



ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

2024

JUNE 2025

Acknowledgments

This report was written by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with contributions from the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at Texas State University.¹

This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce this publication in whole or in part is granted. The accompanying citation is as follows: *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States, 2024*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., and the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at Texas State University, published 2025.



ALERRT

TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY

The FBI and the ALERRT Center support the *Don't Name Them* campaign. This campaign encourages media, law enforcement, and public information officers to shift their focus from the perpetrators of active shooter incidents toward the victims, survivors, and heroes who stopped them, as well as the communities that come together to help in the healing process. To learn more, visit dontnamethem.org.

Front Cover: An FBI seal on the front of the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington, DC (<https://fbijobs.gov/locations>)

¹ This report supplements previous publications containing annual active shooter data since 2000. For previous reports, visit fbi.gov/survive.

Executive Summary

In 2024, the FBI designated 24 active shooter incidents in the United States, a 50% decrease from 2023 (48). There were 106 casualties (23 killed and 83 wounded), a 57% decrease from 2023 (244).

The 24 active shooter incidents in 2024 occurred in 19 states and represent five of the seven location categories.

Additional active shooter incident key findings include:

Incident Data

- The highest number of incidents (four) occurred in Texas, followed by California and North Carolina, each with two incidents.
- June had the highest number of incidents (five); September had the second highest number of incidents (four).
- Incidents occurred every day of the week, with Monday having the highest number of incidents (seven).
- Incidents were more likely to occur between 6 a.m. and 11:59 a.m.
- Incidents occurred in five location categories: 12 occurred in open space (50%), four in commerce (17%), four in education (17%), three in government (13%), and one in house of worship (4%).

Casualty Data

- In the incident with the highest number of casualties (14), four were killed and 10 were wounded.
- In two incidents (4%), there were no casualties.
- Three incidents (13%) met the federal definition for a mass killing incident.

- Of the 24 incidents, six involved law enforcement engagement with an exchange of gunfire, resulting in one law enforcement officer killed and five wounded.

Shooter Data

- Of the 24 incidents, one involved two shooters (4%).
- Of the 25 shooters, 22 were male (88%) and three were female (12%).
- The shooters were between 14 and 73 years old.
- In five incidents (21%), there was an identified connection between the shooter and the location and/or at least one victim. These shooters also met the definition of "insider threat."
- In 24 incidents, 29 firearms were used by shooters—17 handguns (59%), nine rifles (31%), and three shotguns (10%).
- In one incident (4%), the shooter used or attempted to use an improvised explosive device (IED).
- None of the shooters wore body armor.
- Of the 25 shooters, 14 were apprehended by law enforcement (56%), five were killed by law enforcement (20%), and six died by suicide (24%).

2024 Active Shooter Incidents Snapshot








Figure 1

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	i
Executive Summary	ii
2024 Active Shooter Incidents Snapshot	iii
Introduction	1
2024 Incident Statistics	4
2024 Active Shooter Incidents by State/Casualties by State	4
2024 Mass Killings and Six Highest Casualty Counts	6
2024 Active Shooter Incidents by Month, Day of Week, and Time of Day.....	8
2024 Incident Locations and Casualties	10
2024 Open Space Snapshot	12
2024 Commerce Snapshot.....	14
2024 Education Snapshot.....	16
2024 Government Snapshot.....	18
2024 House of Worship Snapshot.....	19
2024 Engagement/Intervention	20
2024 Law Enforcement Exchange of Gunfire Snapshot.....	20
2024 Security Personnel Intervention Snapshot.....	21
2024 Civilian Intervention Snapshot.....	22
2024 Shooter Details	23
2024 Shooter Snapshot.....	23
2024 Behavioral Analysis	27
2024 Active Shooter Incident Summaries	31
Five-Year Overview of Active Shooter Incidents 2020—2024	35
Five-Year Executive Summary	36
2020–2024 Active Shooter Incidents Snapshot	37
2020–2024 Incident Statistics	39
Law Enforcement Engagement, 2020–2024.....	47
Security Personnel Intervention, 2020–2024	48
Civilian Intervention, 2020–2024	48
2000–2024 Incident Statistics	49
Conclusion	50
Glossary	51
Appendix 1 - Definitions of Location Categories	52
Appendix 2 - Behavioral Indicators	53

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2024

Introduction

Active shooter incidents continue to claim lives and devastate individuals, families, and communities across the United States. FBI annual active shooter reports² provide law enforcement, other responders, private industry, and the public with critical data and insights to enhance their understanding of these threats.

The FBI defines an “active shooter” as one or more individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area.³ Implicit in this definition is the shooter’s use of a firearm. The active component of the definition inherently implies the ongoing nature of an incident and thus the potential for a response to affect the outcome.

Scope

The *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States 2024* report is the latest in a series of FBI active shooter reports published since September 2014. The 2024 data cited in this report is valid as of February 9, 2025; however, incident data from previous reports was not updated. The FBI leverages its law enforcement partnerships to gather accurate information.

This report presents active shooter data in organized data sets for clarity and provides readers with an overview of the active shooter threat in the United States.

This report does not identify the reasons responsible for fluctuations in the number of active shooter incidents from one year to another.

Numerous factors can influence whether an active shooter incident occurs, including prevention efforts, preparedness, behavioral threat assessments, and improved communication and engagement among law enforcement, families, and communities.

Methodology

The FBI’s Office of Partner Engagement – Violence Reduction Unit (VRU), through its partnership with the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and the ALERRT Center at Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas, evaluates potential active shooter incidents for inclusion in the annual report.⁴

The FBI identifies incidents that meet the scope of this report using internal FBI holdings and repositories, official law enforcement reports when available, and open source data in the absence of a centralized database of active shooter incidents.

Incidents require the shooter(s) to use (discharge or attempt to discharge) a firearm(s) while killing or attempting to kill people. However, an incident with no casualties may be included—the situation could involve a shooter who misses an intended target; a shooter who experiences a firearm-related malfunction(s); and/or law enforcement, security, or civilian intervention.

² The Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 and Attorney General Order 3365-2013 (02/25/2013) tasked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to research active shooter incidents beginning with the year 2000.

³ See glossary for definitions of “active shooter.”

⁴ The methodology described was first discussed in: Blair, J.Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013*, Texas State University and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2014.

This report does not encompass all firearm-related incidents. A firearm-related incident may be excluded if it involves:

- Self-defense
- Gang violence
- Drug-related violence
- Residential or domestic disputes
- Barricade/hostage situations
- Shootings in relation to another criminal act
- Crossfire as a byproduct of another ongoing criminal act

This methodology was first articulated in *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013* and was applied to the 2024 incidents for consistency.

Process

If an incident qualifies for nomination, the incident is adjudicated among partners. Throughout the year, the research team monitors all incidents to assess whether updated information could include or exclude them from the report. If this occurs, the incident is reevaluated for inclusion.

VRU conducts a data validation and review process to ensure the most recent and accurate information has been collected. The cumulative annual data provides a picture of the active shooter threat within the United States.

A Comparison of 2023–2024 Statistics

		2024	2023
Total Incidents		24	48
Casualties (Excluding Shooters)		106 23 killed 83 wounded	244 105 killed 139 wounded
LE Officers Killed		1	2
LE Officers Wounded		5	12
Met “Mass Killing” Definition		3	15
Incidents Where LE Engaged Shooters		6	12
Shooters		25 shooters 22 male 3 female	49 shooters 48 male 1 female
Shooter Resolutions	Shooters Committed Suicide	6	7
	Shooters Killed by LE	5	12
	Shooters Killed by Citizen	0	0
	Shooters Apprehended by LE	14	30
Shooters Wore Body Armor		0	5
Shooters Used/Attempted to Use IED(s)		1 shooter 1 IED	0

All metrics in 2024 decreased from 2023.

Figure 2

For a full comparison of incidents from 2020 to 2024, see page 38.

2024 Incident Statistics

2024 Active Shooter Incidents by State/Casualties by State




Figure 3

Summary

In 2024, 24 incidents occurred in 19 states.

- Four incidents occurred in **Texas**.
- Two incidents each occurred in **California** and **North Carolina**.
- One incident each occurred in **Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming**.

The 24 incidents in 2024 were broken down into categories based on population:⁵

- Six occurred in locations with a population of less than 10,000.
- Eight occurred in locations with a population between 10,000 and 250,000.
- Four occurred in locations with a population between 250,000 and 500,000.

- Six occurred in locations with a population greater than 500,000.




Figure 4

⁵ Less than 10,000: incidents 3, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 20; 10,000–250,000: incidents 5, 7, 8, 9, 17, 19, 22, and 23; 250,000–500,000: incidents 4, 11, 21, and 24; greater than 500,000: incidents 1, 2, 6, 13, 16, and 18.

2024 Active Shooter Incidents and Casualties by State




Figure 5

Summary

In 2024, Texas had the most incidents (4). Arkansas had the most casualties (14), which were the result of a single incident.⁶

Oklahoma and Tennessee each had one incident, but neither had casualties.

State	Incidents	Casualties
Texas	4	11
California	2	4
North Carolina	2	6
Alaska	1	1
Arkansas	1	14
Colorado	1	3
Florida	1	2
Georgia	1	13
Illinois	1	4
Indiana	1	3

State	Incidents	Casualties
Iowa	1	8
Kentucky	1	8
Michigan	1	9
Oklahoma	1	0
Pennsylvania	1	5
Tennessee	1	0
Washington	1	6
Wisconsin	1	8
Wyoming	1	1

⁶ Incident 10

2024 Mass Killings and Six Highest Casualty Counts




Figure 6

Summary

Three of the 24 incidents (13%) were mass killings.⁷ Mass killings decreased by 80% in 2024 (3) from 2023 (15).

Incident locations with the six highest casualty counts (accounting for 60 casualties [56%] in 2024):

- The Mad Butcher #406, Fordyce, Arkansas: four killed and 10 wounded (**14 total**)

- Apalachee High School, Winder, Georgia: four killed and nine wounded (**13 total**)
- Brooklands Plaza Splash Pad, Rochester Hills, Michigan: nine wounded (**9 total**)
- Perry High School, Perry, Iowa: two killed and six wounded (**8 total**)

- Abundant Life Christian School, Madison, Wisconsin: two killed and six wounded (**8 total**)
- Interstate 75, Exit 49, London, Kentucky: eight wounded (**8 total**)

⁷ Incidents 10, 17, 19; for definition of mass killing, see page 51.

2024 Active Shooter Incidents by Month, Day of Week, and Time of Day




Figure 7

Summary

In 2024, June had the highest number of incidents (five); there were no incidents during the months of March and October. September had the greatest monthly increase in incidents when compared to 2023 (from two to four). April had the greatest monthly decrease in incidents when compared to 2023 (from seven to one).

Number of incidents by month:

- January: 1
- February: 1
- March: 0
- April: 1
- May: 3
- June: 5
- July: 3
- August: 2
- September: 4
- October: 0
- November: 1
- December: 3




Figure 8

Summary

In 2024, Monday had the highest number of incidents (seven); Sunday and Tuesday had the lowest number of incidents (one). Thursday was the only day with an increase in incidents when compared to 2023 (from five to six). Saturday had the greatest decrease of incidents when compared to 2023 (from nine to two).

Number of incidents by day of the week:

- Sunday: 1
- Monday: 7
- Tuesday: 1
- Wednesday: 5
- Thursday: 6
- Friday: 2
- Saturday: 2

2024 Active Shooter Incidents by Time of Day




Figure 9

Summary

In 2024, the 6 a.m. to 11:59 a.m. time period had the most incidents (nine). The 12-hour period from 6 a.m. to 5:59 p.m. had the most incidents (15), accounting for 62% of the total incidents.

Number of incidents by local time:

- 12 a.m. to 5:59 a.m.: 3
- 6 a.m. to 11:59 a.m.: 9
- 12 p.m. to 5:59 p.m.: 6
- 6 p.m. to 11:59 p.m.: 6

2024 Incident Locations and Casualties




Figure 10

Summary

In *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013*, the FBI identified seven location categories for active shooter incidents.⁸ The FBI further breaks down individual categories, such as **commerce** (open or closed to pedestrians, or malls), **government** (military or other government properties), and **education** (pre-K through 12th grade or institution of higher learning [IHL]).

In 2024, the 24 incidents occurred in five location categories, including **open space, commerce, education, government, and house of worship.**

Three incidents (13%) were mass killings, with one each occurring in **commerce, government, and education.**

Number of incidents by location category:

- Open space: 12
- Commerce: 4
- Education: 4
- Government: 3
- House of Worship: 1
- Health Care: 0
- Residence: 0

⁸ See page 52 for location category definitions and breakdown.




Figure 11

Summary

In 2024, the **open space** location category had 12 incidents (50%), resulting in 45 casualties (42%). The **commerce** location category had four incidents (17%), resulting in 23 casualties (22%). The **education** location category had four incidents (17%), resulting in 31 casualties (29%).

The **education** location category had the highest average number of casualties per incident (eight). The **government** and **house of worship** location categories had the lowest average number of casualties (two).

2024 Casualties by Location Category	Open Space	Commerce	Education	Government	House of Worship
Killed (23)	3	8	8	4	0
Wounded (83)	42	15	23	1	2
Total Casualties (106)	45	23	31	5	2
Number of Incidents (24)	12	4	4	3	1
Average Casualties per Incident	4	6	8	2	2



2024 Open Space Snapshot

Incidents

12

Casualties

45

Shooters


13

Mass Killings


0

Open Space: Casualties

■ Civilian ■ LE



Open Space: Detailed Location Breakdown^{9,10}



Open Space: Single vs. Multiple Locations



Figure 12

9 Roadway: incidents 3, 4, 18, and 20; Neighborhood: incidents 9, 11, and 16; Commercial Area: incidents 7, 13, and 21; Park: incident 8; Rural: incident 14.

10 Percentages may not equal 100 due to rounding.




Figure 13

Summary

In 2024, the 12 incidents in the **open space** location category occurred every day of the week, except for Sunday and Friday; Monday had the most incidents (five).

- Of the 13 shooters, nine shooters were apprehended (69%) by law enforcement (three at the scene¹¹ and six at another location), two shooters were killed (15%) (one at the scene and one at another location), and two died by suicide (15%) at another location before law enforcement arrived.
- Fifteen firearms (nine handguns, five rifles, and one shotgun) were used in the incidents.
- In two incidents, the shooter used multiple weapons (in one incident, two handguns were used; in the other incident, two handguns and a shotgun were used).
- The age category 35-44 had the most shooters (five).
- In three incidents, the shooter exchanged gunfire with law enforcement.
- Five incidents took place in multiple locations.

11 In incident 9, the shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene the next day.



2024 Commerce Snapshot

Incidents

4

Casualties

23

Shooters

4

Mass Killings¹²

1
25%

Commerce: Casualties

■ Civilian
■ LE

Total Casualties
(23 total)

21 — 2

Wounded
(15 total)

13 — 2

Killed
(8 total)

8

Commerce: Single vs. Multiple Locations

3




Single Location

1



Multiple Locations

Commerce: Location Breakdown




Commerce: Detailed Location Breakdown¹³

3



Small Business

1



Large Business

Figure 14

¹² Incident 10

¹³ Small Business: incidents 5, 10, and 23; Large Business: incident 6 (occurred inside and outside two warehouses).




Figure 15

Summary

In 2024, the **commerce** location category had four incidents (17%).

- In 2024, incidents in the **commerce** location category occurred in businesses open to the public and businesses closed to the public (two each).
- Three occurred at small businesses, and one occurred at a large business/warehouse district.
- Two incidents occurred on Fridays. One incident occurred each on Wednesday and Thursday.
- Of the four shooters, three were apprehended (75%) by law enforcement (one at the scene and two at another location) and one died by suicide (25%) at the scene before law enforcement arrived.
- Five firearms (four handguns and one shotgun) were used in four incidents. In one incident, the shooter used multiple weapons (one handgun and one shotgun).
- In one incident, the shooter exchanged gunfire with multiple law enforcement officers.
- The age categories 18 and younger, 35-44, 55-64, and 65-74 each had one shooter. **Commerce** had the oldest shooter (73 years old).
- One incident took place in multiple locations. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement the following day.



2024 Education Snapshot

Incidents¹⁴

4

Casualties

31

Shooters

4

Mass Killings¹⁵

1

25%

Education: Casualties

Civilian

Total Casualties
(31 total)

31

Wounded
(23 total)

23

Killed
(8 total)

8


Education: Location Breakdown

2



Pre-K - 12th
Grade

2



High School

Education: Average Incident Duration and Response Time

Average LE
Response
Time

1 minute
48 seconds

Average
Incident
Duration

3 minutes
18 seconds

Education: Shooter by Age Category

3



≤ 18*

1



55-64

*Education had the youngest shooter (age 14) for 2024.

Figure 16

14 Incidents 1, 19, 22, and 24

15 Incident 19




Figure 17

Summary

In 2024, the **education** location category had four incidents (17%).

- Two incidents occurred at private schools in the Pre-K through 12th grade education category (one at a K through eighth grade and one at a K through 12th grade).
- Two incidents occurred at public schools in the Pre-K through 12th grade education location category (both at high schools).
- A total of five firearms (three handguns, one rifle, and one shotgun) were used.
- In three incidents, the shooter used a single firearm. In two incidents, a single handgun was used; in one incident, a single rifle was used.
- In one incident, the shooter used multiple weapons (a single handgun and single shotgun).

- Of the four shooters, three died by suicide at the scene before law enforcement arrived (75%), and one was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene (25%).
- Three shooters were in the age category 18 and younger (14, 15, and 17 years old). Education had the youngest shooter (14 years old). One shooter was in the age category 55-54 (56 years old).
- Three shooters were identified as insider threats (current students).
- The education category had an average police response time of 1 minute 48 seconds¹⁶ and an average incident duration of 3 minutes 18 seconds.¹⁷

16 Police response time accounts for the time from dispatch to first responding officer.

17 Incident duration includes the amount of time lapsed from the first shot fired to the resolution of the shooter.



2024 Government Snapshot

Incidents

3

Casualties

5

Shooters

3

Mass Killings¹⁸

1

33%




Figure 18

Summary

In 2024, the **government** location category had three incidents (13%).¹⁹

- One incident occurred at a national park.
- One incident occurred at a sheriff’s office.
- One incident occurred on a government-owned public transit train.
- Two shooters were in the 25–34 age category (28 and 30 years old); one shooter was in the 45–54 age category (49 years old).
- The shooters' average age was 36 years old.
- Each shooter used a single firearm in each incident (one handgun, two rifles).
- One shooter was identified as an insider threat (employee).
- Two shooters were killed by law enforcement at the scene.
- One shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

¹⁸ Incident 17

¹⁹ Incidents 12, 15, and 17



2024 House of Worship Snapshot

Incidents

1

Casualties

2

Shooters

1

Mass Killings

0

Summary

In 2024, the **house of worship** location category had one incident (4%).²⁰

- The shooter was a 36 year old female.
- The shooter used a rifle.
- The shooter was killed by two security guards (off-duty law enforcement) at the scene.
- In 2024, this was the only incident to occur on a Sunday.

²⁰ Incident 2

2024 Engagement/Intervention

2024 Law Enforcement Exchange of Gunfire Snapshot




Figure 19

Summary

In 2024, six incidents (25%) involved law enforcement engagement with an exchange of gunfire. In three incidents, five law enforcement officers were wounded during multiple officer engagement with an exchange of gunfire. One law enforcement officer was killed prior to exchange of gunfire.

- Four shooters were killed (three at the scene and one at another location).
- Two shooters were apprehended at the scene.
- Five engagements were with multiple law enforcement officers; three shooters were killed (two at the scene, and one at another

location), and two shooters were apprehended at the scene.

- One engagement was with a lone law enforcement officer; the shooter was killed at the scene.

In 2024, 18 incidents (75%) did not have an exchange of gunfire; there were no law enforcement casualties.

- Twelve shooters were apprehended (three at the scene and nine at another location).
- Six shooters died by suicide (four at the scene before law enforcement arrived and two at another location after law enforcement arrived).
- One shooter was killed at the scene.

²¹ Incidents 2, 4, 10, 12, 14, and 16

²² Incidents 10, 12, and 16

²³ Incident 10

2024 Security Personnel Intervention Snapshot

Incidents

1

Security Casualties

0

Shooters

1

Mass Killings

0

Summary

In 2024, one incident involved security personnel intervention.²⁴

- The incident occurred in the **commerce** location category (inside and outside a warehouse, closed to the public).
- The shooter used a single handgun in the incident.
- The shooter was confronted by a security guard but evaded capture and was apprehended by law enforcement at another location the following day.

²⁴ Incident 6

2024 Civilian Intervention Snapshot



Summary

In 2024, one incident involved civilian intervention, which resulted in his death.²⁵

The incident occurred in the Pre-K through 12th grade **education** location category.

- The civilian who intervened was wounded and died 10 days later.
- In the incident, the shooter used a handgun and a shotgun.
- The shooter attempted to use an improved explosive device (IED).
- The shooter died by suicide prior to law enforcement arrival.

²⁵ Incident 1

2024 Shooter Details

2024 Shooter Snapshot





Figure 20

Summary

In 2024, the youngest shooter was 14 years old; the oldest shooter was 73 years old.²⁶ The 35-44 age category had the most shooters (seven). The average age of shooters dropped from 34 years old in 2023 to 33 years old in 2024. Only four shooters were over the age of 44 years old.

Number of shooters by age group:

- 18 and younger: 6
- 19-24: 3
- 25-34: 5
- 35-44: 7
- 45-54: 1
- 55-64: 2
- 65-74: 1

²⁶ Incidents 19 and 23, respectively




Figure 21

Summary

Of the 25 shooters, five shooters (20%) had a known connection to the location and/or at least one victim. These shooters were also identified as insider threats. Shooters' known connections included:

- Current employee²⁷
- Current student²⁸




Figure 22

Summary

Of the 24 incidents, six incidents (25%) occurred in multiple locations.²⁹

Of the six incidents in multiple locations:

- Five took place in the **open space** location category.³⁰ One took place in the **commerce** location category (closed to pedestrian traffic).³¹

27 Incidents 5 and 12

28 Incidents 1, 19, and 24

29 Incidents 3, 6, 11, 13, 16, and 18

30 Incidents 3, 11, 13, 16, and 18

31 Incident 6






Figure 23

Summary

In 24 incidents, 29 firearms were used by shooters.

- Handguns: 17
- Rifles: 9
- Shotguns: 3

In 20 incidents, a single firearm was used:

- A single handgun was used in 11 incidents, resulting in 36 casualties.

- A single rifle was used in nine incidents, resulting in 35 casualties.

In four incidents, multiple firearms were used.^{32,33}

- Two handguns were used in one incident, resulting in nine casualties.
- A handgun and a shotgun were used in two incidents, resulting in 22 casualties.
- Two handguns and a shotgun were used in one incident, resulting in four casualties.

³² Incidents 1, 8, 10, and 16

³³ This is a statistical representation of the types of firearms used to cause casualties, rather than an analysis of which specific weapon caused each type of casualty.

2024 Detailed Active Shooter Resolutions




Figure 24

Summary

Of the 25 shooters³⁴, 14 were apprehended (56%), five were killed (20%), and six died by suicide (24%).

- Nine shooters (36%) were apprehended by law enforcement at another location.
- Five shooters (20%) were apprehended by law enforcement at the scene.
- Four shooters (16%) were killed by law enforcement at the scene.
- One shooter (4%) was killed by law enforcement at another location.
- Four shooters (16%) died by suicide at the scene.
- Two shooters died (8%) by suicide at another location.

³⁴ In incident 13, there were two shooters.

2024 Behavioral Analysis

The Behavioral Analysis Unit-1 (BAU-1) is one of four operational BAU units in the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group and is responsible for providing operational support to terrorism and targeted violence investigations, primarily in a proactive and preventative capacity. BAU-1's mission is to identify, assess, and manage the risk of potential future plans of violence. In furtherance of this mission, BAU-1 provides behaviorally-based investigative and operational support to complex and time-sensitive crimes and other matters of significance involving acts or threats of violence, including terrorism, threats, arson, bombings, stalking, and anticipated or active crisis situations. Within BAU-1, the Behavioral Threat Assessment Center uses threat assessment and threat management (TATM) principles to prevent terrorism and mass casualty targeted violence by assessing the threat posed by a person of concern and providing investigators with management suggestions to mitigate that threat.

Types of Violence

In pursuit of their prevention mission, the FBI's BAU-1 differentiates types of targeted violence, separating acts that require planning and preparation from those that occur in a more spontaneous or impromptu manner due to circumstances of the moment. Acts of targeted violence that are intentional in nature—in which the perpetrator considers, plans, and prepares for the act of violence—are preceded by observable warning sign behaviors that, if recognized and reported, can provide opportunities for disruption. These acts are considered examples of predatory behavior. Acts of targeted violence that arise from emotional responses spontaneously or impulsively do not provide the same breadth of observable warning sign behaviors or time for intervention. Prevention of future attacks can occur through awareness of the warning sign behaviors and communication to local authorities posed to intervene.³⁵ For information regarding what behaviors to be aware of and who to contact, please see www.fbi.gov/prevent.

Mental Health and Impaired Judgment

Assessing the driving force behind an individual's decision to conduct an act of violence is more complex and dynamic than simply determining whether someone was diagnosed with a mental health disorder. Based on BAU-1's research on targeted violence and terrorism, offenders who have committed acts of targeted violence, whether ideologically motivated or not, had a diagnosable mental illness only 25% of the time, which roughly mirrors the prevalence in the general population. BAU-1's research has not identified a causative connection between mental illness and targeted violence or terrorism. Although not causative, mental illness can be a risk factor based on vulnerabilities that may be present, which can be linked to problematic behaviors or impaired judgment. Examples of mental illness may include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depressive disorder. Other psychological disorders such as personality disorders, substance use/abuse, and adjustment disorders due to environmental stressors can also affect mental wellness and a person's resiliency. Substance use/abuse—whether of illicit, prescription, or legal substances—occurs with less frequency in cases of intentional acts of targeted violence than in cases of reactive/emotional violence. However, substance use/abuse can result in impaired judgment through increased fight or flight responses, grandiosity, paranoia, and altered thought processes.

The following data reflects a preliminary categorization of incidents based on information available prior to the publication of this report and does not purport to be a complete analysis of individual shooters' behaviors leading up to the attack. These categorizations are based on reported behaviors indicating the shooter likely planned and prepared for the attack. The categorization of incidents could alter based on additional information.

³⁵ See Appendix 2 for a list of warning signs and predatory behaviors.

2024 Shooters with Predatory Behavior Snapshot









Figure 25

³⁶ Incidents 1, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 24. Shooters in incidents 1, 5, 12, 19, and 24 were identified as insider threats.





Figure 26

Summary

In 2024, shooters exhibited predatory behaviors in 14 of the 24 incidents (58%), resulting in 77% of the casualties.

- In 14 incidents, 19 firearms were used (11 handguns, five rifles, and three shotguns).
- In four incidents, multiple firearms were used.
- In four incidents, the shooter exchanged gunfire with law enforcement.
- In five incidents, the shooter was considered an insider threat.
- Both the **open space** and **education** location categories had four incidents each.
- Both the **commerce** and **government** location categories had three incidents each.
- The 25-34 age category had the most shooters (four).
- The shooters' average age was 39 years old.
- Six shooters died by suicide (four at the scene before law enforcement arrived and two at another location after law enforcement arrived).
- Five shooters were apprehended (three at the scene and two at another location).
- Three shooters were killed by law enforcement (two at the scene and one at another location).

2024 Shooters Lacking Predatory Behavior Snapshot




Figure 27

Summary

In 2024, 11 shooters (42%) did not exhibit predatory behaviors, resulting in 23% of the casualties.

- In 10 incidents, the shooter used a single firearm (six handguns and four rifles).
- In two incidents, the shooter exchanged gunfire with law enforcement.
- Eight incidents occurred in the **open space** location category.

- Both the **house of worship** and **commerce** location categories had one incident each.
- Nine shooters were apprehended (three at the scene and six at another location).
- Two shooters were killed by law enforcement at the scene.

³⁷ Incidents 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 18, and 21

2024 Active Shooter Incident Summaries



Open Space
12



Commerce
4



Education
4



Government
3



House of
Worship
1



Health Care
0



Residence
0

The FBI identified 24 active shooter incidents in 2024. Incident summaries are listed in local times.

** Incidents designated as mass killings*

1. Perry High School, Perry, Iowa (Education)



On Thursday, January 4, 2024, at approximately 7:35 a.m., an identified male shooter, 17, armed with a shotgun and a handgun, began shooting people inside Perry High School in Perry, Iowa. Two people (one faculty member and one student) were killed; six people (two faculty members and four students) were wounded. The shooter died by suicide at the scene before law enforcement arrived.

2. Lakewood Church, Houston, Texas (House of Worship)



On Sunday, February 11, 2024, at approximately 1:55 p.m., an identified female shooter, 36, armed with a rifle, began shooting people in Lakewood Church in Houston, Texas.

Two people were wounded. The shooter was killed by two security guards (off-duty law enforcement) during an exchange of gunfire at the scene.

3. Multiple Locations Interstate 10, Bonifay, Florida (Open Space)



On Monday, April 8, 2024, at approximately 11:15 a.m., an identified female shooter, 22, armed with a handgun, began shooting people in moving vehicles on Interstate 10 between mile markers 107 and 112 in Bonifay, Florida. Two people were wounded. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

4. 100 Block North Gilcrease Museum Road, Tulsa, Oklahoma (Open Space)



On Wednesday, May 15, 2024, at approximately 3:30 p.m., an identified male shooter, 21, armed with a handgun, began shooting at occupied vehicles in the 100 block of North Gilcrease Museum Road, Tulsa, Oklahoma. There were no casualties reported. The shooter was killed by law enforcement at the scene during an exchange of gunfire.

5. Delaware County Linen Inc., Chester, Pennsylvania (Commerce)



On Wednesday, May 22, 2024, at approximately 8:28 a.m., an identified male shooter, 61, armed with a handgun, began shooting people at Delaware County Linen Inc., in Chester, Pennsylvania. Two people (employees) were killed; three people (employees) were wounded. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

6. Refresco Beverages and Oncor Electric, Fort Worth, Texas (Commerce)



On Thursday, May 30, 2024, at approximately 2:30 a.m., an identified male shooter, 18, armed with a handgun, began shooting people outside Refresco Beverages and inside Oncor Electric in Fort Worth, Texas. One person (employee) was killed. The shooter was confronted by a security guard but evaded capture and was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene the following day.

7. 400 Block of South State Street, San Jacinto, California (Open Space)



On Monday, June 3, 2024, at approximately 7:05 a.m., an identified male shooter, 39, armed with a handgun, began shooting people in moving vehicles along the 400 block of South State Street, San Jacinto, California. One person was killed; one person was wounded. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene.

8. Brooklands Plaza Splash Pad, Rochester Hills, Michigan (Open Space)



On Saturday, June 15, 2024, at approximately 5:11 p.m., an identified shooter, 42, armed with two handguns, began shooting people at the Brooklands Plaza Splash Pad in Rochester Hills, Michigan. Nine people were wounded. The shooter died by suicide at another location.

9. Coulter Street and 37th Avenue, Amarillo, Texas (Open Space)



On Monday, June 17, 2024, at approximately 10:50 p.m., an identified male shooter, 35, armed with a rifle, began shooting at people in moving vehicles near 37th Avenue, Coulter Street, and Sleepy Hollow Boulevard in Amarillo, Texas. Four people were wounded (three sustained incidental injuries from glass). The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene the next day.

10. The Mad Butcher #406, Fordyce, Arkansas (Commerce)*



On Friday, June 21, 2024, at approximately 11:38 a.m., an identified male shooter, 44, armed with a shotgun and a handgun, began shooting at people inside and outside The Mad Butcher supermarket in Fordyce, Arkansas. Four people were killed; 10 people were wounded (eight civilians and two law enforcement officers). The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene following an exchange of gunfire.

11. Cherry Creek Racquet Club and Pheasant Run Communities, Aurora, Colorado (Open Space)



On Thursday, June 27, 2024, at approximately 9:20 p.m., an identified male shooter, 34, armed with a rifle, began shooting people in the Cherry Creek Racquet Club and Pheasant Run communities in Aurora, Colorado. Three people were wounded. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

12. Canyon Lodge/Yellowstone National Park, Mammoth Hot Springs, Wyoming (Government)



On Thursday, July 4, 2024, at approximately 8:00 a.m., an identified male shooter, 28, armed with a rifle, began shooting outside the Canyon Lodge and Resort in Yellowstone National Park, Mammoth Hot Springs, Wyoming. One person was wounded (a law enforcement ranger). The shooter was killed by law enforcement rangers at the scene during an exchange of gunfire.

13. Multiple Locations, Charlotte, North Carolina (Open Space)



On Tuesday, July 9, 2024, between 1:05 a.m. and 1:30 a.m., two identified male shooters, 16 and 18, armed with a single handgun, began shooting people at various locations in Charlotte, North Carolina. One person was killed; two people were wounded. The shooters were apprehended by law enforcement at another location two days later.

14. 100 Block of Murphytown Road, Green Mountain, North Carolina (Open Space)



On Wednesday, July 24, 2024, at approximately 1:51 p.m., an identified male shooter, 36, armed with a rifle, began shooting at utility workers in the 100 block of Murphytown Road, Green Mountain, North Carolina. Three people were wounded. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene following an exchange of gunfire.

15. Monroe County Justice Center, Madisonville, Tennessee (Government)



On Friday, August 2, 2024, at approximately 8:30 a.m., an identified male shooter, 49, armed with a rifle, began shooting at people inside and outside the Monroe County Justice Center in Madisonville, Tennessee. There were no casualties reported. The shooter was killed by law enforcement at the scene.

16. For Oak Cliff, Dallas, Texas (Open Space)



On Thursday, August 29, 2024, at approximately 10:04 p.m., an identified male shooter, 30, armed with two handguns and a shotgun, began shooting people outside Oak Cliff Community Center in Dallas, Texas. One person was killed (law enforcement); three people were wounded (two law enforcement and one civilian). The shooter was killed by law enforcement at another location following a vehicle pursuit.

17. Chicago Transportation Authority (CTA), Blue Line Train, Forest Park, Illinois (Government)*



On Monday, September 2, 2024, at approximately 5:27 a.m., an identified male shooter, 30, armed with a handgun, began shooting people inside a CTA Blue Line train near the 711 Desplaines Avenue Station in Forest Park, Illinois. Four people were killed. The shooter was apprehended at another location by law enforcement.

18. Interstate 5, Seattle, Washington (Open Space)



On Monday, September 2, 2024, starting at approximately 8:30 p.m., an identified male shooter, 44, armed with a handgun, began shooting people in vehicles on Interstate 5 in Seattle, Washington. Six people were wounded (one with incidental injuries). The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

19. Apalachee High School, Winder, Georgia (Education)*



On Wednesday, September 4, 2024, at approximately 10:20 a.m., an identified male shooter, 14, armed with a rifle, began shooting people inside Apalachee High School in Winder, Georgia. Four people were killed (two students and two teachers); nine people were wounded (eight students and one teacher). The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at the scene.

20. Interstate 75, Exit 49, London, Kentucky (Open Space)



On Saturday, September 7, 2024, at approximately 5:25 p.m., an identified male shooter, 32, armed with a rifle, began shooting people in vehicles on Interstate 75, exit 49 in London, Kentucky. Eight people were wounded (three in vehicle collisions). The shooter died by suicide and was found five days later.

21. University Lake Park, Anchorage, Alaska (Open Space)



On Monday, November 25, 2024, at approximately 10:45 p.m., an identified male shooter, 21, armed with a rifle, began shooting people on a trail near University Lake Park Medical Center in Anchorage, Alaska. One person was wounded. The shooter was apprehended at a different location approximately three weeks later.

22. Feather River Adventist School, Oroville, California (Education)



On Wednesday, December 4, 2024, at approximately 1:08 p.m., an identified male shooter, 56, armed with a handgun, began shooting students outside Feather River Adventist School in Oroville, California. Two people were wounded (students). The shooter died by suicide at the scene before law enforcement arrived.

23. Lafayette Laundry, Lafayette, Indiana (Commerce)



On Thursday, December 5, 2024, at approximately 7:40 p.m., an identified male shooter, 73, armed with a handgun, began shooting people inside Lafayette Laundry in Lafayette, Indiana. One person was killed; two people were wounded. The shooter died by suicide several days after sustaining a self-inflicted gunshot wound on the day of the shooting before law enforcement arrived.

24. Abundant Life Christian School, Madison, Wisconsin (Education)



On Monday, December 16, 2024, at approximately 10:57 a.m., an identified female shooter, 15, armed with a handgun, began shooting individuals inside the Abundant Life Christian School in Madison, Wisconsin. Two people were killed (one student and one staff member); six people were wounded (five students and one teacher). The shooter died by suicide at the scene before law enforcement arrived.



Five-Year Overview of Active Shooter Incidents 2020—2024

Five-Year Executive Summary

From 2020–2024, the FBI designated 223 active shooter incidents in the United States, a 70% increase from the previous five-year period 2015–2019 (131).

There were 227 shooters in the 223 active shooter incidents from 2020–2024, which occurred in 43 states and the District of Columbia, representing all seven location categories.

Additional five-year key findings include:

Incident Data

- California had the most incidents (25), followed by Texas (22) and Florida (13).
- June had the highest number of incidents (35); May had the second highest number of incidents (27); February and October had the least number of incidents (11).
- Saturday had the highest number of incidents (46); Monday had the second highest number of incidents (38); Friday had the least number of incidents (23).
- Incidents occurred in seven location categories: 92 incidents (41%) occurred in **open space**, 88 in **commerce** (39%), 13 in **education** (6%), 11 in **government** (5%), 11 in **residence** (5%), four in **health care** (2%), and four in **house of worship** (2%).

Casualty Data

- There were 1,070 casualties (369 killed and 701 wounded). The average number of casualties was 4.8 per incident.
- Seven law enforcement officers were killed; 54 were wounded.
- In the incident with the highest number of casualties (55), seven were killed and 48 were wounded (Central Avenue, Highland Park, Illinois, 2022).
- In 22 incidents, there were no casualties.

- Forty-eight incidents (22%) were mass killings.
- Fifty-two incidents (23%) involved law enforcement engagement with an exchange of gunfire resulting in six law enforcement officers killed and 41 wounded.

Shooter Data

- Of the 227 shooters, 215 were male (95%), nine were female (4%), and three are unidentified and at large (1%).
- Shooters were as young as 12 years old and as old as 87 years old.
- In the 223 incidents, 283 firearms were used by the shooters—178 handguns, 76 rifles, 15 shotguns, and 14 unidentified firearms.
- In the 223 incidents, 172 involved a single firearm, 46 involved multiple firearms, and five involved unknown firearms.
- In two incidents (1%), the shooter used or attempted to use IEDs.
- Of the 227 shooters, 13 wore body armor (6%).
- Of the 227 shooters, 130 were apprehended by law enforcement (57%), 42 were killed by law enforcement (19%), 40 died by suicide (18%), eight were killed by citizens (4%), and six remain at large (3%). One shooter was killed in a vehicle crash while attempting to escape.

2020–2024 Active Shooter Incidents Snapshot








Figure 28

A Comparison of 2020–2024 Statistics

	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	
Total Incidents	24	48	50	61	40	
Casualties (Excluding Shooters)	106 <i>23 killed 83 wounded</i>	244 <i>105 killed 139 wounded</i>	313 <i>100 killed 213 wounded</i>	243 <i>103 killed 140 wounded</i>	164 <i>38 killed 126 wounded</i>	
LE Officers Killed	1	2	1	2	1	
LE Officers Wounded	5	12	21	5	11	
Met “Mass Killing” Definition	3	15	13	12	5	
Incidents Where LE Engaged Shooters	6	12	9	17	8	
Shooters	25 shooters <i>22 male 3 female</i>	49 shooters <i>48 male 1 female</i>	50 shooters <i>48 male 1 female 1 unknown</i>	61 shooters <i>60 male 1 female</i>	42 shooters <i>37 male 3 female 2 unknown</i>	
Shooter Resolutions*	Shooters Committed Suicide	6	7	9	11	7
	Shooters Killed by LE	5	12	7	14	4
	Shooters Killed by Citizen	0	0	2	4	2
	Shooters Apprehended by LE	14	30	30 <i>2 at large</i>	30 <i>1 at large</i>	26 <i>3 at large</i>
Shooters Wore Body Armor	0	5	4	2	1	
Shooters Used/ Attempted to Use IED(s)	1 shooter <i>1 IED</i>	0	0	1 shooter <i>4 IEDs</i>	0	

* In 2021, one shooter was killed in a vehicle crash and does not fit into any shooter resolution category. Three of the six “at large” shooters remain unidentified.

Figure 29

2020–2024 Incident Statistics




Figure 30

Summary

In 2024, the number of incidents (24) decreased 50% from 2023 (48). The data from 2020-2024 shows a downward trend. The average number of incidents per year from 2020–2024 was 44.6.

Number of incidents within the five-year period, 2020–2024:³⁸

- 2020: **40**
- 2021: **61**
- 2022: **50**
- 2023: **48**
- 2024: **24**

38 For previous reports, [visit fbi.gov/survive](https://www.fbi.gov/survive).




Figure 31

Summary

In 2024, casualties (106) decreased 57% from 2023 (244) and is less than the five-year average for the years 2020–2024 (214). The incident with the highest number of casualties (55) in the five-year period was in 2022 on Central Avenue in Highland Park, Illinois.

In 2024, the number killed (23) decreased 78% from 2023 (105) and is less than the five-year average for the years 2020–2024 (74).

In 2024, the number wounded (83) decreased 40% from 2023 (139) and is less than the five-year average for the years 2020–2024 (140).

Number of killed, wounded, and total casualties for the years 2020–2024:³⁹

Year	Killed	Wounded	Total Casualties
2020	38	126	164
2021	103	140	243
2022	100	213	313
2023	105	139	244
2024	23	83	106

³⁹ The FBI attempts to validate previous incident information when available, which may result in updates to previously published data.




Figure 32

Summary

From 2020–2024, June had the highest number of incidents (35), an average of seven per year. February and October each had the lowest number of incidents (11), an average of 2.2 per year.

Average number of incidents by month:

- January: 2.4
- February: 2.2
- March: 3.2
- April: 4.6
- May: 5.4
- June: 7
- July: 4.2
- August: 4.6
- September: 3
- October: 2.2
- November: 3
- December: 2.8




Figure 33

Summary

From 2020–2024, Saturday had the highest number of incidents (46); Friday had the lowest number of incidents (23).

Average number of incidents by day of week:

- Sunday: 5.2
- Monday: 7.6
- Tuesday: 5
- Wednesday: 6.3
- Thursday: 6.6
- Friday: 4.4
- Saturday: 9.2

From 2020–2024, 128 incidents (57%) occurred between 12 p.m. and 11:59 p.m., and 95 incidents (43%) occurred between 12 a.m. and 11:59 a.m.

Average number of incidents by time of day:

- 12 a.m. to 5:59 a.m.: 8
- 6 a.m. to 11:59 a.m.: 11
- 12 p.m. to 5:59 p.m.: 12.8
- 6 p.m. to 11:59 p.m.: 12.8




Figure 34

Summary

From 2020–2024, 48 incidents (22%) were mass killings. The average number of mass killings was 9.6 per year for the last five years.

Year	Incidents	Mass Killings
2020	40	5
2021	61	12
2022	50	13
2023	48	15
2024	24	3

2020–2024 Active Shooter Incident Casualties by Location Categories




Figure 35

Summary

From 2020–2024, the **commerce** location category had 88 incidents (39%), resulting in 498 casualties (46%). The **open space** location category had 92 incidents (41%), resulting in 335 casualties (31%). The **education** location category had 13 incidents (6%), resulting in 116 casualties (11%). The **education** location category had the highest average of casualties (nine) per incident for the last five years. In 2024, the **education** location category had an average of 7.8 casualties per incident. The **house of worship** location category had the lowest average of casualties (three) per incident for the same period.

Average casualties per incident by location category:

- Commerce: 6
- Open space: 4
- Education: 9
- Residence: 4
- Government: 4
- Health care: 4
- House of worship: 3

2020–2024 Active Shooter Incidents and Location Categories by Year





Figure 36

Summary

From 2020–2024, the 223 incidents occurred in all seven location categories.

Of the 223 incidents, 92 occurred in **open space** (41%), 88 occurred in **commerce** (39%), 13 in **education** (6%), 11 in **government** (5%), 11 in **residence** (5%), four in **health care** (2%), and four in **house of worship** (2%).

- From 2020–2024, **open space** became the location category with the highest number of incidents for the five-year period, whereas

from 2019–2023, **commerce** had the most incidents for the five-year period.

- From 2020–2023 the **open space** location category saw an increase of incidents each year. Although **open space** incidents decreased in 2024, it remained the category with the highest number of incidents.
- Commerce** and **open space** were the only location categories with incidents in all five years.




Figure 37

Summary

Of the 227 shooters from 2020–2024, 130 were apprehended (57%),⁴⁰ 51 were killed (22%), and

40 died by suicide (18%). Six shooters remain at large (3%).

Year	Apprehended	Killed	Suicide	At Large	Total Shooters	Total Incidents
2020	26 (62%)	6 (14%)	7 (17%)	3 (7%)	42	40
2021	30 (49%)	19 (31%)	11 (18%)	1 (2%)	61	61
2022	30 (60%)	9 (18%)	9 (18%)	2 (4%)	50	50
2023	30 (61%)	12 (26%)	7 (15%)	0 (0%)	49	48
2024	14 (56%)	5 (20%)	6 (24%)	0 (0%)	25	24

40 Three shooters previously recorded as "at large" in the 2020 and 2022 reports were since apprehended.

Law Enforcement Engagement, 2020–2024




Figure 38

Summary

From 2020–2024, of the 223 incidents, 52 involved law enforcement engagement (23%).

- In 2021, 17 incidents involved law enforcement engagement (28%), representing the highest number during the five-year period.
- In 2024, six incidents involved law enforcement engagement (25%), representing the lowest number during the five-year period.

From 2020-2024, the average number of law enforcement casualties per incident was 0.9.

- 2022 had the highest average of law enforcement casualties per incident (1.88).
- 2021 had the lowest average of law enforcement casualties per incident (0.24).




Figure 39

Summary

From 2020–2024, law enforcement engaged 52 shooters in 52 incidents. Thirty-two shooters (62%) were killed, 15 shooters (29%) were

apprehended, and five shooters (10%) died by suicide.

Security Personnel Intervention, 2020–2024

Summary

From 2020 and 2024, security personnel intervened in seven incidents. These interventions resulted in four security casualties.

During those seven incidents, three shooters were killed and four were apprehended.

Resolutions	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Apprehended	0	0	1	2	1
Killed	2	1	0	0	0
Incidents	2	1	1	2	1
Security Casualties	0	2	1	1	0

Civilian Intervention, 2020–2024

Summary

From 2020 and 2024, civilians intervened in 20 incidents. These interventions resulted in nine civilian casualties.⁴¹

During those 20 incidents, seven shooters were killed, four shooters died by suicide, and nine shooters were apprehended.

Resolutions	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Apprehended	1	2	5	1	0
Killed	0	4	2	1	0
Suicide	0	0	1	2	1
Incidents	1	6	8	4	1
Civilian Casualties	0	2	1	5	1

41 Additional civilian intervention casualties were identified for an incident in 2023, resulting in an increase from two to five for that year.

2000–2024 Incident Statistics




Figure 40

Summary

From 2000–2024, there were 556 incidents, resulting in 3,921 casualties (1,432 killed, 2,489 wounded).

2017 had the highest average of casualties per incident. There were 31 incidents, resulting in 734 casualties—an average of 23.7 casualties per incident.

- 2017 had the incident with the highest number of casualties (547—58 killed and 489 wounded) at the Route 91 Harvest Festival in Las Vegas, Nevada.

2016 had the second highest average of casualties per incident. There were 20 incidents, resulting in 214 casualties—an average of 10.7 casualties per incident.

- 2016 had the incident with the second highest number of casualties (102—49 killed and 53 wounded) at Pulse Night Club in Orlando, Florida.

From 2000–2024, the average number of casualties was 7.1 per incident (2.6 killed and 4.5 wounded).

Conclusion

Consistent research, collection, and adjudication methods from previous reports is used to identify active shooter trends. These trends reveal risks to the public based on changes in location of attacks, most dangerous day(s) and time(s), and type(s) of firearm(s) used.

The FBI emphasizes the importance of active shooter preparedness training and exercises for law enforcement, first responders, and civilians.

For many years, the FBI has leveraged its expertise and unique resources to assist law enforcement partners. The FBI remains dedicated to helping law enforcement partners nationwide protect the American people. The FBI will continue a victim-centered approach to support partners, victims, and impacted communities.

The Office of Partner Engagement provides active shooter prevention, response, and recovery trainings through its partnership with the ALERRT Center at Texas State University in San Marcos, Texas. For more information, refer to www.alerrt.org.

The FBI remains committed to training and empowering civilians. The FBI encourages safety and security through its options-based Active Shooter Attack Prevention and Preparedness (ASAPP) training.

Civilians should understand the risks associated with an active shooter attack and utilize available resources to prepare for, prevent, and survive such incidents. The FBI endorses the concepts of “Run, Hide, Fight” to empower civilians to take action to survive an active shooter incident. For more information, refer to www.fbi.gov/survive.

Civilians can help prevent future attacks by reporting behaviors of concern to authorities for potential intervention. For more information, refer to www.fbi.gov/prevent.

This document was researched and prepared by the FBI’s Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) with support from the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU); local FBI field offices; and state, county, and local law enforcement partners across the country.

Glossary

Active shooter (FBI definition): one or more individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area

Active shooter (U.S. federal government definition): an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area

Active Shooter Attack Prevention and Preparedness (ASAPP): an options-based training platform that provides civilians with resources to develop plans and responses if faced with an active shooter incident

Civilian intervention: instances where individuals who are not law enforcement nor security personnel intervened or attempted to intervene to end an active shooter incident

Improvised explosive device (IED): a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner, incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals, designed to destroy, incapacitate, injure, harass, or distract

Insider threat: individual(s) with current or prior authorized access and/or understanding of a group, organization, institution, location, and knowledge of the same that can be used

to carry out an attack against its employees, members, or occupants

Law enforcement engagement: instances where law enforcement and the shooter exchanged gunfire

Mass killing: three or more killings in a single incident⁴²

Multiple locations: incidents where the active shooting component occurred at more than one location

Predatory behavior: incidents when a perpetrator considers, plans, and prepares for the act of violence; they are preceded by observable warning sign behaviors that, if recognized and reported, can provide opportunities for disruption

Security intervention: instances where security personnel intervened or attempted to intervene to end an active shooter incident

Security personnel: employee(s) or volunteer(s) who protects a building or property and has no sworn law enforcement authority

Shooter connection: refers to the relationship or link between the shooter and the location, victims, or circumstances of the incident

⁴² The statute does not address the inclusion or exclusion of the shooter. The FBI does not include the shooter in mass killing statistics. Derived from Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, 28 USC § 530C(b)(1)(M)(i).

Appendix 1 - Definitions of Location Categories



Commerce, Businesses Open to the

Public: Private properties with the primary function of making, buying, or selling goods or providing services in exchange for money where the public is anticipated on a daily basis. Examples include restaurants, bars, law firms, theaters, grocery stores, private civic organization spaces, and event venues. This category does not include locations otherwise defined more exclusively in another category, such as malls, health care facilities, or institutions of higher education.



Commerce, Businesses Closed to the

Public: Private properties primarily functioning in commerce without daily public traffic. Examples include office space, manufacturing centers, packaging and distribution facilities and factories, warehouses, assembly plants, and commercial vehicle maintenance, storage, and repair facilities.



Commerce, Malls:

Types of businesses typically consisting of more than one anchor store and many smaller businesses under a single roof, though they may include some open spaces. Strip malls, which typically provide no indoor open spaces and are often arranged in a single row, are included in the business category.



Education, Pre-K–12th Grade:

Public and private properties used for educating students from pre-kindergarten (pre-K) to 12th grade, including extracurricular activities, as well as school administrative functions such as board and staff meetings.



Education, Institutions of Higher

Learning (IHL): Public or private properties used for post-high school studies.



Government, Military Properties:

Public properties owned by the U.S. government and primarily reserved for U.S. military use. Examples include military bases, airfields, seaports, and training ranges.



Government, Other (Non-Military)

Government Properties: Public properties owned by local, state, federal, tribal, or territorial governmental entities. Examples include courthouses, administrative buildings, and town halls. This category does not include locations otherwise defined more exclusively in another category, such as military property or schools.



Health Care Facilities:

Public or private facilities that provide primary or secondary health services. Examples include hospitals, clinics, urgent care, hospice care, and retirement facilities.



Houses of Worship:

Public or private facilities used for religiously sponsored activities at the time of an incident. This includes commercial properties used as houses of worship at the time of the incident. Examples include churches, temples, synagogues, mosques, and related religious gathering and retreat facilities.



Open Spaces:

Public or private properties openly accessible to the public. Incidents are categorized as occurring in open space if they take place primarily in an open-air location rather than beginning or ending inside a building. Examples include incidents where the shooter is inside a moving car and incidents where the shooter acts while walking or running through public streets, open parking lots, or parks.



Residences:

Public or private, single or multi-family places of residence.

Appendix 2 - Behavioral Indicators

Research has found that mass shooters just don't snap. They spend their time thinking about violence and they plan, prepare, and often share indicators before their attacks. This means there are opportunities to identify someone who is on a pathway to violence—and prevent their attack.

Studies have also proven that before most mass attacks, someone observed concerning behaviors that were signs the person was on a path to violence. The people who noticed were often friends, family, schoolmates, coworkers, or loved ones.

You may be in a unique position to observe these signs in someone you know. Educating yourself on what to look for can be the key to preventing an attack of mass violence in your community.

What to Know

No single behavior means someone will commit violence, but research has identified behaviors that may indicate a person is moving towards violence.

The earlier a person's concerning behaviors are noticed, the more options are available to get the person help.

Together with other concerning behaviors, new or inappropriate interest in weapons may increase concern for violence against others.

Common Concerning Behaviors:

- Comments, jokes, or threats about violent plans
- Repeated or detailed fantasies about violence
- Comments about hurting themselves or others
- Creating a document, video, suicide note, or other item to explain or claim credit for future violence
- Seeing violence as a way to solve their problems
- Unusual difficulty coping with stress

- Reduced interest in hobbies and other activities
- Worsening performance at school or work
- Increasing isolation from family, friends, or others
- Angry outbursts or physical aggression
- Increasingly troublesome interactions with others
- Obsessive interest in prior attackers or attacks
- Bizarre or unexpected change in appearance, including dress or hygiene
- Asking questions about or testing security at a possible target
- Changing vocabulary, style of speech, or how they act in a way that reflects a hardened point of view or new sense of purpose associated with violent extremist causes, particularly after a catalyzing event

What to Do

Talk to Someone You Trust

If you are worried that someone you know may be displaying concerning behaviors, the most important thing you can do is tell someone.

Be the key to preventing violence by talking to someone you trust. This could be a school administrator, employee assistance peer, coach, religious leader, or someone else you respect.

Contact Law Enforcement

If you believe someone is planning or preparing for violence, think about contacting police, visiting your nearest FBI field office, or reporting it at tips.fbi.gov.

Law enforcement can work with other professionals to provide needed resources to individuals in or approaching crisis.



For more information about the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Active Shooter Resources, visit our website:

fbi.gov/survive



ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES **2024**

**Testimony of Lisa Geller – Director of Implementation
Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions
In Support of SB26-004 – Expand List of Petitioners for Protection Order
Senate State, Veterans, and Military Affairs Committee
Tuesday, January 27, 2026**

Dear Chair Wallace, Vice Chair Sullivan, and Members of the Committee,

My name is Lisa Geller, and I am the Director of Implementation at the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions and the co-lead of the [National Extreme Risk Protection Order Resource Center](#). In my role, I provide training and technical assistance to all jurisdictions with ERPO laws and have spent the last several years learning about promising practices for better implementing these laws across the country. I am writing to you in my individual capacity as a gun policy expert with over ten years of experience researching, advocating for, and implementing extreme risk protection orders. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of Johns Hopkins University.

I am testifying today in support of SB26-004, a bill that would amend Colorado’s ERPO law to expand the list of eligible petitioners and further clarify language in the bill related to minors. Critically, SB26-004 would add healthcare facilities that employ a healthcare professional or mental health professional, a co-responder who is part of a co-responder community response, and other institutional and community petitioners from schools to the list of eligible petitioners for an ERPO. The bill also clarifies that minors may be respondents to ERPOs.

[Colorado’s ERPO law](#) went into effect on January 1, 2020. In the past 6 years, ERPOs have been used in efforts to [prevent suicides](#) and [interpersonal violence](#) in the state. Like many states, most ERPO petitioners in Colorado are law enforcement officers. SB26-004 would expand the list of people able to petition a court to keep an individual safe from harm to self, others, or both. It is particularly important to extend this power to co-responders who may be able to assess an individual during a call for service without involving law enforcement. Currently, co-responders would have to work with law enforcement to file the petition, which utilizes more resources and may delay the ability to get someone the help they need.

Additionally, gun violence is the [leading cause of death](#) for young people in the United States. While minors cannot purchase firearms in Colorado, they may be able to possess firearms, and there are many situations in which ERPO use among minors may be appropriate. Notably, the Uvalde mass shooter purchased the firearm he used to carry out the mass shooting at Robb Elementary School just 23 minutes after turning 18. If an ERPO is in place when a minor is close to reaching the age of majority, it would prevent that individual from purchasing firearms. Colorado’s ERPO law is currently silent on the issue of whether minors can be respondents. It is best practice to clarify this – as Washington state and Michigan have done – through legislation.

By explicitly enumerating minors as eligible respondents, and by empowering additional, qualified, responsible petitioners to use this tool, SB26-004 will guarantee more individuals' access to this lifesaving tool. For these reasons, I strongly urge the committee to recommend this bill for passage.

Thank you.

Lisa Geller, MPH

Director of Implementation | Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions

Senior Practice Associate | Department Health Policy and Management

Co-Lead | National ERPO Resource Center

Testimony in Support of SB 26-004
Hannah Kay, MD, FAAP
January 27, 2026

Good afternoon. My name is Dr. Hannah Kay. I am a pediatrician in Denver and I am submitting this testimony on behalf of the American Academy of Pediatrics, Colorado Chapter and our over 800 members across the state. We urge your support of Senate Bill 26-004 to support expansion of the list of petitioners who may file for an extreme risk protection order.

When I was a medical student, I never thought that my career in pediatrics would involve taking care of such a significant number of children and families affected by gun violence. Children with broken bones, shattered faces, bullets in their bellies, in their brains.

During my first year of pediatric residency here in Denver I once was caring for more than one child at the same time who both had been shot in the head in separate events and were both on life support. One child miraculously survived and remains severely impaired, and one tragically passed away. The memories of taking care of them haunt me to this day, especially when encountered with ongoing injuries and death from gun violence. The young man who passed away died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Perhaps had he been seen at a clinic prior, an extreme risk protection order filed by the physician could have helped save his life. Expanding those from a pediatric practice who can file an ERPO could potentially help save the lives of many other young people in our community who die by suicide.

Injuries from firearms are a leading cause of death, disability, and injury to children in the United States. Our children need and deserve a safer environment free from gun violence. This bill is a step in the right direction towards that end.

Children are at risk of injury and death from firearms in their homes from domestic violence and from suicide. There are often warning signs that are present prior to these tragedies, and often it is mental health professionals, pediatricians, or teachers who are the first to become aware of these signs. It would be incredibly helpful for these professionals to be able to act with support from their practice or institution in a meaningful way to keep children safe. For example, we see many adolescents and young adults in our practice who are having thoughts of suicide, and I counsel families on safe storage or removal of firearms. Having the ability for my practice to file an extreme risk protection order would be an even more helpful tool to help keep our patients safe while they seek treatment, and to make sure an impulsive decision to harm themselves or someone else with a firearm doesn't ruin the rest of their lives.

I urge you, members of the committee, to support Senate Bill 26-004 to make Colorado a safer place to live for our children and families. Thank you to the sponsors of this bill and to members of this Committee for your consideration.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

11250 WAPLES MILL ROAD FAIRFAX,

VIRGINIA 22030



NRA

January 26, 2026

State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee
200 East Colfax Avenue
Denver, CO 80203

RE: Senate Bill 26-004 – Expand List of Petitioners for Protection Order

Position: OPPOSE

Dear Chairwoman Wallace,

I am writing to you regarding SB26-004 and the National Rifle Association's (NRA) position on this piece of legislation. We strongly oppose Senate Bill 26-004, which signifies a significant and hazardous expansion of the state's "Red Flag" laws.

This legislation significantly expands the scope of individuals and entities authorized to petition the court to revoke the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens. By introducing the concept of "institutional petitioners," this bill authorizes entire school districts, private schools, K-12 administrators, and higher education institutions, including community colleges—to apply for Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs). Additionally, this authority is extended to healthcare facilities, behavioral health centers, and even "co-responders" within community response teams.

Our principal concern pertains to the erosion of due process rights. Under this legislation, these institutions are permitted to request a temporary extreme risk protection order "without notice to the respondent," thereby allowing for the seizure of a citizen's firearms prior to any court hearing or opportunity for defense. This constitutes a blatant infringement of fundamental constitutional protections.

Furthermore, the legislation undermines individual privacy rights by permitting the designated institutional petitioners to disclose a respondent's protected health information at their discretion for investigative purposes. Although the legislation asserts that such disclosures are confined to the "minimum necessary," it provides extensive immunity from civil, administrative, or criminal

liability to those who choose to disclose these private records, provided they assert to act in "good faith."


The most concerning aspect is that the legislation explicitly states that a "respondent" may include a minor. This provision potentially allows educational institutions and healthcare facilities to scrutinize families and children, which could result in the creation of a permanent record that may impinge upon a minor's future rights.

From the NRA's perspective, constitutional rights should not be dictated by the arbitrary decisions of institutional bureaucracies. Genuine public safety is achieved through appropriate mental health interventions rather than the implementation of clandestine petition systems and property seizures without prior notice. We respectfully recommend a 'no' vote on SB26-004 to safeguard the due-process rights and the Second Amendment rights of all Colorado residents. We appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee.

Sincerely,

Kelvin Curtis

Kelvin Curtis
State Director – Colorado
NRA-ILA



Testimony in opposition to: SB26-004, Expand List of Petitioners for Protection Orders

The Firearms Coalition of Colorado
PO Box 1454, Englewood, CO 80150-1454

Thank you, Chair and Committee.

My name is Robert Edmiston. I am with the Firearms Coalition of Colorado an NRA-affiliated, all-volunteer, grassroots organization dedicated to the protection of individual rights and public safety.

I am a former U.S. Army Officer and Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor. I have a Master's Degree in Psychology, Counseling and Guidance.

I am writing in opposition to the measure under consideration. SB26-004 increases the number of entities that can file for dangerous, ex-parte court orders known as Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) against persons believed to own firearms and believed to possibly be a danger to themselves or others. The ERPO expansion includes: health care agencies, behavioral health centers, K-12 schools, and colleges and universities. This measure greatly increases the number of medically and psychologically unqualified individuals who have the power to initiate a process to send armed police agents to the doors of unsuspecting citizens who may or may not possess firearms. We believe this legislation increases the risk of deadly confrontations between police and citizens and "punishment by process" of innocent persons.

The recent fatal interactions between immigration officers and citizens highlight the danger when armed government agents interact with citizens in emotionally tense situations. However, this problem is not new. Please see the attached handout that outlines four previous tragedies, one of which is directly attributable to ERPO enforcement. (Why Red Flag Bills Are Dangerous to Honest Citizens.)

Another unintended consequence of this expansion will be the further erosion of the trust that honest firearms owners have in educational institutions, medical facilities, and behavioral health centers. The inclusion of health care agencies in the mix means that gun owners now apparently have to worry about even more unqualified individuals who could seriously impact or end their lives based on a "reasonable" personal opinion that a person who may or may not own a firearm might be a risk sometime to self or others. This reduction in trust will deter many innocent firearms owners from seeking what might be beneficial treatment or services.

Some gun owners possess numerous firearms in their collections. The trauma of being confronted by armed police agents and having valuable possessions, some with sentimental value, hauled away after a disruptive search of a domicile would be enough to send many innocent people into therapy. Now, interacting with anyone in an

educational facility, seeking any kind of therapy, medical treatment, or health care service becomes even more emotionally dangerous, assuming the individual survives the encounter with government agents, who have been informed that they are confronting a threat.

We urge a "No" vote on this proposal.

Thank you.

Robert Edmiston
Volunteer Lobbyist
The Firearms Coalition of Colorado
PO Box 1454, Englewood, CO 80150-1454

January 24, 2026

Dear Distinguished Members of the Senate State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee,

RE: SB26-004 Expand List of Petitioners of Protection Orders

I respectfully ask you to support SB26-004, which will expand the list of petitioners of Protective Orders. Specifically, this bill adds a health-care facility that employs a health-care professional or mental health professional and a co-responder who is part of a co-responder community response to the of community members who may petition the court for an extreme risk protection order (ERPO).

I was reassured when in 2023, Colorado passed an expansion of ERPO petitioners. This significant evolution included mental health providers, health-care providers, district attorneys, and educators. It also required the Colorado Department of Public Health create an education campaign about ERPOs. This resulted in 371 successful ERPOs granted from 2020 to 2024. The *CU Firearm Injury Prevention Initiative* analyzed the data around ERPOs in Colorado, and concluded the ERPO law has been proven to save lives.

Research suggests that for every 10-15 ERPOs granted, one suicide death can be prevented. There are also studies evaluating the potential impact of ERPOs to prevent mass shootings, homicides, and other firearm-involved injuries and deaths. Please note several successful ERPOs in the past 2 years:

1. Petitioner Group: Behavioral Health, Threat Types: Self and others, Case: 20s male diagnosed with PTSD and psychotic disorder was experiencing hallucinations. He consistently carried multiple firearms while at home, owns multiple handguns and an AK-47.
2. Petitioner: Behavioral health provider, Threat types: Others, Case: 50s male. He brandished firearms during a road rage incident, Owned 9 firearms.
3. Petitioner: Inpatient Behavioral health provider, Threat types: other, Case: 20s male who was diagnosed with Severe and Persistent Mental Illness and had recurrent psychiatric hospitalizations. During the hospitalizations, he expressed an intent to buy firearms and kill others upon discharge. The ERPO made it so he could not go and purchase the firearms.

4. Petitioner: Counselor/Therapist, Threat types: Self, Case: 30s male with delusional disorder. He believed he was being “psychically attacked” by a certain individual in town, and believed the person told him to go on a barefoot run in the middle of the night, resulting in a lengthy hospital stay to care for his wounds. He had registered for a conceal carry class and planned to buy a firearm.

5. Petitioner: higher education, Board of Trustees at respondent’s college, Threat types: Self, Case: 20s male who had a history of suicidal threats and attempts. He had a previous hospitalization following a suicidal crisis. He told his friends that he had purchased a handgun and wanted to die by suicide.

6. Petitioner: District Attorney, Threat types: others, Case: 20s male currently incarcerated. The judge found him incompetent and unable to be restored to competency. He had multiple arrests and prior convictions, including for unwanted sexual contact and menacing. He was accused of aggravated robbery, in which he held up a convenience store and threatened employees and customers with an AK-47. The AK-47 was taken into custody and destroyed, but the DA was concerned about other firearms when the respondent was released.

In summary, expanding the list of petitioners would enlarge the net in which to catch persons at risk of harming themselves and others.

Thank you for taking the time to review, support and pass **SB26-004**.

Sincerely,

Thomas Wilson

Aurora

I am testifying in opposition to Senate bill 26-004, in violation of our constitutional rights under the due process clause and 2nd Amendment. First, allowing institutional organizations such as health care facilities and universities to file an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) instead of their employee who observed the individual behavior, allows these organizations to petition to remove a citizen's guns without the individual employees' participation in this process. An employee's cryptic remarks in an organizational record becomes the basis for denial of a protected liberty to keep and bear arms. It is alarming that supporters of red flag laws would authorize organizations to initiate a gun seizure process based on an employee's report on individual behavior, when the employee is not concerned enough about the behavior to file an ERPO petition. I also see no requirement for the organization to have first called law enforcement to investigate the remarks or behavior that are the basis for the ERPO petition. This bill invites further abuse of ERPOs in violation of individual liberties protected in the Constitution. I opposed the original "red flag" law and I oppose SB26-004. I request a "no" vote on this bill.

Terri Carver
Former State Representative (R-HD20)
Colorado Springs, CO

Senate State, Veterans & Military Affairs Committee

Subject: SB26-004, Expand List of Petitioners for Protection Order

Dear Committee Members,

I spent the afternoon carefully listening to all of the testimony. Neither during the initial introduction nor during the testimonies was I able to understand and ascertain what the process is for an educational, medical or mental professional to make an application. Who is to say that an educator or medical or mental health professional is unbiased and truly “concerned” about the welfare of a child? How would anyone ensure this legislation would not be used for nefarious purposes? The answer is, you can’t. The regrettable outcome of COVID is that most Americans have developed a deep distrust for these White Coat “Professionals”. Even if you could honestly say you are not violating our Constitution, which you can’t, even if you could say that this is a just and unbiased process, which you can’t, there is truly nothing in this legislation that moves the needle for protection of our children. A few people mentioned that it would provide protections, but references to respected sources were not forthcoming.

To spend countless hours on enacting legislation which constrains and restricts Constitution rights is tyrannical. For the record, I am including a link to a recent article which directly addresses the explosion of red flag laws across 21 states. As explained in the article is this part of a much larger agenda.

<https://www.nraila.org/articles/20251020/colorado-joins-states-in-promoting-use-of-red-flag-laws>

I am deeply concern about this legislation and I ask for a NO vote.

Respectfully,
Tanya S. Regan
Colorado Springs, CO

<https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/SB26-004>

<https://bha.colorado.gov/behavioral-health/co-responder>

Chair and members of the committee. I am Alexander Cisneros. I am an undergraduate at the University of Colorado Boulder. I ask that you support SB26-004.

Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) are a crucial way to prevent tragedies from occurring. I believe that they are an option that makes it far less likely that my little brothers, now Juniors in high school, would have more days off due to gun violence than snow days, as I did when I was their age.

Fundamentally, it makes sense to allow [co-responders](#), themselves behavioral health specialists, to file an ERPO request with a court. It makes sense to allow schools to file an ERPO with a court, and if that were an option for my school, perhaps some of the events during my Junior year would not have occurred.

Ultimately I believe that this bill will open the way for my university - our community - to take care of the people within it. I believe it will help open a broader conversation of how we can better support the mental health and safety needs of everyone at our university.

I hope you will take this into consideration and support this bill.

Why Red Flag Bills are Dangerous to Honest Citizens

We believe Red Flag Bills have a disastrous effect on the relationship between law-abiding gun owners and honest law enforcement officers, who those gun owners have traditionally supported. Faced with the prospect of a hostile confrontation with heavily armed officers intent on disarming them, essentially at gunpoint, on the basis of a possibly groundless accusation; law abiding gun owners will have little choice, but to treat law enforcement officers with suspicion and dread, knowing that any contact by officers with citizens could be preludes to life-threatening situations.

Officers ordered to serve Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) have no choice but to treat the subjects of the orders with the presumption that they are actually threats. Officers, already somewhat estranged from civilians by their natural need for defensive awareness and made more wary by recent attacks on law enforcement, sometimes called the “War on Cops,” are going to be hyper-vigilant. This situation has resulted and will result in the unnecessary deaths of civilians, as well as officers. Below are four examples, where police/civilian confrontations ended in tragedy. We believe Red Flag Bills will create more unfortunate violence by causing more unnecessary hostile encounters.

In December of 2004, Frank Lobato was shot and killed by Denver Police. Mr. Lobato was sitting in bed with a can of soda pop, when police entered his room on a domestic violence call. Mr. Lobato was not the suspect in the case, but the responding officer mistook the soda can for a gun and killed him. (1)

In July of 2018, Richard “Gary” Black, decorated Vietnam War veteran and former Internal Revenue agent, was shot in Aurora by police responding to his home following a break-in by a group of people, including a naked man, who assaulted his grandson and tried to drown the boy in the bathtub. Mr. Black, who was forced to shoot the naked intruder, was armed when the police arrived and killed him. (2)

In November of 2018, Gary Willis of Arundel County, Maryland was shot and killed by police at his residence in a pre-dawn raid as they served an ERPO. The niece of the slain individual stated that her uncle “wasn’t a danger to anyone and questioned the police response. She said it (the ERPO filing) was just ‘family being family.’” (3)

Also in November of 2018, at a bar in a Chicago suburb, police shot and killed a security guard, who had just subdued an active shooter in the bar. Jemel Roberson, the slain guard, reportedly had plans to become a law enforcement officer. (4)

1. <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/11/nation/na-denver11>.

2. <https://www.denverpost.com/2018/07/31/aurora-police-shooting-victim-identified/>.

3. (Need to copy and paste this link into browser.)

<https://www.ammoland.com/2018/11/maryland-red-flag-gun-confiscation-order-ends-with-dead-gun-owner/>.

4. <https://fox8.com/2018/11/13/suburban-chicago-security-guard-was-killed-by-police-while-doing-his-job-lawyer-says/>.

Written testimony on SB26-004

January 27, 2026

Colorado Senate State, Veterans, and Military Affairs Committee

From: David B. Kopel

727 East 16th Ave.

Denver, Colo. 80203

303-279-6536

david@i2i.org

Executive Summary

A University of Colorado School of Medicine study on Colorado gun confiscation shows the following:

- 75% of law enforcement petitions for confiscation are ultimately found to be valid.
- Only 11% of confiscation petitions from family and romantic partners are ultimately found to be valid.
- Twenty percent of all confiscation petitions are granted when the court hears only one side, but then are reversed when the court hears both sides.

Therefore:

- The extremely poor rate of legitimate petitions from non-law enforcement persons shows that the State needs to do a much better job of informing the public how to file proper petitions.
- Fixing the serious problems with non-law enforcement petitions should precede recklessly expanding a broken system to generate even more low quality petitions.
- To address the problem of 20% of ex parte petitions improperly leading to gun confiscation from non-dangerous persons, Colorado should adopt the Vermont rule that a petitioner seeking to proceed ex parte must show “specific facts” that “the respondent poses an imminent and extreme risk of causing harm.”

Testimony

I have testified before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee and the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution in support of “red flag” laws, if such laws are properly structured to protect public safety *and* due process.¹ Colorado’s law is having serious problems and needs to be fixed. Proposals for further expansion at this stage are reckless and irresponsible.

I. Plain title violation

SB26-004 drastically expands who may file a court petition for confiscation of a citizen’s firearms. Like most bills on the topic, this bill’s title is intentionally deceptive. The title is “Concerning who may petition a court for an extreme risk protection order.” As at least the supporting lobbyists know, “extreme risk” is a falsehood. Current Colorado law provides for gun confiscation based upon “a significant risk,” not an “extreme” one.²

Therefore, SB26-004 violates the plain title Colorado constitutional requirement for legislation, that the “one subject” of a bill “shall be clearly expressed in its title.” Colo. Const., art. V, § 21, A bill title about “extreme risk” that instead applies to something much lesser, “a significant risk” is a calculated decision to deceive the public and the media.

To comply with article V, section 21, SB26-004 should be amended so that the word “extreme” is stricken from the title. The only purpose of keeping the word in the title is continuing deception.

II. University of Colorado School of Medicine Study

A detailed study of firearms confiscation orders in Colorado was conducted by authors from University of Colorado School of Medicine. The authors are part of the school’s Firearm Injury Prevention Initiative and similar projects. The

¹ U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution. [Hearing on Red Flag laws](#). Apr. 28, 2021. [Written testimony](#).

U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, [written testimony](#) on “Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action.” [Hearing on mental health and gun legislation](#). Kopel starts at 31:36. March 26, 2019. Supplemental [Questions for the Record](#), from Sen. Grassley.

² C.R.S. § 13-14.5-103(3) (ex parte, preponderance of evidence, temporary confiscation); § 13-14.5-105(2) (long-term confiscation, clear and convincing evidence, right to defend oneself).

study examined Colorado confiscation petitions from 2020 to 2022, a period when only law enforcement officers or family members or romantic partners (broadly defined) could file confiscation petitions. Leslie M Barnard, Nisha Batta, Megan McCarthy, Kimberly Thies, Caitlin Robinson, Marcus Schultze, Marian E. Betz, & Christopher E. Knoepke, *Implementation of Extreme Risk Protection Orders in Colorado from 2020 to 2022: Firearm relinquishment and return and petitioner characteristics*, 44 PREVENTIVE MEDICINE REPORTS 102800 (Aug. 2024).³

The CU Medicine data show serious flaws in the existing gun confiscation system. These flaws should be addressed before partly dysfunctional system is further expanded.

According to the CU Medicine data, confiscation petitions filed by law enforcement officers tend to be relatively high quality at every stage, and petitions from other persons tend to be over very low quality.

Of the 193 ex parte petitions by law enforcement officers for temporary gun confiscation in 2000 to 2002, 182 were granted, and 11 were denied or dismissed. (All data are in Table 2 of the article.)

Then, when the person whose guns had already been confiscated was later given an opportunity to be heard, final confiscation orders were granted in 145 cases, and denied or dismissed in 37.

In other words, when there is no due process — no chance for the target of the petition to defend himself or herself — the law enforcement petition is granted 94.3% of the time. When due process is allowed later, law enforcement succeeds in 79.7% of cases,

Thus, the data indicate that 14.6% of gun confiscation petitions sought by law enforcement are granted improperly. That is, when the court heard only one side, confiscation was ordered, but when the court later heard both sides, confiscation was denied. Thus, about 1 in 8 law enforcement petitions for gun confiscation results in incorrect temporary confiscation of firearms, because the court was only allowed to consider evidence from one side.

Put another way, of the 193 petitions filed by law enforcement, 145 resulted in a final order once both sides were heard. Thus, about 75 percent of law

³ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211335524002158>.

enforcement petitions filed (145 of 193) appear to have had a strong factual basis.

The petitions filed by family members and romantic partners were considerably lower quality. At the “temporary” stage, before the individual could defend himself or herself, 56 family/romantic petitions were granted, and 104 were denied. This means that even when the person in favor of gun confiscation was the only person the court heard from, the evidence was so lacking that the court ruled against confiscation 65% of the time

After the 56 ex parte petitions were granted, the targeted individual later received a day in court. Then, the court found that the *majority* of the temporary petitions should be denied or dismissed. Once the target was given the opportunity to be heard, only 22 of the 56 temporary confiscation orders were made permanent. Thus, over 60% of the temporary confiscation orders obtained by family and romantic were later found to be incorrect.

In other words, when a family member or romantic partner files a gun confiscation petition, there is only an 11% change (22 out of 170) that the petition will be one that stands up under due process. Eighty-nine percent of petitions from family members and (former) romantic partners turn out to be invalid.

As demonstrated by the 89% failure rate for petitions filed by the general public, the State of Colorado has done an abysmal job of educating members of the public how to file proper petitions for gun confiscation. As with so much of what has transpired in Colorado State government in recent years, the General Assembly and the Executive Branch have been eager self-congratulators at signing ceremonies for new legislation, and failures at effective follow-through for successful implementation.

Rather than expanding on failure, the advocates of SB26-004 ought to get to work on finding out why the system they designed works so poorly for the general public.

III. Fixing the enormous error rate for temporary petitions

The CU study covered 353 gun confiscation petitions. Of these, 167 ultimately led to a year-long renewable order against an individual possessing firearms.

Unfortunately, along the way to disarming the 167, the Colorado system improperly disarmed 71 other people. This is a disarmament error rate of 29.8% (71 of 238). The 71 wrongfully disarmed petitions were 37 from law enforcement petitions and 34 from family/romance petitions.

In other words, for nearly one-fifth (19.56%) of all gun confiscation petitions, the respondent was wrongfully disarmed during an ex parte hearing. The confiscation order was issued when the person had no notice and could not present his side. Later, after the person's guns had already been confiscated, the person was granted a hearing, and the confiscation was then denied or dismissed. For any given confiscation petition, there is about a 20% chance that a Coloradoan's firearms will be wrongfully confiscated, and (hopefully) eventually returned.

Because 20% of Colorado confiscation petitions result in wrongful confiscation, the confiscation statute should be revised so that ex parte proceedings are authorized only when the petitioners can show some reason why ex parte is necessary. For example, in Vermont, a petitioner who seeks to proceed ex parte must show "specific facts" that "the respondent poses an imminent and extreme risk of causing harm." Vt. Stats. tit. 13 § 4054.

For persons and lobbies motivated by animus against gun owners in general, that Colorado's current system confiscates guns from innocent people 20% of the time may be a cherished feature. For sensible persons concerned with protecting both public safety and civil rights, the Colorado confiscation system is in need of reform.