person. No on EE appealed from the order affirming the fine against it for failing to disclose the registered agent on multiple communications during the 2020 election cycle. No on EE argued that the registered agent disclosure requirement was facially unconstitutional and violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. A disclosure requirement on election-related communications withstands a First Amendment challenge only if it survives "exacting scrutiny" and is narrowly tailored to the government's asserted interest in requiring the disclosure, which must be sufficiently important. The Court of Appeals determined that the registered agent disclosure requirement was not sufficiently related to a sufficiently important governmental interest, including the asserted interest of providing information to the voting public about the issue committee's sources of funding or its "legal face". A division of the Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the registered agent disclosure requirement in section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., did not withstand the exacting scrutiny of a First Amendment challenge and was unconstitutional on its face. (For more information, contact Rebecca Bayetti.)
Castro v. People, Colorado Supreme Court No. 22SC712 (July 1, 2024)
Holding: The court holds that an alternate juror may be substituted mid-deliberation.
Case Summary: During jury deliberations, a juror suffered a heart attack. An alternate juror was added, and the new jury convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed, alleging that the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations had begun required a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that substitution of a regular juror with an alternate juror during deliberations raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but that here the presumption was overcome. The Court noted, as it had previously, that the General Assembly should look at clarifying the statutes. (For more information, contact Jessica Chapman.)
Nat'l Ass'n of Indus. Bankers v. Weiser, United States District Court No. 1:24-CV-00812-DDD-KAS (June 18, 2024)
Holding: Pending a final determination of the claims on the merits, the federal district court preliminarily enjoined the state attorney general and the uniform consumer credit code administrator from enforcing the interest rates in the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) with respect to any loan made by members of trade associations whose members include (or partner with) state-chartered, FDIC-insured banks that engage in consumer lending, to the extent that:
(a) the applicable interest rate in 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) exceeds the rate that would be permitted in the absence of that subsection, and
(b) the loan is not "made in" Colorado within the meaning of the effective date note to 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.
The state may only apply its UCCC interest rates to loans made by lenders in Colorado, regardless of the location or residence of the borrower.
Case Summary: Trade associations whose members include (or partner with) state-chartered, FDIC-insured banks that engage in consumer lending sought to preliminarily enjoin the state attorney general and the uniform consumer credit code administrator from enforcing the state's lower interest-rate caps with respect to loans made by lenders that are not located in the state.
A federal statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d, caps the interest rates that such banks may charge on loans, and that statute expressly preempts any lower interest-rate caps that may be imposed by state law. A state may, however, opt out of § 1831d's application "with respect to loans made in" that state, and Colorado has done so.
Determination of where a loan is "made" under § 1831d depends on where the lender performs its loan-making functions, not the borrower's location. The consistent use of "make" and "made" throughout the statutory text indicates that the plain and ordinary answer to the question of who "makes" a loan is the bank, not the borrower. It follows, then, that the answer to the question of where a loan is "made" depends on the location of the bank, and where the bank takes certain actions, but not on the location of the borrower who "obtains" or "receives" the loan.
Therefore, the state may only opt out of § 1831d for loans made by lenders in the state. It may not apply its UCCC to loans made to Colorado residents otherwise.
St. Mary Catholic Par. in Littleton v. Roy, United States District Court No. 23-CV-02079-JLK (June 4, 2024)
Holding: Under the free exercise clause of the first amendment, the federal district court permanently enjoined the executive director of the department of early childhood and the director of the universal preschool program, acting in their official capacities, from requiring, as a condition for participation in the universal preschool program, that the preschools agree to provide or provide eligible children an equal opportunity to enroll and receive preschool services regardless of religious affiliation for as long as the directors allow exemptions from the religious affiliation aspect of the equal opportunity requirement and in the universal preschool program service agreement.
Case Summary: Two Catholic parishes that operate preschools, St. Mary Catholic Parish in Littleton and St. Bernadette Catholic Parish in Lakewood, and the parents of a preschool-aged child, Daniel and Lisa Sheley (plaintiffs), brought their claims against Dr. Lisa Roy, the executive director of the Colorado department of early childhood, and Dawn Odean, the director of the Colorado universal preschool program, in their official capacities (defendants). Plaintiffs' claims alleged among other allegations that the equity-related requirements of Colorado's universal preschool program, as the requirements are applied to them, violate their rights guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Section 26.5-4-205(2)(b) requires preschool providers receiving funding through the program to give students with certain characteristics an equal opportunity to enroll and receive services. The department must adopt the equal opportunity requirement as part of its quality standards and must ensure that each preschool provider that participates in the program meets that standard. The equal opportunity requirement does not grant the department the authority or discretion to exempt providers from complying with it.
The question in this case is whether the department, in administering the program, has nevertheless created exceptions to the equal opportunity requirement that warrant granting the plaintiff preschools similar exemptions. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' policies favor other religious denominations because they allow faith-based preschools to prioritize their congregation members. The plaintiff preschools wanted to give admissions preference to the children of all members of the Catholic Church and believed that they were unable to do so under the statute.
The department had allowed faith-based providers to deny children and families equal opportunity based on their religious affiliation, or lack thereof, and cited no compelling interest for permitting that discrimination while denying plaintiffs' request for a related exemption. Thus, the creation and implementation of the congregation exception violated plaintiffs' free exercise rights. The court granted plaintiffs relief in the form of a limited permanent injunction, declaratory judgment, and nominal damages.