

Second Regular Session
Seventy-fifth General Assembly
STATE OF COLORADO

ENGROSSED

*This Version Includes All Amendments Adopted
on Second Reading in the House of Introduction*

LLS NO. 26-0710.01 Conrad Imel x2313

SENATE BILL 26-005

SENATE SPONSORSHIP

Weissman and Gonzales J., Coleman, Hinrichsen, Jodeh, Kipp, Marchman, Rodriguez,
Wallace

HOUSE SPONSORSHIP

Mabrey and Zokaie,

Senate Committees

Judiciary
Appropriations

House Committees

A BILL FOR AN ACT

101 **CONCERNING STATE COURT REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL**
102 **CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OCCURRING DURING IMMIGRATION**
103 **ENFORCEMENT, AND, IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, MAKING AN**
104 **APPROPRIATION.**

Bill Summary

(Note: This summary applies to this bill as introduced and does not reflect any amendments that may be subsequently adopted. If this bill passes third reading in the house of introduction, a bill summary that applies to the reengrossed version of this bill will be available at <http://leg.colorado.gov>.)

The bill creates a statutory cause of action for a person who is injured during a civil immigration enforcement action by another person who, whether or not under color of law, violates the United States

Shading denotes HOUSE amendment. Double underlining denotes SENATE amendment.
Capital letters or bold & italic numbers indicate new material to be added to existing law.
Dashes through the words or numbers indicate deletions from existing law.

SENATE
Amended 2nd Reading
February 23, 2026

constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement. A person who violates the United States constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement is liable to the injured party for legal or equitable relief or any other appropriate relief. The action must be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues.

1 *Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:*

2 **SECTION 1. Legislative declaration.** (1) The general assembly
3 finds and declares that:

4 (a) Since the earliest days of the nation, the United States supreme
5 court has held, in cases such as *Little v. Barreme*, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), and
6 *Murray v. The Charming Betsey*, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), that federal officials
7 may be liable in damages for violations of federal laws;

8 (b) In later 19th century cases as well, the United States supreme
9 court held that federal officials could be liable for damages even for
10 reasons relating to but beyond the lawful scope of federal duties, *Mitchell*
11 *v. Harmony*, 54 U.S. 115 (1851), and in particular that state courts
12 possessed jurisdiction to consider such damages claims, *Teal v. Felton*,
13 53 U.S. 284 (1852);

14 (c) The United States supreme court has long held that federal
15 employees are not inherently beyond the reach of state laws simply
16 because they are federal employees. For example, in *Johnson v.*
17 *Maryland*, 254 U.S. 51 (1920), the court noted, "[A]n employee of the
18 United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while
19 acting in the course of his employment", and in *Colorado v. Symes*, 286
20 U.S. 510 (1932), the court stated, "Federal officers and employees are not,
21 merely because they are such, granted immunity from prosecution in state
22 courts for crimes against state law".

23 (d) Decades later, the United States supreme court continued to

1 recognize the role of state law in holding federal officials accountable for
2 legal violations, noting in *Wheeldin v. Wheeler*, 373 U.S. 647 (1963),
3 "[w]hen it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power, federal
4 officials are usually governed by local law";

5 (e) When the United States supreme court recognized a federal
6 law cause of action for violation of certain constitutional rights in *Bivens*
7 *v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that cause
8 of action was in addition to, rather than instead of, traditional state law
9 remedies. Even one of the dissenting justices in *Bivens* noted the ongoing
10 role of state courts, writing, "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of
11 creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress
12 and the legislatures of the States".

13 (f) More recently, congress has made federal statutory law the
14 exclusive remedy for certain claims sounding in tort, but this exclusivity
15 specifically "does not extend or apply to a civil action against an
16 employee of the Government [. . .] which is brought for a violation of the
17 Constitution of the United States", 28 U.S.C. sec. 2679. The prime
18 sponsor of legislation amending the federal "Tort Claims Act" to provide
19 for limited exclusivity took pains to clarify, "We make special provisions
20 here to make clear that the more controversial issue of constitutional torts
21 is not covered by this bill. If you are accused of having violated
22 someone's constitutional rights, this bill does not affect it", 134 Cong.
23 Rec. 15963 (1988).

24 (g) In 2022, in declining to extend the scope of the *Bivens* action
25 in *Egbert v. Boule*, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the United States supreme court
26 observed that legislatures, not courts, are the better branches of
27 government to fashion damages remedies;

1 (h) In its most recently completed term, the United States supreme
2 court declined, in *Martin v. United States*, 145 S. Ct. 1689 (2025), to
3 extend the doctrine of supremacy clause immunity beyond its traditional
4 criminal law context;

5 (i) Violating the federal constitutional rights of residents of the
6 United States has never been and can never be "necessary and proper" to
7 the execution of the laws and powers of the United States within the
8 meaning of article I, section 8, clause 18 of the United States constitution;
9 and

10 (j) In enacting this act, the Colorado general assembly affirms its
11 longstanding and rightful role as a sovereign state in providing forum in
12 its courts for adjudication of claims of federal constitutional violations.

13 **SECTION 2.** In Colorado Revised Statutes, **add** 13-20-1302 as
14 follows:

15 **13-20-1302. Civil action for violation of constitutional rights**
16 **during immigration enforcement - relief - attorney fees - time limit to**
17 **commence action - definition.**

18 (1) A PERSON WHO HAS THEIR RIGHTS THAT ARE GUARANTEED BY
19 THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION VIOLATED BY ANOTHER PERSON WHO,
20 ACTING UNDER COLOR OF ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL LAW, IS
21 PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, MAY BRING A CIVIL
22 ACTION AGAINST ANOTHER PERSON WHOSE CONDUCT WAS THE PROXIMATE
23 CAUSE OF THE VIOLATION. A PERSON FOUND TO HAVE VIOLATED THE
24 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHILE PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL
25 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IS LIABLE TO THE PERSON WHOSE RIGHTS ARE
26 VIOLATED FOR LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RELIEF OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE
27 RELIEF.

1 (2) (a) IN AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION, A
2 COURT SHALL AWARD REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO A
3 PREVAILING PLAINTIFF. IN ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, A COURT
4 SHALL DEEM A PLAINTIFF TO HAVE PREVAILED IF THE PLAINTIFF'S SUIT WAS
5 A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR OR SIGNIFICANT CATALYST IN OBTAINING THE
6 RESULTS SOUGHT BY THE LITIGATION.

7 (b) WHEN A JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT,
8 THE COURT MAY AWARD REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES TO THE
9 DEFENDANT FOR DEFENDING ANY CLAIMS THE COURT FINDS FRIVOLOUS.

10 (3) TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE UNITED
11 STATES CONSTITUTION AND 42 U.S.C. SEC. 1983, A GRANT OF IMMUNITY
12 TO A DEFENDANT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SOVEREIGN
13 IMMUNITY; OFFICIAL IMMUNITY; INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY;
14 QUALIFIED IMMUNITY; SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMMUNITY; STATUTORY
15 IMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE "COLORADO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
16 ACT", ARTICLE 10 OF TITLE 24; OR COMMON LAW IMMUNITY, DOES NOT
17 APPLY IN AN ACTION BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION.

18 (4) AS USED IN THIS SECTION, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE
19 REQUIRES, "CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT" MEANS AN ACTION TO
20 INVESTIGATE, QUESTION, DETAIN, TRANSFER, OR ARREST A PERSON FOR
21 THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING FEDERAL CIVIL IMMIGRATION LAW. "CIVIL
22 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT" DOES NOT INCLUDE AN ACTION COMMITTED
23 BY A PEACE OFFICER WHO IS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PEACE
24 OFFICER'S DUTIES CONSISTENT WITH STATE LAW.

25 (5) PURSUANT TO SECTION 13-80-102, A CIVIL ACTION DESCRIBED
26 IN THIS SECTION MUST BE COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THE
27 CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES.

1 **SECTION 3.** In Colorado Revised Statutes, 13-80-102, **amend**
2 (1)(k); and **add** (1)(l) as follows:

3 **13-80-102. General limitation of actions - two years.**

4 (1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon
5 which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, must be
6 commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not
7 thereafter:

8 (k) All actions brought ~~under~~ PURSUANT TO section 13-21-109 (2);
9 AND

10 (l) AN ACTION ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
11 DURING CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT BROUGHT PURSUANT TO
12 SECTION 13-20-1302.

13 **SECTION 4. Severability.** If any provision of this act or the
14 application of this act to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
15 invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act that
16 can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
17 this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.

18 **SECTION 5. Appropriation.** (1) For the 2026-27 state fiscal
19 year, \$125,604 is appropriated to the department of law. This
20 appropriation is from the legal services cash fund created in section
21 24-31-108 (4), C.R.S., from revenue received from the department of
22 personnel that is continuously appropriated to the department of personnel
23 from the risk management fund created in section 24-30-1510 (1)(a),
24 C.R.S. The appropriation to the department of law is based on an
25 assumption that the department of law will require an additional 0.5 FTE.
26 To implement this act, the department of law may use this appropriation
27 to provide legal services for the department of personnel.

1 **SECTION 6. Safety clause.** The general assembly finds,
2 determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate
3 preservation of the public peace, health, or safety or for appropriations for
4 the support and maintenance of the departments of the state and state
5 institutions.