

A REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY AND THREAT ASSESSMENT
ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHOOTING AT ARAPAHOE HIGH SCHOOL
ON
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Presented to the Littleton Public School District and Board of
Education

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by

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INTRODUCTION

This independent report was completed at the request of the newly appointed Superintendent of the Littleton Public Schools (LPS), on behalf of the Board of Education (BOE). The report reviews and disseminates findings and recommendations primarily from the discovery process of the investigatory Arbitration pursuant to the Agreement between the Davis family and the Littleton Public Schools, dated April 1, 2015.

Purpose of the Arbitration

The purpose of this report, as stated in the arbitration agreement, is to help investigate and review the facts and circumstances related to the tragic shooting at Arapahoe High School (AHS) on December 13, 2013. The stated goal of the arbitration was “to provide lessons learned and information to assist in developing policy, identifying steps that can be taken, and suggesting response protocols that would represent best practices in response to students in crisis” (Davis v. Littleton, 2015). The parties agreed that respective independent reports would be furnished to provide learning, in lieu of a decision by the arbitrator.

Goals of this Review

Toward the goals of the arbitration agreement, and with the purpose of suggesting best practices related to the safety of schools, students, and staff, this review examines a variety of the psychological safety, mental health efforts, and threat assessment practices in the Littleton Public School District (LPS) and specifically at Arapahoe High School (AHS). The authors proposed a review based on available data sources and with a defined set of key elements, with the focus being to identify potential issues and gaps in school safety, mental health, and threat assessment practices that existed in LPS and at AHS in 2013 (pre-event). It also examines efforts toward remediation of those gaps by comparing practices in 2015 (post-event). The ultimate goal is to provide learning from the AHS incident to all those who work in a variety of ways to make schools safe and to enhance the well being of students and staff in Colorado, and around the country.

It is important to note that this report is *not* a review of post-incident emergency response efforts by Arapahoe High School, the school district, or law enforcement agencies to the events on December 13, 2013, nor does it include discussion of the immediate aftermath, evacuation, or reunification of students and families. This report is also *not* a review of the mental state of the student of the perpetrator of the attack. This report was also prepared under time constraints determined by the conditions of the arbitration and therefore key elements were chosen for review based on the time allowed and the judgment of the authors who selected the most relevant

priorities from the facts collected that could provide the most benefit to LPS and to others, across disciplines and stakeholder groups.

It should be noted that while other incidents of school shootings around the country and in our state have been reviewed by commissions or groups of individuals designed to provide multiple perspectives on lessons learned, this review is the primary work of an author with school, school psychology, and school safety and crisis intervention background, and three secondary authors with clinical psychology backgrounds and expertise in school and workplace violence, risk assessment, and crisis intervention. This arbitration process and its data sources, persons deposed, and documents provided were limited in scope.

Authors of the Report

Primary Author:

Linda M. Kanan, Ph.D.

The primary author of the report is Linda M. Kanan, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor since 1995 in the Child, Family and School Psychology Program at the University of Denver, Morgridge College of Education. Dr. Kanan is a School Psychologist, with over 30 years of experience in education, including 21 years of working with adolescents in secondary school settings and specializing in school safety and crisis intervention in schools. Dr. Kanan was the first Director of the Colorado School Safety Resource Center when it was created by legislation in 2008 and she served in that position until 2011. She has taught Crisis Prevention and Intervention in Schools at Colorado universities since 2005 and is the author or co-author of several publications on crisis prevention in schools. In addition, Dr. Kanan has been a crisis recovery responder within the Cherry Creek Schools and as part of the Colorado Society of School Psychologists Statewide Crisis Response Team providing intervention after the tragedies at Columbine, Platte Canyon High School, the Aurora Theater shootings, as well as the incident at Arapahoe High School. She has conducted threat assessments during her work in schools and has provided training on the topic since 2003. She conducted some preliminary review of Littleton Public Schools Psychological Safety efforts in February 2014, and then presented some preliminary findings to the Littleton Safety and Mental Health Advisory Committee (SMHAC) on February 28, 2015.

Secondary Authors:

John Nicoletti, Ph.D., ABPP

Dr. John Nicoletti, Board Certified Specialist in Police and Public Safety Psychology, of Nicoletti-Flater and Associates also contributed to the review of materials and authoring of this report. Dr. Nicoletti is considered a national expert in police psychology, violence risk assessment, workplace and school violence prevention, as well as crisis intervention and trauma recovery. He testified at the request of the Columbine Commission in 1999-2000 and has testified in Washington D.C. in front of Congress and the Police Executive Research Forum Commission on threat assessment and school shootings. Dr. Nicoletti has provided trainings for

and conducted numerous threat assessments for schools, college campuses, private corporations and government agencies, including participation as part of the International Association of Chiefs of Police Team investigating the Virginia Tech shootings in 2007. He and his associates have assisted in recovery efforts for many national and local active shooter situations including Columbine, Platte Canyon, New Life Church, Aurora Theater Shooting, and the Arapahoe High School shooting. Dr. Nicoletti also participated in an administrative review of the Littleton Public Schools threat assessment procedures on June 24, 2014 (Deposition Exhibit 17, 2015).

Sara Garrido, Psy.D.

Dr. Sara Garrido, who has worked with Nicoletti-Flater Associates since 2009, provided additional review and made contributions to the report. She received her Master's degree in Clinical Psychology from the University of Colorado Denver and received her Doctorate in Clinical Psychology from the University of Denver's Graduate School of Professional Psychology (GSPP) where she now serves as an adjunct faculty member. She specializes in crisis intervention, policy review, and conducting violence risk assessments for Nicoletti-Flater Associates. She regularly consults with school districts and universities across the state on violence prevention. In May 2015, Dr. Garrido testified at the Colorado State Capitol regarding the need for school safety experts as part of threat assessment. She is a member of the American Psychological Association (APA), International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP).

Mariya Dvoskina, M.A.

Mariya Dvoskina, M.A. also provided additional review and made contributions to this report. Mariya received her Masters degree in Clinical Psychology from the University of Denver in 2014, and is currently finishing her Psy.D. in Clinical Psychology from the University of Denver, specializing in forensic psychology. She has forensic clinical experience working with highly traumatized populations, providing assessments, conducting evaluations, and facilitating individual and group therapy. Mariya has worked with clients presenting with a variety of problems (including substance abuse, psychotic disorders, PTSD and other trauma related disorders, and personality disorders). She is currently completing her doctoral internship with Nicoletti-Flater Associates.

Data Sources

Information considered for this report was extensive, yet depositions were limited in scope, and did not include depositions of the attacker's parents nor depositions with students and others who may have known the student. Data sources included:

- The Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office Investigative Report released in October 2014, including over 2,500 pages of investigative materials and interviews.

- As part of the arbitration discovery, depositions were taken between July and November 2015 of eleven key personnel from the Littleton Public Schools and of the School Resource Officer from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office. The primary author attended five of those depositions in person or by phone and reviewed transcripts of the additional depositions.
- Over 5,200 pages of documents and records provided by the Littleton Public Schools for the arbitration.
- Additional interviews conducted by the primary author with selected personnel of the Littleton Public Schools, covering topics that were not questioned in depositions and some additional data sources that were requested for a more comprehensive and varying review of topics in this report.

While not all of those materials are used as references for this report, they were all reviewed and considered by the authors. Best practice recommendations are taken from published federal, state and other guidelines for schools and published research. The subject matter experts who authored this report contributed additional best practice recommendations.

Audience for this Report

This report is primarily developed for the following stakeholder groups:

- Littleton Public Schools leadership and employees and their community,
- School leaders and school employees in Colorado and around the country who wish to learn from the Arapahoe High School incident to enhance their own school safety practices and procedures, and
- School boards, legislators, and other policy makers.

Organization of this Report

This independent report reviews pre-event practices (Fall 2013) and post-event practices (as of Fall 2015) at Arapahoe High School and throughout the Littleton Public School District, as well as available information on the student attacker. The organization of this report and findings is suggested following recommended frameworks of school safety and emergency planning. (Colorado School Safety Resource Center, 2009; Cowan, Vaillancourt & Pollitt, 2013; U.S. Department of Education, 2007; U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, & Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013).

It is presented in the following seven sections:

- I. Executive Summary
- II. Prevention Efforts
- III. Preparedness, Mitigation, and Protection as Prevention
- IV. Threat Assessment: Process, Training, and Documentation
- V. A Threat Assessment Trend Analysis and Case Review
- VI. Crisis Recovery Efforts After the Tragedy
- VII. Conclusions
- VIII. Reference List
- IX. Appendices

Overview of the Incident on December 13, 2013

Arapahoe High School (AHS), a 9-12 grade school with over 2,100 students, is part of the Littleton Public School District (LPS), in suburban Arapahoe County south of Denver. The Littleton Public School District serves about 15,400 students.

On September 3, 2013, a high school senior (hereinafter referred to as KP), was overheard threatening the life of the school debate coach at Arapahoe High School immediately following a meeting between KP, his mother, and the coach. KP voluntarily remained out of school for the next three days. A school threat assessment meeting was conducted regarding that threat on September 9, 2013. KP was allowed to return to school because he was thought to be a low level concern at that time. On December 13, 2013, at about 12:30 p.m., KP entered AHS with a pump-action shotgun, a large hunting knife, several rounds of ammunition in bandoliers and backpack, a knife, and 3 improvised incendiary devices. He fired three rounds in the school hallway, shooting 17 year-old Claire Davis. He then ran a short distance down an intersecting hallway and entered the library, calling for the school debate coach who escaped through a door, as other students also escaped or hid from the attack. He lit and threw incendiary devices, setting fire to books and a bookcase. When officers entered the library a few minutes later, they found that KP had taken his own life with a self-inflicted gunshot (Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office Investigative Report, 2014). Claire died of her injuries eight days later on December 21, 2013.

Section I

Executive Summary

The Purpose of This Review

The goal of this report was assess and disseminate findings and recommendations primarily from the discovery process in the investigatory arbitration between the Davis family and the Littleton Public Schools (LPS) resulting from the shooting incident at Arapahoe High School on December 13, 2013.

This specific review was designed to examine a variety of the psychological safety and threat assessment practices in the Littleton Public School District (LPS) and specifically at Arapahoe High School (AHS). Recommendations in the report are divided as to those specific to continue to improve practices in the Littleton Public Schools and to those designed for others to gain knowledge of the “lessons learned” and review their own practices with the goal of continual improvement in school safety. The ultimate goal was to provide information for improved practices to the Littleton Public Schools, its students and staff, and to *all* those who work in a variety of ways to make schools safe and to enhance the wellbeing of students and staff in Colorado and around the country.

How This Review was Completed

The primary author was Linda Kanan, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, Morgridge College of Education, with secondary authorship by John Nicoletti, Ph.D., ABPP, Sara Garrido, Psy.D. and Mariya Dvoskina, MA. of Nicoletti-Flater Associates, PLLP. These authors have combined expertise in school safety, mental health, threat assessment, and violence prevention.

The review was based on available data sources and focused on a defined set of key elements in an effort to identify issues, strengths, and potential gaps that existed in LPS and at AHS prior to the December 2013 shooting. The report then examined the efforts initiated by LPS District towards remediation of those gaps by comparing practices since the 2013 event. There were some limitations to the investigatory arbitration process and to the data sources, and to a restricted timeline to produce findings; hence those limitations may affect information in this review and report.

Report Overview

The findings and recommendations of this report are best understood when read in the context of the full report. The reader is encouraged to read sections of the report related to the findings and recommendations for further explanation of the review that provided the basis of the recommendations.

Findings in this report are related to reviewing key practices in the Littleton Public Schools and at Arapahoe High School in 2013, gaps that were identified in that review, efforts that have been taken to remediate those gaps and the practices in 2015, with recommendations for continuing improvement going forward. Recommendations are provided specifically for LPS and each section also includes recommendations for *all* schools.

The report reviews the following areas that were determined as important to the review of events related to this incident:

- Prevention Efforts (Section II)
- Preparedness, Mitigation, and Protection as Prevention (Section III)
- Threat Assessment: Process, Training and Documentation (Section IV)
- A Threat Assessment Trend Analysis and Case Review (Section V)
- Crisis Recovery Efforts After the Tragedy (Section VII)

Conclusion

The arbitration discovery process allowed selected experts to more closely examine the multiple events surrounding the tragic shooting at Arapahoe High School on December 13, 2013. The data sources reviewed for this project consisted of depositions, documents provided by the school district, and materials from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office. It is the hope of these authors that the information will be used to provide direction for future efforts and best practices in psychological safety and threat assessment in the Littleton Public Schools and *all* Colorado schools. The recommendations made in this report are numerous and varied, it is our hope that LPS and *all* schools will review the recommendations and determine their priorities going forward, based on their own capacity and resources.

Providing for the safety of schools requires an institutional and personal commitment from every member of the school and community. Effective school safety starts with prevention, provides for student's mental health and early intervention, integrates physical safety and security with psychological safety, and engages schools, families, law enforcement, community treatment providers, and other community agencies as partners.

School staff, students, parents, law enforcement officers and the community at large *all* play a

part in assisting in the detection, reporting, and disrupting of potentially violent or concerning behaviors. It is through everyone's combined efforts that school violence can hopefully be prevented. In order to accomplish this goal, however, all members of those groups (the detectors) must be trained on identifying behaviors that are concerning and not just a part of the normal experience of being a child or an adolescent. Only then can effective intervention occur to disrupt, assess, or manage the behavior of concern and the individual.

Schools and districts can easily become overwhelmed by the multitude of components and immense responsibility that is included in effective violence prevention, threat assessment and management, and other components of school safety. Colorado has some excellent resources to assist school districts with the challenges of school safety and threat assessment and management. The state has created the Colorado School Safety Resource Center (CSSRC) and Safe2Tell, and also has the expertise of others in the community with the range of resources, training, and consultation. Moving forward, it is recommended that the state and the Colorado School Safety Resource Center (CSSRC) continue work to develop and coordinate school violence prevention best practice procedures in threat assessment, training and management and provide resources and training to stakeholders. Those state entities have the responsibility to continue their marketing and provision of resources to schools, especially smaller districts and ones with limited resources. It is then the responsibility of schools to seek out and use those excellent resources. *It is all of our continued efforts that will increase the likelihood of success in preventing school violence and keeping our schools and communities safe.*

Section II

Prevention Efforts

I. Overview of School Safety, Psychological Safety and Prevention

Schools today face many challenges to school safety. Those challenges come from within, as well as from outside the school community. For the last decade or more, schools have been encouraged to put efforts into all phases of safety and crisis planning: prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). The phases were somewhat revised in 2013 as the 5 missions of Preparedness: Prevention, Mitigation, Protection, Response and Recovery (U.S. Department of Education, et al., 2013).

How does one determine whether a school is really safe? A key component of establishing a safe school is preventing a crisis from happening in the first place or, in those incidents where a crisis cannot be prevented (i.e. natural disasters), to be prepared to respond to the crisis in order to mitigate the negative impact. When the problem of school violence became a serious consideration for schools beginning in the late 90's, especially following the Columbine High School shooting, some schools responded by increasing their security, employing more security officers and installing more cameras. Another common trend was the use of "zero-tolerance" policies. Such policies meant that a student would be automatically expelled for bringing a firearm to or making a threat at school. Those policies then expanded to include other weapons, and even objects that looked like weapons. Over time, the zero-tolerance policies became largely criticized for being ineffective in contributing to school safety, increasing school suspensions and expulsions, having a variety of negative outcomes for students, and were seen as contributing to disproportionality in disciplinary practices for several groups of students, including minority students and special education students (American Psychological Association, 2008; Skiba, 2010; Skiba & Rausch, 2006). These policies also did not account for the seriousness of the threat, or the degree of risk, and they failed to focus on preventative factors (Cornell, 2006).

A safe school is more than one that has good physical safety measures and is prepared in a crisis; it is also one that establishes and maintains a positive school climate and implements good prevention and intervention practices. The notion of psychological safety may be less familiar to some readers of this report. This concept is concerned with creation of a safe environment related to school climate, relationships within the building, and measures taken to ensure students feel safe at school and where both students and staff see it as a place where they can learn and teach and are free from psychological harm (Reeves, et al., 2010). School safety prevention efforts and mental health services should be developed along with crisis preparedness, development of response protocols and recovery support. *Physical safety and*

security and psychological safety and mental wellness go hand-in-hand and combine to provide comprehensive school safety efforts.

In 2013, *A Framework for Safe and Successful Schools* was authored by six professional organizations, including the National Association of School Psychologists, the American School Counselor Organization, the School Social Workers Association of America, the National Association of School Resource Officers, and both national organizations of elementary and secondary school principals (Cowan, et al., 2013). This document also emphasizes balancing needs for physical and psychological safety. Implemented, integrated services are seen as the most effective way to support school safety, prevention, and intervention services and student learning. This is referred to in schools as a multi-tiered system of supports (MTSS) and encompasses prevention and wellness promotion, universal efforts to address academic, behavioral, and emotional barriers to learning, implementation of evidence-based interventions that increase in intensity, monitoring of student progress to implemented interventions, and systematic data-based decision making about needs for services (Cowan et al., 2013; Reeves et al., 2010).

For the purposes of this report, the LPS and AHS prevention efforts that support psychological safety are embodied in the policies, practices, programs, and personnel in the schools. We note that some of these prevention efforts and related issues were not explored in any appreciable depth in the arbitration, but we believe it necessary and appropriate to expand the scope of our review to include them to provide benefit and show the interrelatedness of the efforts. The key elements reviewed here can be divided broadly into the categories of prevention planning, awareness and reporting efforts, mental health personnel, and disciplinary personnel and practices.

II. Prevention Planning and Provision of Services

There are system wide considerations to prevention planning and integration of the various phases of safety efforts. School safety, positive school climates and psychological safety are not achieved by singular actions like bringing in a speaker for an assembly or purchasing a designated program, but rather by effective comprehensive efforts requiring the dedication of leadership and staff and relevant community members (Cowan et al., 2013, Reeves et al., 2010).

The first step in the planning process is considered to be the development of a district level safety team (safe schools team) comprised of leadership responsible for overseeing safety, prevention, and intervention efforts and should include membership with content knowledge expertise and others of relevant stakeholder groups (CSSRC, 2014; Cowan et al., 2013; Reeves et al., 2010). This team is not the crisis management team, but may include members of that team. This safety team (safe schools team) helps to ensure common language and common vision for safety efforts, distributes responsibility for sustaining those efforts, examines relevant data, and then determines what is needed for implementation and accountability from schools.

This team should meet regularly to provide leadership around data collection and planning, problem solve, implement and manage particular strategies, such as development of materials and resources, training, coaching, and evaluation related to the district safety and prevention efforts (Reeves et al., 2010). Comprehensive school safety planning is not a one-time event, but a constant process that requires continual attention and sustained effort.

The next step is to collect and use a variety of data to help identify the degree and nature of the concerns with student safety in the school and community and determine priorities. First, school safety audits that evaluate physical safety of building sites are recommended (U.S. Department of Education, 2007; (U.S. Department of Education et al., 2013). That discussion is not seen as relevant to this review of prevention planning, but can be helpful to schools. Data gathering related to psychological safety issues is seen as more of a process rather than an event (Reeves et al., 2010). Data can be gathered and reviewed in several ways, some using existing data sources (i.e. suspensions, expulsions, suicide risk and threat assessment data) such as the data required for PBIS implementation. For other information that is not available in existing data, such as student, teacher, and parent attitudes, behaviors, perceptions and evaluation of the school climate and safety, schools may need to administer surveys or questionnaires. There are well-known limitations in schools as to the time and resources available to survey students, but it is clearly preferable to use a survey that has been shown to have adequate measurement of the variables and can be repeated over time to demonstrate progress. The Colorado Education Initiative, Colorado Department of Education, the Colorado School Safety Resource Center and others have worked to provide resources to schools with the toolkit developed in 2012 (Colorado Education Initiative, 2012). This toolkit provides more information about issues related to surveying about school climate and compares several survey options for schools.

A Review of LPS Prevention Planning

Since 2007, the Littleton Public Schools has identified a framework for a three-tiered model of social-emotional learning that could also be seen as their model for the multi-tiered system of supports. A multi-tiered system ideally contains universal efforts, usually thought to be for all students, all staff and all settings; targeted efforts, generally for students in smaller groups, for those who demonstrate concerning patterns of behavior, and; intensive level services for those students requiring the most intensive behavioral support, and intensive efforts. This can also be used as the identified framework for conceptualization for prevention planning.

LPS and AHS Prevention Planning in 2013

1. LPS had a defined multi-tiered model for Social Emotional Learning for students, a Coordinator of Student Support Services under Special Education, who provided consultation, resources and training and support to schools and mental health services. The Director of Special Education also provided consultation and support, as a Student

Intervention Team and use of the pyramid or multi-tiered system was required at all schools. The district provided support for behavior consultants (Thompson, 2015).

2. The Positive Behavior and Intervention Supports (PBIS) model, which is in use in many schools in Colorado and across the country, was promoted to LPS schools and supported with district coaching beginning in 07-08 with 8 schools. The behavior consultation team served as coaches for PBIS. By 2013, nineteen (19) schools in LPS used the PBIS model (Thompson, 2015).
 - a. PBIS is recognized as an effective framework to promote proactive strategies for defining, teaching, and supporting appropriate student behaviors to create positive school environments. Application of the model includes strategies for classrooms and non-teaching environments, such as the playground or cafeteria, and there is emphasis on regular data collection and review. The model has been supported for over twelve years through professional development and technical assistance provided by the Colorado Department of Education. AHS is not designated as a PBIS school.
3. The district had a Student Intervention Team (SIT) process in place with guidance from the district since 2010. AHS also had an SIT team process, which, at that time, was primarily conceptualized for academic support (Pramenko, 2015; Thompson, 2015).
4. Suicide prevention activities were emphasized, as the district (and specifically AHS) had experienced several suicides in the 2009-2010 school years.
5. LPS promoted Colorado School Safety Week and distributed a flyer that provided suggestions of activities for schools. AHS had activities planned for October 21-25, 2013 (LPS 02062).
6. The district has provided evidence of collection of data, such as disciplinary data, threat assessments, and suicide assessments over the years.

Identified Gaps in LPS and AHS Prevention Planning in 2013

1. While there was a framework for LPS SEB Services, there was no identified district level safety team (safe schools team) to plan and coordinate prevention and safety efforts that included leadership and other relevant departments or disciplines.
2. Schools in LPS, as in many other districts, operate with site-based management and decision-making in many aspect of education. Therefore efforts related to prevention and intervention components within the psychological safety framework differ from school to school. While there was a district framework for SEB Services, there was no district

driven accountability for schools for any specific components related to psychological safety.

3. Data gathering, as it relates generally to psychological safety and prevention, was in place at the district level with keeping of objective data, as to the number of suicide assessments, the number of threat assessments, etc. recommendations about a systematic approach. However, the district, and Arapahoe High School did not administer climate or other surveys of any kind to students.

LPS and AHS Prevention Planning in 2015

1. In October 2014, the district Safety and Mental Health Advisory Committee (SMHAC) was formed. The creation of this committee is seen as a positive step and was designed to gather input from various school and community stakeholder groups. Considered an advisory group to the Superintendent and the Board of Education, the group includes parents, mental health experts, community members, agency leaders, law enforcement representatives, teachers, students, and administrators and was established to review the programs and services in LPS that serve children at risk or in crisis. These include safety and security, mental health, and communications (LPS Safety & Mental Health Advisory Committee, 2015).
2. Positive Behavior and Intervention Supports (PBIS) is continuing at the 19 schools, with all four middle schools currently collecting data and identified as implementing the model to fidelity.
3. The Student Intervention Team (SIT) process continues in place at AHS and is supported by the district. This process has been expanded to include behavioral concerns.
4. In the Summer of 2014, the district took steps to realign systems at the district level with a goal of integrating differing aspects of social, emotional and behavioral support with discipline and mental health using their framework of a tiered approach. The Director of Social, Emotional, and Behavior Services began overseeing the disciplinary process and mental health services. There is a Director of Special Education who also provides direction and support to the Student Intervention Team process. The Coordinator of Student Support Services works now with alternative programs, Special Education, and SEB Services. Those three district personnel provide varying aspects of psychological safety support. (Thompson, personal communication, October 5, 2105).
5. There is evidence of district-encouraged promotion of Colorado Safe Schools Month each October with outline of activities and events across various aspects of prevention. In 2015, the provided information included Mental Health First Aid training, parent

workshops, suicide prevention and a page of “ideas” for schools. Safe 2 Tell posters were also distributed to schools.

6. In December 2015, the district began a mapping of resources and provision of services related to the Colorado Academic Standards for comprehensive health that now includes social-emotional wellness and violence prevention across grade levels (CDE, 2009). These are seen as universal efforts for all students, and demonstrate an effort to systematically look at components across the district.
7. At AHS, the school began an advisement class with students this year, on a limited basis. This is seen as an effort to improve the climate and culture and to address some issues such as reporting of concerns, responsible use of social media, etc.

Recommendations for Continuing Improvement to LPS Prevention Planning in 2015

1. LPS now has a Safety and Mental Health Advisory Committee acting in an advisory capacity. This is considered a good step to gain input from various stakeholder groups. They also have a district Emergency Planning and Safety Team. However, these groups do not appear to provide the same leadership function as an identified district safety team (safe schools planning team) that could coordinate the district’s prevention and psychological safety efforts, as well as the other phases of efforts. Such a safety team would include key leadership and various other relevant departments or disciplines. Stakeholder input can then be gained from SMHAC at defined intervals.
 - a. As many recommendations will come from the various reports of the arbitration, this team could also help to prioritize the next steps for LPS, given available resources.
 - b. While being respectful of the Littleton Public Schools’ and other Colorado school districts’ history and culture of site-based management, it is strongly recommended that school safety issues no longer be site-based in design. Certain expectations are best seen as district-driven for leadership and content expertise, coordinated planning, and compliance with best practices.

Some Best Practices Prevention Planning for ALL Schools

1. Establishment of a district safety team (safe schools planning team) to provide leadership and vision to coordinate efforts in all phases of a comprehensive safe schools plan and to provide the leadership and monitoring of the broadly defined psychological safety efforts in a district.
2. Multi-tiered planning and accountability for prevention and other psychological safety efforts. This helps identify what is expected as best practice at the universal level, for all

schools, students, and staff, and what is expected or provided at the other levels of intervention efforts

3. Data based decision-making should be used for identification of needs, capacity building, and progress in psychological safety and prevention over time.
 - a. Resource mapping of current district capacity can contribute to the planning and setting of priorities, given the limitations of every district's resources, time, and personnel. The process can then be repeated at school sites.
 - b. Nationwide or statewide data will not provide individual schools an accurate picture of their own students or community. Secondary schools are encouraged to participate in the Healthy Kids Colorado Survey or complete climate surveys that can also give them comparison data.
4. Ongoing accountability and monitoring of prevention and psychological safety efforts, based on the district vision and priorities.
5. The Colorado School Safety Resource Center has identified a variety of resources that can be helpful to school safety planning and school safety teams. A guide is available to identify key elements for districts and schools. The guide also provides resources for development of a comprehensive safe schools plan and there is an accompanying checklist of the elements for use by a team (CSSRC, 2014a; CSSRC, 2014b).

III. The Importance of Raising Awareness and Providing Reporting Mechanisms

Everyone shares in the responsibility for reducing the risk of violence. Maintaining order in schools, demonstrating mutual respect and caring for one another, and getting help for children who are troubled or in need of intervention for other issues, are the responsibilities of everyone in the school and in the community.

One of the foundations of identifying a student in crisis or interrupting a potential school attack situation is early detection. We know from education and mental health research that early intervention is best for a range of concerns, both academic and behavioral. This requires that those who have the most direct contact with students are made aware of the range of behaviors that can indicate a student of concern and then know where and how to best report the concern. Teachers and other school staff members interacting with children also need awareness training on child abuse and reporting requirements, signs of suicide awareness, and awareness of other potentially dangerous behaviors such as bullying and harassment, drug and alcohol misuse, etc. They also need to be informed about the process for referral of academic concerns.

The 2002 U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education study of 37 school violence incidents across the country indicated that 93% of those incidents were planned incidents, with over half of those having been planned for at least a month. In 81% of those incidents, at least

one other person knew of the act and in the majority of cases, more than one person knew, most often schoolmates or siblings. However, the vast majority of the attackers (92%) engaged in some behaviors causing concern to school officials, parents, teachers, police or fellow students. (Vossekuil et al., 2002). That has driven the recommendations that students, teachers, parents and others be trained to recognize behaviors of concern and report the concern. Multiple reporting methods are always encouraged, as some will more likely tell a trusted adult, while others may feel more comfortable reporting in an anonymous manner. A small study of 15 individuals with prior knowledge of school attacks indicated reporting was influenced by relationships at school and perceptions that the report would be taken seriously (Pollack et al., 2008). Another study of high school students found that the most common reason for not reporting threats was that students did not regard the threat as serious (Nekvasil & Cornell, 2012). Of course, the information must be reported in a timely manner when the concern is for the welfare of a student, the school, or the community.

One focus of the arbitration discovery questioning concerned the discussion of early warning signs first publicized by the federal government to schools in 1998 (Dwyer et al., 1998). These reviewers conceptualize awareness training in a broader sense, as student behavioral or emotional concerns relate to a *range* of behaviors and issues and not all of them are related to the potential for violence, but they may indicate a need for various interventions. There are some cautions about awareness training and the use of specific warning signs. It is important to avoid inappropriately labeling or stigmatizing individual students because they appear to fit a specific profile or set of early warning indicators. Caution must be taken not to misinterpret the signs. None of these signs alone is sufficient for predicting aggression and violence and it is inappropriate to use the early warning signs as a checklist against which to match individual children. They are not of equal significance or seriousness and it is not always possible to predict behaviors that lead to violence (Dwyer et al., 1998). Rather, the warning signs, especially when presented in combination, indicate a need for further analysis to determine appropriate intervention. The signs are best used for teachers to refer students so that other professionals may evaluate and consult with the child's caregivers to determine a course of action.

Awareness training should also help students and adults learn how to identify threats, in addition to other behaviors of concern and then teach them *the importance* of reporting behaviors. This awareness can provide the first step in a comprehensive threat assessment process. Breaking the "code of silence" among students is not easy, but the message must be that "telling keeps people safe". The *Essentials of School Threat Assessment* guidance first created by the Colorado School Safety Resource Center in 2010-11 also includes awareness training as a key foundational element of establishing a good threat assessment process. Behaviors must get reported in a timely manner in order for the threat assessment process to provide early intervention.

Safe2Tell has been a valuable anonymous reporting resource in Colorado since its creation in 2004 following a Columbine Commission recommendation. Safe2Tell data indicates that use has increased by 53% yearly since its creation (Safe2Tell, 2015). Reports are made about a variety of

concerns ranging from suicide to weapons and planned school attacks. Some districts have also created and promoted their own reporting systems for the district.

A Review of LPS and AHS Awareness and Reporting Efforts

A Review of LPS and AHS Awareness and Reporting Efforts 2013

1. Safe2Tell was promoted on the LPS website in 2013. At AHS, Safe2Tell was promoted through posters, and verbal reminders were given to students related to the need to report concerns; “let someone know, let an adult know” (Pramenko, 2015). LPS received seventeen (17) reports to Safe2Tell during the 2011-12 school year and 40 during the 2013-14 school year, which demonstrated evidence of awareness by some of the district’s students.
2. There were also seven slides in the LPS Threat Assessment Training related to warning signs, including one slide on Safe2Tell and one for a “Turn and Talk” activity for discussion of how teaching staff get trained to recognize concerns and report behaviors of concern (Exhibit 4, 2015).
3. Student IDs at AHS in 2013 had the phone number of the Suicide Prevention Lifeline, as well as the main office and guidance office phone numbers.

Identified Gaps in 2013

1. While reminders were provided to students about reporting concerns, students did not seem to be trained in any systematic way to know the basic behaviors of concern that need to be reported. Safe2 Tell was not on student ID badges in 2013. The Sheriff’s report has interviews with several students who reportedly either knew about or were shown weapons by KP and never reported the weapon or a concern to staff or Safe2Tell (ACSO, 2014).
2. Some teachers and administrators at AHS reported confusion about FERPA privacy protections of student information and some thought it was a barrier in some way to reporting or discussing behavioral concerns (Lombardi, 2015; Pramenko, 2015). It is unclear where this misunderstanding comes from and how much training teachers get related to FERPA in their university training programs. Administrators are required to take some type of school law course in their training, but the content may differ.

LPS and AHS Awareness and Reporting Efforts 2015

1. There has been increased awareness and use of Safe2Tell in LPS and at AHS.
 - a. Safe2Tell phone number is now included on AHS ID badges in 2015.
 - b. Increased Safe2Tell reports are coming to LPS, with 74 reported for the 2014-15 school year and 49 reports in the 2015-16 school year until December 31, 2015 (Grace, 2015). At AHS, specific reminders about reporting concerns are discussed with students at class meetings.
 - c. This school year, the administration at AHS ordered the printing of 16 additional Safe2Tell posters that were placed around the building (Pramenko, 2015). That is also a positive effort to remediate an identified gap in 2013.
 - d. The principal at AHS receives notifications of Safe2Tell reports, along with the Director of Security and the Director of SEB Services. At AHS, that Safe2Tell report is now shared with every administrator and counselor at AHS by the principal (Pramenko, personal communication, December 9, 2015).
 - e. In 2015 LPS began piloting the new Safe2Tell app and feedback was provided. The Director of Security now gets tips immediately on his phone and it also goes to the school Principal, among others. It is reported that the system seems to be working effectively (Grace, personal communication, November 9, 2015).
2. Additional training has been provided to AHS staff. Clarification and additional training on FERPA provisions and exceptions was provided to AHS staff in February 2014 to review the provisions of the law and the exceptions. Some components of recommended awareness training for staff occurred at AHS in 2014 and again in 2015.
3. At AHS, a new “Teacher Contact Tab” has been added to the Infinite Campus system at AHS, where teachers can now record student conferences, parent contacts, and referrals to counselors (Meredith, 2015; Pramenko, personal communication, December 9, 2015). This is seen as an effort to remediate gaps in reported information and communication and to create a vortex for compiling of behavioral data from teachers. Parent notifications are now sent by email every other week if a student has failing grades.

Recommendations for Continuing Improvement to LPS Awareness and Reporting Efforts

1. Awareness training on a variety of relevant topics is recommended for all school employees and students. Training should include identification of the warning signs of troubled kids, identification of threats, awareness of child abuse and reporting requirements, awareness of signs of depressed or suicidal students, identifying drug and alcohol misuse, harassment and bullying, self-injury, and other topics that require reporting.

2. Training should include specific reminders of the district’s security reporting number, Safe2Tell, and the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline. Other best practice recommendations related to training of students and staff are included below.

Some Best Practices in Awareness and Reporting for ALL Schools

1. All members of every school community should be trained in the indicators of behavioral and emotional concerns, knowledge about multiple reporting systems, and the importance of timely reporting.
 - a. Teachers and other school staff need awareness training that includes identification of the warning signs of troubled kids, identification of threats, awareness of child abuse and reporting requirements, awareness of signs of depressed or suicidal students, identifying drug and alcohol misuse, harassment and bullying, self-injury, and other topics that require reporting. Training should also include the importance of reporting in a timely manner. This is important at all schools.
 - b. Parents also need information about recognizing behaviors of concern and the importance of reporting concerns to school staff to obtain possible intervention for their child.
 - c. The student “code of silence” is seen as a strong factor. Adults need to take specific steps to try to address this from an early age. It can be helpful to describe it as “getting help for friends or other people” and that “telling helps keep people safe”. Students should be given information about reporting various types of concerns, including threats, and where to report them, including awareness about Safe 2 Tell, any district reporting mechanisms, the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline, and telling a trusted adult at home or at school. The notion that students “are our eyes and ears” stated by the AHS principal is correct (Pramenko, 2015).
 - Schools should provide students a review of important policies regarding student code of conduct every year (PBIS model recommends reminders two times a year about key elements of conduct code or behavioral expectations).
 - Safe2Tell has various resources available on its website to assist in training, including discussion questions for high school students (safe2tell.org).
2. Teachers are not required to take school law classes, but privacy of school and special education records is often emphasized in education programs. FERPA was designed to protect student education records and should not be a barrier to discussing or reporting personal observations of behaviors of concern. FERPA misunderstandings are evident enough to require a reminder about FERPA to all new and current administrative and

teaching staff in all schools. The misunderstandings are also commonplace enough across the country that the Family Policy Compliance Office at the U.S. Department of Education and the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) websites both include information about balancing privacy and safety, the health and safety exceptions to the law, and the misunderstandings of the law on the sharing of personal information (<http://familypolicy.ed.gov/faq-page/ferpa-school-officials> and <http://rems.ed.gov/K12FERPA.aspx>). Information on this topic is also presented as part of the Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operation Plans (U.S. Department of Education, et al., 2013).

IV. Provision of Mental Health Services as Prevention

It has long been recognized that mental health concerns must be addressed if schools are to function satisfactorily and students are to succeed at school. A variety of psychosocial problems can affect learning and performance of students. Such problems are exacerbated as effects of performing poorly at school and punishment for misbehavior leads to school failure. School-based personnel and school-linked programs have long been developed for purposes of early intervention, crisis intervention and prevention, treatment, and promotion of positive social and emotional development. Promoting good mental health in schools is about establishing comprehensive, multifaceted approaches that help ensure schools are caring and supportive places that maximize learning and well-being and strengthen students, families, schools, and communities (School Mental Health project, n.d.). As many as one in five children are reported to have mental health problems and many of those students do not receive assistance outside of the school setting (CDC, 2013; NAMI, n.d.). Schools play an important part in early identification of and intervention for these problems.

While no single strategy will create a safe school, collaborative efforts among administrators, teachers, school mental health personnel, school resource officers, parents, and community agencies provide a multi-disciplinary approach to support services (NASP, 2015). The mental health personnel in schools, when used effectively, can help to provide services for those students exhibiting early disruptive behavior, significant school adjustment problems, and across the levels in a multi-tiered service model (Derochers, December 2014).

For the purposes of this report, mental health services in schools are conceptualized as those services provided by school psychologists, school social workers, and school guidance counselors.

A Review of LPS and AHS Mental Health Services

Mental Health Services at LPS and AHS in 2013

1. In 2013 the district employed twenty (20) School Psychologists, twelve (12) School Social Workers and twenty-six (26) School Counselors (sometimes referred to as Guidance Counselors). Those personnel groups provided a range of counseling, assessment, and intervention services to students and families. AHS had one psychologist and four counselors in 2013.
2. The district provided monthly meetings for School Psychologists and School Social workers. School counselors were invited to attend, as possible, but their duties are usually conceptualized somewhat differently in schools, especially with regard to Special Education and intervention support.
3. A mental health resource library was on the district intranet with all forms and guidance in a variety of areas (suicide, threats, discipline, etc.).
4. The district had an in-district trainer in the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training program (ASIST). Review of agendas for meetings indicates regular updates to training in the area of suicide prevention for school psychologists and social workers. ASIST training was required for all mental health staff (beginning 2008) and all high school staff had been trained in alertness for suicide signs with safeTALK prior to 2013.
5. Communication with outside service providers or evaluators is considered best practice to meet the needs of students. At AHS, in the case in question, there was an attempt in the 2013 threat assessment meeting to gain parent permission to speak to outside service providers and one follow-up attempt was noted (Depo. Exhibit 35; Song, 2015).

Identified Gaps in Mental Health Services 2013

1. Agendas for meetings showed that school psychologists and social workers received updates to suicide prevention training, but specific threat assessment and threat management topics were not seen on agendas.
2. At AHS, in the case that was the subject of arbitration, there could have been improvement in the mental health teaming and communication with disciplinary personnel and to the follow-up after a threat assessment.

Mental Health Services at LPS and AHS in 2015

1. The district requested an increase in mental health staffing in both 2014 and 2015 and those increases were approved by the Board of Education. Some of the goals of the increases were to build multi-disciplinary teams, increase the targeted interventions provided to students in the middle level of the framework and to increase direct counseling and case management.
 - a. LPS mental health staffing has increased since 2013 to twenty-four (24) psychologists, twenty (20) school social workers and twenty-seven (27) counselors. Increases were first made to secondary school support in 2014 and to elementary school support in 2015. That represents about a 22.5% increase for mental health support staff since 2013.
 - b. Specifically, at AHS, mental health support has increased over the last two years from one school psychologist to two and four (4) counselors to six (6).
2. LPS meetings and updated training continues monthly for the psychologists and social workers, with twice-yearly meetings including counselors. The format has changed to include updates from the district and breakout sessions so that peer consultation can occur. A review of agenda items shows discussions about social-emotional intervention and updates on community resources.
3. In 2015, AHS continues weekly administrative team meetings but they have added regular every other week meetings between its administrative staff and its mental health support staff that includes all administrators, counselors and psychologists (Pramenko, personal communication, December 9, 2015). This is seen also as an added effort to improve communication, teaming, problem solving, and better coordination of efforts on behalf of students, as well as better monitoring and follow-up of kids of concern.
4. Guidance for use of the Infinite Campus (IC) Contact Log has been updated for counselors, school psychologists and social workers in the district.
5. Suicide prevention work continues, with an LPS ASIST program trainer. During promotion for Colorado Safe Schools Month in 2015, parent and community workshops were offered in SafeTALK Suicide Prevention. LPS has materials for employees provided to help direct best practice in assessment, documentation, referrals, and communication with parents. Other promotion for the month included offerings for staff and community training in Mental Health First Aid (MHFA).

Recommendations for Continuing Improvement for Mental Health Services at LPS in 2015

1. The district has demonstrated yearly efforts to update school psychologists and school social workers about available community resources and suicide assessment. These

mental health providers could also use the opportunity to continue and update their professional growth in threat assessment and threat management strategies and teaming with disciplinary personnel through peer consultation and case practice.

Some Best Practices in Delivery of Mental Health Services for ALL Schools

1. All national professional organizations have provided suggested ratios for staff to students in individual schools. Best available data on national recommendations are School Psychologist: 1:500-700, School Social Workers: 1:250, School Counselors: 1:250, and School Nurses: 1:750. Information reviewed from a couple of years ago shows Colorado schools to be staffed at significantly lower than recommended ratios. School districts are encouraged to increase staffing for mental health support as resources allow.
2. School mental health support personnel with their training and knowledge are important to the threat assessment and threat management process in schools. Regular professional growth should also include regular updates and opportunities for peer consultation, knowledge about the availability of community resources, and case practice in threat assessment, suicide prevention, and on other violence prevention topics.

V. Disciplinary Personnel and Practices as Prevention

Disciplining students, particularly those with chronic or serious behavior problems, is a long-standing challenge for educators. They must balance the needs of the school community and those of the individual student. Generally, school discipline is designed to enforce the code of conduct and address misbehaviors. However, increasingly, school discipline is viewed as a method of effectively teaching positive behavior. To that end, school administrators providing discipline in today's schools need a good understanding of the law and policy, understanding of student behavior, best practices in communication and partnering with parents and effective intervention strategies.

Current research and legislation offer alternative 'best practice' strategies that support the safe education of *all* students. Positive discipline strategies are research-based procedures that focus on increasing desirable behaviors instead of simply decreasing undesirable behaviors through punishment. They emphasize the importance of making positive changes in the child's environment in order to improve the child's behavior. Such changes may entail the use of positive reinforcement, modeling, supportive teacher-student relations, family support, and assistance from a variety of educational and mental health specialists (NASP, 2002). Interventions that target low levels of inappropriate behavior before they escalate into violence can significantly reduce the need for harsh consequences later. PBIS principles have also been demonstrated to effectively address misbehaviors (Horner, et al., 2015).

Disciplinary practices can be seen as opportunities for teaching and management of behavior. There is no federal guidance related to effective discipline and positive behavior. However, schools have been encouraged reduce punitive measures, such as zero tolerance policies and increase their efforts to teach positive behavior as early intervention (Cowan et al., 2013). Administrative and disciplinary personnel need continuing professional education to identify key indicators of students' mental health problems, as they are often the initial contact with students in distress and provide an excellent opportunity to obtain early intervention (Cowan, et al., 2013).

Colorado school districts annually report the number of incidents and disciplinary actions taken for certain types of student behavior to the Colorado Department of Education in accordance with the Safe School Act enacted in 2000. The passage of House Bill 12-1345 in 2012 eliminated mandatory expulsions for certain behaviors related to assaults, weapons, robbery, and drugs and instructed schools to use prevention, restorative justice and other approaches to address misconduct (C.R.S. 22-32-109.1 (2)(II)(B)). Since that time, there have been continuing efforts by the CDE Office of Learning Supports and the CSSRC Alternative Discipline Workgroup to provide materials, training and guidance on positive school discipline and alternatives to suspension (CDE, 2015, September). Creative Discipline and Alternatives to Suspension information can be found on the CDE website, including information provided and adapted from the Littleton Public Schools (<https://www.cde.state.co.us/pbis/creativedisiplinealternativestosuspensionhand-out>).

Specific behavior violations of school conduct codes at a school district get condensed for reporting into the categories defined in the law. In April 2015 the Colorado Department of Education also provided updated information for clarification about behavior statutes related to school discipline and attendance and also provided a Guide for Determining Most Serious Incidents (CDE, April 2015a; CDE, April 2015b). Detrimental behavior is described as behavior on school property that is detrimental to the welfare or safety of other students or of school personnel, including behavior that creates a threat of physical harm to the student or to other students.

A Review of LPS and AHS Discipline Practices as Prevention

Discipline Personnel and Practices at LPS and AHS in 2013

1. LPS district administrators provided annual trainings and updates to the Code of Conduct in the annual training to administrators. LPS had guidance on expulsions, manifestation hearings, and completing the behavior log. LPS Board policy JICDA and regulations outlined in the student code of conduct, including those for bullying, threats and off-campus events, and JIH outlined information on student interrogations and searches (Deposition Exhibit 1, LPS 01058-01128).

2. LPS had a Restorative Justice Intervention Program.
3. AHS had a defined code of conduct provided to students and parents, and reviews of the code of conduct were provided to students at AHS in class meetings at the beginning of the year (Pramenko, 2015).
4. AHS had weekly administrative team meetings. At those meetings, issues related to individual students were discussed, including KP on September 9th and 30th 2013. (Depo. Exhibit 12). The AHS Principal also met with assistant principals for individual meetings. Notes from the AP and Principal meeting also show KP was discussed on September 6th and 13th of 2013. (Depo. Exhibit 12; Kolasa, 2015; Meredith, 2015; Pramenko, 2015).

Identified Gaps in Disciplinary Practices in 2013

1. At AHS, in the case that was the subject of arbitration, there could have been improvement in the disciplinary communication and teaming with mental health personnel and to the follow-up plan and monitoring after a threat assessment.
2. Not all disciplinary or behavioral data was recorded for a record that could be obtained easily.
3. The understanding and practice of searches of students was unclear to some administrative staff (Meredith, 2015).
4. Through various teacher reports, it appears that AHS employees did not seem to have a unified understanding of what behaviors of concern should be reported to the office and what should be “teacher managed”. There were apparent gaps in timely reporting of behaviors of concern in classrooms and at off-campus events (the reader is referred to Section V of this report for more review of the AHS case).

Discipline Personnel and Practices at LPS and AHS in 2015

1. LPS has new oversight from the Director of SEB Services that was an effort to better coordinate training and integration of support services for behavior.
2. At AHS the number of teaching staff has increased, however, the number of school administrators at AHS has stayed consistent at 5 between 2013 and 2015.
3. A review of the latest LPS district training provided to administrative and disciplinary personnel shows improvements in provision of data, discussion of safety as a first priority, mental health needs, emphasis on teaming with others in the school, considering

timelines of incidents and taking time to gather information, as well as updates to the student code of conduct.

4. AHS continues its weekly administrative team meetings, but now AHS has regular every other week meetings between its administrative staff and its mental health support staff that includes all administrators, counselors and psychologists (Pramenko, personal communication, December 9, 2015). This is seen also as an added effort to improve communication, teaming, problem solving, and better coordination of efforts on behalf of students, as well as better monitoring and follow-up of kids of concern.
5. LPS has shown development of alternatives to suspension, as promoted by the Colorado Department of Education and now has a Help Sheet for Alternatives to Suspension that can help provide effective discipline.
6. The district has also expanded and clarified the Guidance for Completion of the Behavior Log in the Infinite Campus (IC) system.
7. Training was provided to AHS administrative and teaching staff to clarify FERPA provisions about protected information and the exceptions on February 12, 2014.
8. A new “Teacher Contact Tab” has been added to the Infinite Campus system at AHS in 2015, where teachers can now record student conferences, parent contacts, and referrals to counselors. Other teachers, all administrators, and mental health support staff can also view this record on the IC system.
9. The primary author conducted a review of AHS disciplinary data over four years from 2011-2015 that was provided as part of the discovery (LPS DR 000001-000089). The data was limited to incidents in certain categories of behavioral violations and descriptors were very brief for each event, showing the primary violation code and the resulting disciplinary action. The primary author is not a school administrator nor specifically trained related to discipline. The review was completed by focusing on what was determined by the reviewer as the significant incidents for review.
 - a. There were 102 behavioral incidents during the years in question that were examined in the review. Of those, 26 were determined to include behavior that could be considered a threat to safety in some way, including the KP incident. This percentage of incidents at AHS is consistent with senior high school data from 2013-14 reported by the Colorado Department of Education (CDE, 2015, May).
 - b. For all of those incidents involving threats of any kind, threat assessments were completed and included in Deposition Exhibit 39. Disciplinary action with at least one day of out-of-school suspension followed for 25 of the 26 incidents reviewed, except the KP case had documented that mom kept the student home for 3 days.

Recommendations for Continuing Improvement for Discipline Personnel and Practices at LPS and AHS in 2015

1. School district administrators and disciplinary personnel could benefit from clear guidance related to the coding of behaviors and district policy and practices on “reasonable suspicion” searches and best practice suggestions in the search of social media.
2. AHS is piloting the new Teacher Contact Tab on the Infinite Campus system. If feedback is positive, this should be used at other LPS schools to help provide a consolidation of information.
3. Behavior Detail Logs should reflect the completion of a threat assessment for another consolidation of data over time.

Some Best Practices Using School Discipline as Prevention for ALL Schools

1. PBIS principles include a positive approach to discipline that includes teaching behavioral expectations to students. This principle can still be effectively used in schools that are not using other aspects of the PBIS model. Teaching of appropriate behavior should be explicit and should be started in school at an early age. For students of all ages, this includes regular reminders of the behavioral expectations and a continuum of procedures for discouraging rule violations.
2. Clarity should be provided to teaching staff about what behaviors are expected to be referred to the office and what the typical behaviors are that they are expected to manage, such as tardiness to class, moderate attendance difficulties, typical misbehaviors, communication with parents, etc.
3. Each school should have a method for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the discipline system. Regular review of discipline data can be helpful in that process.
4. Collaboration between disciplinary personnel and mental health personnel can be an effective tool to best problem-solve about difficult students and difficult concerns.
5. Most importantly, school administrators and disciplinary personnel need policy, practice, and legal updates regularly. They also need a skill set to effectively address behavioral issues, including awareness of mental health issues. They need to clearly understand the restrictions and exceptions to FERPA, what information can be shared on a “need to know” basis, and the district’s policy and practices on “reasonable suspicion” searches and best practice suggestions in the search of social media.

VI. Prevention Efforts: Key Findings and Recommendations

Littleton Public Schools (LPS) and Arapahoe High School (AHS) have shown numerous efforts to improve prevention planning, coordination of services, provide increased reporting awareness, increased mental health services at AHS, and to train disciplinary staff. Some of these efforts include:

1. Creation of the SMHAC committee in 2014 and its renewal of charge for this school year (2015-16) has contributed to participation of various stakeholder groups.
2. Increased promotion of Safe 2 Tell, including the addition of the number on the back of student IDs at AHS. There is evidence of increased use of that reporting system through the number of calls the district is now receiving.
3. Confusion by some staff at AHS regarding FERPA is unclear, but the district has provided training for clarification. It is noted that the FERPA misunderstandings are evident enough around the country that the U.S. Department of Education and the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools assistance website has information about the misunderstandings.
4. Mental health staffing has increased significantly in the district and at AHS since 2013.
5. Disciplinary staff training now includes discussions of safety as a first priority, considering mental health needs and teaming.

Recommendations for the Littleton Public Schools Going Forward

1. Development of a district safety (safe schools planning) team, that can best help to prioritize recommendations from this and other reports, and set a direction to guide and monitor school safety efforts going forward.
2. That district safety team should expand the use of data sources to further identify district needs and monitor progress over time. Secondary schools should be encouraged to participate in the Healthy Kids Colorado Survey or the district should consider use of a climate survey.
3. Provide all school staff and school students yearly training to increase awareness of the indicators of behavioral and emotional concerns, knowledge about using multiple reporting systems, and the importance of timely reporting.
4. District mental health personnel need continuing professional development in threat assessment and threat management strategies and teaming with disciplinary personnel.
5. Administrators need continuing professional development related to identification of behaviors of concern, and also need continuing specific training about legal and policy issues related to FERPA “need to know” and “reasonable suspicion” related to searches. This needs to be reviewed regularly for school administrative personnel.

Some Prevention Recommendations for ALL Schools

Providing good prevention efforts is multi-faceted, and districts and schools are encouraged to think of early, integrated, and coordinated efforts to provide the most benefit to all students. The following prevention recommendations in this report are designed to help *all* districts improve their psychological safety and prevention efforts.

1. A district level school safety team (safe schools planning team is recommended to all districts. This team would be most effective as a representative group from leadership, various safety, prevention, behavioral and special education services, and various grade levels to discuss and proactively address the district's needs and services, in all physical and psychological safety areas, Prevention – Recovery.
 - a. The purposes of this team would be to assess strengths and gaps in existing services and supports, to set priorities from best practice recommendations, to oversee progress with the district priorities, determine school site expectations and help to determine compliance with best practices in school safety.
 - b. Schools are also encouraged to have a school safety team at the school site level. That team should also meet regularly and plan and review efforts at the school site level. Site based data will then drive variance in site based decisions related to the outline of best practices from the district.

2. Psychological safety and prevention is best driven by data. Districts and schools are encouraged to review a variety of existing data regularly to assist in setting priorities and to provide monitoring of their efforts over time.
 - a. Secondary schools are also encouraged to consider the addition of surveys to gather the view of student attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions. A climate survey is best seen as also gathering teacher data and parent data also, as possible.
 - b. All districts and school will have practical considerations such as funding sources and staff resources regarding implementation of this recommendation. Other considerations include deciding what to measure, whom to survey, the method for surveying, the time required, etc. The resource from the Colorado Education Initiative (2012) can be reviewed for additional items of consideration about surveys and available resources.

3. Increased awareness of indicators of behavioral and emotional concerns, knowledge about multiple reporting systems, and the importance of timely reporting should take place *throughout every school and community*. Awareness about district systems for reporting and Safe2Tell should be provided to students and staff in all schools and school districts across Colorado. Information should also be provided to parents and community partners. In the review of the AHS incident, there was information about concerns across the school, the students, the parents, law enforcement and in the community that was not reported or gathered to allow for needed intervention to occur before the tragedy.

- a. Any effort to support a statewide promotion of the anonymous Safe2Tell system is seen as helpful. The reporting system has been in existence since 2004, yet very student, staff and parent may not be aware of it. This is an important addition to safety and prevention efforts.
4. FERPA misunderstandings are evident enough to require a reminder about FERPA to new and current administrative and teaching staff in all schools. The misunderstandings are also commonplace enough across the country that the Family Policy Compliance Office at the U.S. Department of Education and the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) websites both include information about balancing privacy and safety, the health and safety exceptions to the law, and the misunderstandings of the law on the sharing of personal information (<http://familypolicy.ed.gov/faq-page/ferpa-school-officials> and <http://rems.ed.gov/K12FERPA.aspx>).
5. Many professionals in a school help to support students' positive mental health. The mental health personnel mentioned above, school nurses, and other instructional support personnel all work to provide support to students. School-based mental health can service to support a positive school climate, as well as to provide direct intervention to students. Colorado schools seemed to be staffed at significantly lower levels than national recommendations for school mental health support staff. Given limitations to available resources, it remains a challenge for some districts to meet the recommended standards, but increasing the availability of mental health resources would likely be beneficial both to individual students and to general school safety.
 - a. Teaming of mental health support staff with administrative and disciplinary staff is important, as it provides integrated efforts from professionals with differing expertise. This teaming approach can also be linked with academic support and community partners. Parents also play an important part in mental health support and school efforts should also be aimed at partnering with parents in a variety of ways, in the best interest of kids and safety.
 - b. Regular professional development related to crisis prevention, effective intervention, using community partnerships, effective strategies for working with parents, developing a positive school climate, etc. are especially important for these employee groups who provide services to students.
6. School administrative and disciplinary personnel need time for continuing education also. The important topics such as best practices in effective discipline, FERPA clarifications, information about identification of indicators of mental health concerns, and “reasonable suspicion” searches are just some of the topics needing regular updates.
 - a. Schools should also use their own disciplinary data to review consistency or effectiveness of their practices. A review of their data may also determine consistency with CDE guidelines and drive topics for continuing education.

- b. Completion of school threat assessments should be noted in electronic record keeping for individual students. This would help to maintain the knowledge of that data source over time.

Section III

Preparedness, Mitigation, and Protection

I. Preparedness, Protection, and Mitigation as Prevention

The primary scope of this review was the examination of the psychological safety and threat assessment issues in the arbitration discovery related to the tragic incident at AHS in 2013. However, there are recommendations at the federal and state level that have been made to schools related to the need for emergency preparedness, mitigation, and protection. Also, aspects of physical safety can also be seen with a prevention lens, as means to reduce the likelihood that a crisis event will occur and mitigation to reduce the loss of life or property damage related to an event (U.S. Department of Education, et al., 2013; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013, 2015). The reader is referred to additional information likely provided in another report of the facts and issues more closely examining preparedness, protection, and physical safety efforts of the Littleton Public Schools.

The primary reviewer determined that some of the preparedness mitigation and protection information provided during the discovery process, two visits to the building, and during a follow up interview with the LPS Director of Safety and Security and AHS Principal was deemed important to include in this report. This is not meant to be a review of Emergency Preparedness, Mitigation, and Protection measures in LPS or at AHS. This section is only an overview of those aspects seen as related to prevention in a broad sense for schools.

1. LPS has an Emergency Planning and Safety Committee that has been in existence since the year 2000. This committee met monthly until 2013, includes an Assistant Superintendent, the Director of Safety and Security, and representatives from various levels of principals, maintenance, mental health, Special Education, the Littleton Police Department, and Arapahoe County Sheriff's representatives (Grace, personal communication November 9, 2015).
 - a. LPS has been using Incident Command principles in school emergency management templates since 2001, with revisions made in 2009 to be compliant with aspects of SB 08-181 and SB 11-172 and the changes in the provisions of the Colorado Safe Schools Act (C.R.S. 22.32.109.1).
 - b. The LPS district has had radio interoperability capability through radio systems for a long time and with ACSO since 2001. Recommendations for radio interoperability date back to 1999 and to the Columbine Commission report. That was seen as an effective tool for schools in this active shooter emergency situation in 2013 (Grace, personal communication, November 9, 2015).

- c. LPS has used an electronic school emergency planning software program (SEMPS) since 2011 and has electronic availability of school based emergency management plans. LPS schools updated these electronic emergency plans yearly.
 - d. School sites have been provided with classroom emergency flip charts that provide a reference for emergency actions for various types of emergency situations and for “go bags” in the case of emergencies.
 - e. LPS District Security provides ICS tabletop scenarios for practice and the Director or security staff attends various crisis drills at the schools (Grace, 2015).
 - At AHS, a lockdown drill was completed in October of 2013 and included attendance by the Director of Security, district leadership staff and the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office. Information gained in that drill practice was reviewed and input provided from the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office. That information on active shooter, evacuations and lockdown was presented at a faculty meeting in November 2013 and all the drill review was thought to be helpful the day of the shooting (Pramenko, 2015).
 - f. LPS District Security provided documentation of numerous other efforts over the years and recognition for their physical safety efforts.
2. LPS District Security includes 10 staff members who provide 24 hours a day, 7 days a week dispatch and patrols of LPS buildings and sites.
- a. LPS district security staff includes those certified as Red Cross Trainers in First Aid, AED, and as CPI trainers. They train staff around the district in these prevention and intervention techniques.
 - CPI is a program to teach non-violent crisis intervention. CPI teaches staff to identify behaviors that could lead to a crisis, most effectively respond to prevent the situation from escalating, and to use verbal and nonverbal techniques to defuse hostile behavior and resolve a crisis before it can become violent. CPI training for staff provides a focus on prevention, by teaching strategies for safely defusing anxious, hostile, or violent behavior at the earliest possible stage.
 - b. The LPS Director of Security collaborated with Safe2Tell in 2015 for the development of the new Safe2Tell phone app. He provided feedback, gets tips immediately, and is positive about Safe2Tell responsiveness (Grace, personal communication November 9, 2015).
3. The district schools have designated campus supervisors at the school sites. These supervisors are directed and supervised by the principals.
- a. At this time campus supervisors are not required to attend the security staff training in CPI mentioned above, as they are school site staff, and not supervised from the district level.

- b. CPI training has been seen as valuable in schools for many years as another way to provide awareness and understanding of behavior and skill training for staff that have daily contact with students. It also provides them with effective strategies for de-escalating disruptive behavior in non-violent ways.
 - c. The district is encouraged to consider this training as a requirement for all campus monitors to enhance prevention efforts.
4. At AHS and LPS, there have been continued efforts to enhance safety and security since 2013. Many of those were already part of plans for security upgrades and security management systems provided in dedication of funding from approval of a 2012 bond for the district.
- a. After the incident on December 13, 2013, AHS had up to 8 additional staff for campus supervision thru May 2014.
 - b. AHS had 4 campus supervisors in 2013, and they now have five.
 - c. AHS has added stations for personnel at 2 main entrances to the building, complete with Internet and communication access.
 - d. AHS has installed the Lobby Guard system at the main entrance to check the identification of visitors and visitor badges are issued by the campus supervisors.
 - e. At AHS security camera upgrades had been scheduled before the incident. Those upgrades were scheduled to be completed during the winter break 2013 and have been made.

II. Preparedness, Protection, and Mitigation as Prevention: Key Findings and Recommendations

While this report is not a review of preparedness, emergency planning or security in the Littleton Public Schools or at Arapahoe High School, some aspects of these efforts were considered as contributing to prevention of crisis or emergencies and reviewed as part of a comprehensive approach to school safety.

Findings Related to the Littleton Public Schools

1. The Littleton Public Schools has a long history of actively engaging and improving their emergency preparedness and security systems over the years. They have worked to continually improve in these areas, including efforts to make needed revisions after 2008 Colorado legislation and to implement strategic planning for improvements to safety and security allowed with a 2012 bond allocation.
2. LPS has a district security office with 24 hour, seven days a week security staff of 10. The district security staff provides dispatch, patrol, and several types of training to other personnel in the district.

Recommendations for the Littleton Public Schools Going Forward

1. The school sites have campus supervisors at each school that are directed and supervised by principals or assistant principals. These campus supervisors are seen as a tool for prevention, detection, and early intervention (disruption) in their daily interactions with students. The campus supervisors at LPS school sites could benefit from regular and ongoing training.
 - a. CPI or other similar training is also recommended to provide awareness and skills training for campus supervisors.
 - b. The campus supervisor group should also be provided the same type of awareness and reporting training recommended for all school personnel.

Recommendations for ALL Schools

1. All campus security or campus supervision staff should have regular training in awareness of behaviors of concern and strategies and skills for best practice in non-violent crisis intervention to help diffuse situations and students and to resolve crises before they become violent.

Section IV

Threat Assessment: Process, Training, and Documentation

I. An Overview of Threat Assessment in Schools

While we are reminded that school attacks are rare in occurrence, they clearly have a tremendous and lasting effect on the school in which it occurred, the surrounding community, and often, the nation as a whole. In the aftermath of such incidents, questions arise as to what could be done to prevent future incidents. In June 1999, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education began a collaborative effort to answer questions about school attacks, and the result was the *Safe School Initiative*, an extensive examination of 37 incidents of targeted school shootings and school attacks that occurred in the United States beginning with the earliest identified incident in 1974 through May 2000 (Vossekuil, et al., 2002). That report included the use of the term "targeted violence" in school settings, describing school shootings and other school-based attacks where the school was deliberately selected as the location for the attack and was not simply a random site of opportunity. Threat assessment in schools grew from the results of that initiative as a violence prevention strategy that begins with the evaluation of students who threaten to harm others or engage in concerning or attack-related behaviors and is usually followed by intervention planning designed to reduce the risk of violence. Schools have been encouraged to use a threat assessment process of inquiry in federal guidance since 2000 (Fein et al., 2002, 2004; O'Toole, 2000; Vossekuil et al., 2002).

The growing problem of student-based threats of violence was also discussed at an FBI national conference on school violence within three months of the Columbine High School shootings. Experts from various fields, including law, mental health and education came together to examine those schools that had been involved in a school shooting (O'Toole, 2000). The FBI and other experts who convened agreed that there was no distinct profile or profiling system that would be useful in identifying potential school shooters, but recommended an approach that involved inquiry and careful investigation of the threats made by students, as well as implementation of procedures to address such threats (O'Toole, 2000). In addition to the findings of the FBI, the Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education's review of individuals who had engaged in threats or attack behaviors against schools supported the conclusions of the FBI (Fein et al. 2002, 2004; Vossekuil et al. 2002).

The joint report from the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education recommended that schools should implement a multidisciplinary threat assessment approach in order to identify potential risks (Fein et al. 2002, 2004). This approach focuses on violence prevention by confronting and managing disruptive behaviors rather than simply bolstering security or implementing ineffective zero-tolerance policies. Independent research also supports the threat

assessment approach, as numerous studies suggest that such a process, when implemented properly, can help to create a safer school climate, allow for prevention of school violence, and has more predictive power than other methods (Cornell, 2014; Cornell & Sheras, 2006; Randazzo et al., 2006; Allen et al., 2008).

Threat assessment and identification of potential school attackers was also included in recommendations by the Governor's Columbine Commission in May 2001, which suggested that every middle school and high school have a trained threat assessment team (State of Colorado, 2001). In 2008, the Colorado School Safety Resource Center (CSSRC) in the Department of Public Safety was established by legislation with the goal of enhancing the ability of schools to create safe school environments and prevent violence through the provisions of resources and training (C.R.S. 24-33.5-1801 et seq.). In 2009-2010 the Colorado School Safety Resource Center held a series of workgroup meetings involving representatives of thirteen agencies and school districts to develop guidelines that were first presented and published on their website in 2010 entitled *Essentials of School Threat Assessment: Preventing Targeted School Violence* (CSSRC, 2015, Depo. Exhibit 5, 2015; Depo. Exhibit 6, 2015). This document used some of the previously mentioned recommendations as guidance, considered the subject matter expertise and experience of the group, and outlined key elements in a threat assessment process. The CSSRC guidance also suggested steps in the process with a flow chart, and reiterated the need for examination of student behaviors and the Secret Service Eleven Key Questions to help organize and analyze the information obtained. Training has been provided by the CSSRC on the topic of threat assessment in schools at varying locations around the state since 2010, and several training workshop presentations and resources are available on their website (<https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cssrc/node/42321>).

The recommendations for threat assessment in schools have continued with more recent guidance to include the development of threat assessment teams in school emergency plans (U.S. Department of Education, 2013; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). A 2015 publication from the Department of Homeland Security on their K-12 School Outreach Initiative (June, 2015) indicated that in a sample of 96 school districts across 50 states, nearly 70% had threat assessment teams. That document reminds schools to have clear policies, threat assessment protocols, and central points of contact (also referred to as a "vortex" for information in Colorado documents) (CSSRC, 2010-2015; Nicoletti, 2014, 2013). The Department of Homeland Security continues to remind schools that threat assessment teams can help to open dialogue on students with troubling behaviors and help to effectively manage such situations. Published research also indicates the presence of threats and threat assessments on all ages of students from kindergarten through 12th grade (Cornell & Williams, 2006). Since the recommendations first came out in the early 2000s, the threat assessment approach has been implemented with students of all ages in many schools across the United States and in Colorado.

II. Threat Assessment as a Process

Threat assessment in schools is best described as a process of inquiry used to identify, assess and manage students who communicate threats of violence or engage in some form of threatening behavior (Borum et al., 2010). Ultimately threat assessment is one type of prevention tool. As early as 2000, federal guidance concluded that schools should not rely on student profiling and not attempt to draw up a checklist of signs that could detect a potential school shooter (O'Toole, 2000; Cornell, 2014). Instead, the threat assessment process is seen as a flexible approach to violence prevention that requires a team to make reasoned judgments and is seen as a useful alternative to zero tolerance discipline and exclusion of students through expulsion or suspensions (Cornell, 2014).

Researchers and school-based practitioners have recommended school-based threat assessment teams as a best practice response to student threats of violence (Cornell, 2014; Cornell & Sheras, 2006; Cornell & Williams, 2006; Reddy Ranzano et al., 2006).

The site-based team knows the students and resources, can respond quickly, can usually accomplish the inquiry tasks, review the information, and develop a site-based intervention plan. The CSSRC guidelines (CSSRC 2010-2015) recommend a 3-person team, with at least two team members being on site. The members of the team must be trained and are suggested to include an administrator, a school mental health professional (psychologist, social worker or counselor) and a local law enforcement contact (SRO). School psychologists, social workers, counselors and/or other mental health staff members are seen as integral to the process, helping to identify support needs or intervention services (Cornell, 2014). Other staff members who may have specific information about the student or relevant to the situation, such as special education personnel, may also be included.

The first step of this process involves the school raising awareness about potential behaviors of concern and having some formal process or mechanism for students and staff to report concerning behaviors to the appropriate parties, as described in Section II of this report. The second step involves convening the Threat Assessment Team, as mentioned above. Other subject matter experts, as needed, may be added to the team (special education, other law enforcement, private mental health providers, probation officers, school safety experts, school legal representative) or other additional staff who know the student and may be able to contribute to the process.

A key element for the process to work as designed is that the school must ensure that a 'vortex' is created for all behavioral or other relevant data. Ensuring that all potential data points or behavioral indicators are being filtered to a centralized person or the team safeguards against important data being left out of the process. Each data point can be viewed as a puzzle piece. Only once every puzzle piece is made available and evaluated to see how it fits a complete picture be realized. The principles that guide the tasks of the team are to gather information,

consider the context and seriousness of the student's behavior, and to determine if the student poses a threat, not simply to determine that a student has made a threat (Fein et al., 2002).

Some behavioral indicators to note during a threat assessment include evidence of perceived injustice, feeling victimized, externalization of responsibility, development of a grudge, becoming obsessed with avenging, and presence or avenging behaviors (Nicoletti, 2010). Additionally, evidence of planning is often found in three key areas: school property (locker, backpack, desk, and car), bedroom at home, or stored through technology (cell phone, computer, social media). Each of these areas should be thoroughly searched as part of the threat assessment process. Parents and the student can be used to assist in the search, and law enforcement, as needed. All information related to the behavioral indicators and search for information should be documented in writing and provided to the vortex. The vortex can be a single person who receives all of the relevant data and assisted by accurate record keeping, as long as it is clearly shared with members of a team. Either way, *a team* of individuals needs to assist in the evaluation of the data. Without a vortex, each event will appear as an isolated incident, which means it is likely that a progression or escalation will be missed.

The information gathered will then need to be reviewed by the team for determination of the seriousness of the behaviors in order to best develop an action and intervention plan commensurate with concern. With regard to documentation, a standardized threat assessment documentation form should be used and as much behavioral detail as possible should be provided when completing the form. The documentation of specific interventions that are developed (countermeasures) is essential as elements of the process and of the documentation form. Specifically, what is going to be done, who is responsible for implementation of the action item, intervention, or countermeasure; when the countermeasure will be activated; how the effectiveness of the countermeasure will be evaluated, and what the contingency plan is if the countermeasure is not seen to be effective. Examples of appropriate intervention (countermeasures) should be provided during training of members of the threat assessment team.

For a general best practice outline of the process that draws upon the federal guidance, the reader is referred to the CSSRC document, which outlines a detailed eight-step model of inquiry and suggests that a variety of information be gathered about the student. The basic inquiry steps include:

- 1) Assemble the threat assessment team
- 2) Gather a variety of information
- 3) Use multiple data sources
- 4) Organize and analyze the information
- 5) Determine the level of concern leading to an action plan
- 6) Develop an action and support plan
- 7) Document the threat assessment and keep records for the information "vortex"
- 8) Continue monitoring of the student and the effectiveness of the plan.

While other models exist, one that has been field-tested is the Virginia Student Threat Assessment Guidelines (Cornell & Sheras, 2006). This model includes a 7-step decision tree used to evaluate threats into transient (such as expression of anger or frustration) or substantive (one that cannot be easily resolved and has a sustained intent to harm someone beyond the immediate incident), respond, and implement a written safety plan.

Review of the Littleton Public Schools Threat Assessment Process

The purpose of this section is to summarize the review of the LPS and AHS Threat Assessment (TA) process in 2013, identify the gaps that were noted and review the attempts to remediate those gaps as of 2015. Any remaining areas for consideration of continuing improvement have also been noted.

Littleton Public Schools and AHS Threat Assessment Process 2013

1. Beginning in the 2008-2009 school year, LPS developed a standardized LPS threat assessment protocol similar to models in neighboring school districts at the time and using some of the recommendations from the FBI and Secret Service mentioned above (Depo. Exhibit 9, 2015). By 2010, district administrators provided consultation to schools and training was differentiated for elementary and secondary schools. Some changes were also made to the documentation form during that year. In 2011, the district began integrating the training offered related to threat assessment, suicide assessment and bullying into one combined unit of training lasting approximately 2-3 hours, provided by the current Director of Social, Emotional and Behavior (SEB) Services.
2. A review of the Littleton Public Schools Threat Assessment process in 2013 concludes that a process was in place and LPS had provided training on the process.
 - a. LPS threat assessment training slides reviewed indicated an established clear process of seven steps.
 - 1) Establish safety – Isolate the student
 - 2) Make immediate notifications
 - 3) Activate team members, clarify the plan
 - 4) Collect and review all information - there was a slide on sources of information, including interviews, records review, searches, written material, etc.
 - 5) Determine the level of concern – guidance for determining level of concern
 - 6) Develop an action plan
 - 7) Documentation - All Threat Assessment documentation forms were to be sent to the current Director of Social, Emotional and Behavior Services, for review and record keeping.

3. A review of data from Arapahoe High School (Depo. Exhibit 39) indicates the process had been implemented at AHS only on a very limited basis. There had only been two threat assessments completed at AHS before the KP incident in September 2013, one in 2011 and one in 2012.
4. The involved staff at AHS reported they had limited experience with threat assessments (Depo. Exhibit 39, 2015; Kolasa, 2015 p. 16; Song, 2015, p. 21). The school psychologist reported completing 5-10 in her career, including the 2 previous ones at AHS (Song, 2015, p. 21). The involved administrator had participated in the one TA in 2012 where there was also attendance by another AHS administrator and the Director of SEB Services.
5. A plan was developed at the TA meeting on September 9, 2013 that included a follow up meeting to be held with KP and the coach of his debate team. That meeting was held on 9.26.13 and a plan was developed for his participation on the team.

Identified Gaps in LPS and AHS Threat Assessment Process 2013

1. Review of the AHS threat assessment forms in Deposition Exhibit 39 indicates that implementation of the exact process could not necessarily be reviewed from the forms. While the process specifically directs “collect and review all information,” data sources used for the threat assessments were not specified on the form and many forms lacked specific behavioral information. Forms varied in completion and therefore it was also sometimes difficult to see the reasoning behind assigned risk levels. However, other information from the review of the forms was gained and specific recommendations for continuing improvement have been provided to LPS in Appendix A for their consideration.
2. All steps of the LPS process as outlined by LPS do not appear to have been followed by the AHS staff in the threat assessment of KP. Further discussion of the specific information and process used in the AHS threat assessment that was the focus of the arbitration discovery are provided in Section V of the report.
 - a. There was only a two-person team in the threat assessment of KP. The SRO was not involved at the TA meeting, although he had completed a written report on the incident that occurred on September 3, 2013. No interviews were conducted with KP or his family outside the meeting process (Depo. Exhibit 35; Englert, 2015; Kolasa, 2015; Song, 2015). The KP threat assessment form was not sent to the Director of SEB Services, as the LPS process would have indicated (Song, 2015; Thompson, 2015, p. 54-56).

Littleton Public School Threat Assessment Process 2015

3. LPS and AHS have engaged in multiple efforts toward continuing improvement to their threat assessment process since 2013.
 - a. Specific reviews of LPS Threat and Danger Assessment procedures were conducted with AHS staff on four occasions, including two separate sessions of training in February 2014.
 - At AHS, eleven administrative and mental health staff members completed an additional training session on February 24, 2014.
 - A question and answer session was held with AHS staff in November 2014, and again in September 2015. Last spring, the Director of SEB Services also went to 2 other high schools for review sessions, at the request of the principals.
 - b. A multi-agency review meeting was held in June 2014 to review the LPS threat assessment protocol. This meeting included participants of the Littleton Police Department, Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office, Arapahoe/Douglas Mental Health, Dr. John Nicoletti, and LPS Administrators (Depo. Exhibit 17, 2015).
 - c. A three person LPS District Threat Assessment Team was established beginning the 2014-2015 school year. This is seen as an excellent addition of a formalized step with a district level group review of process in all assessments. The group meets weekly and reviews all behavior reports involving restraint of students, suicide assessments, threat assessment reports, Safe2Tell reports, and information related to juvenile sex offenders attending LPS schools (Grace, 2015; Thompson, 2015).
 - This team includes the Director of Social, Emotional and Behavior Services (SEB), the Coordinator of Student Support Services, and the LPS Director of Security.
 - d. LPS gathered feedback in September 2014 regarding the threat assessment process and guidance document from the K-12 principals meeting. Drafts were also presented to all mental health staff and administrators. In October 2014 the LPS Guidance Document and Help Sheet for threat assessments were finalized and used with training. An update on the process was provided to the AHS staff on November 11, 2014 (Thompson, personal communication October 5, 2015).
 - e. In February 2015, Dr. Linda Kanan provided a preliminary review of the district's threat assessment process, along with review of other psychological safety measures to the Safety and Mental Health Advisory Committee, first convened December 2, 2014.

- This committee is considered an advisory group to the Superintendent and to the Board of Education. The committee includes parents, mental health experts, community members, agency leaders, law enforcement representatives, teachers, students and administrators and was established to review the programs and services in LPS to serve children at risk or in crisis and to keep families safe (LPS Safety & Mental Health Advisory Committee, 2015).
- f. Threat Assessment guidance documents were revised in some areas in September 2015 for training in the 2015 school year. Revisions to threat assessment training was created, returning to the PowerPoint slide format (LPS, 2015). Updated threat assessment documents are available on the district intranet.
4. The following information about threat assessments is now available on the website of the Littleton Public Schools when reviewed on December 8, 2015 and could be seen as the current statement of their threshold for threat assessment: “The LPS Threat Assessment protocol is initiated when a student poses a threat, makes a threat, or if there is concern that a student might act out violently. LPS administrators lead a process that includes gathering information, interviewing involved persons, completing a screening tool, communicating with parents and establishing an action plan. Suspension may be used as an immediate intervention during the threat assessment process. The student’s age, background and developmental level are taken into consideration when assessing the level of concern and appropriate interventions. In serious situations, a law enforcement investigation may be initiated at the same time as the school is conducting a Threat Assessment.” (<http://www.littletonpublicschools.net/content/threat-assessment>).

Recommendations for Continuing Improvement in the LPS and AHS Threat Assessment Process

1. A general process has been established and improved, but implementation of the process by specific personnel is difficult to determine on the documentation forms. Recommendations to the form (Appendix A) are seen to also help to improve the specifics of process implementation for some less experienced staff.
- a. The recommended changes include prompts about data sources, searches, detail beside the prompts, and specifics about evaluating the information with coding of behaviors and consideration of the 11 Key Questions by the Secret Service will encourage consistent application of the district process. The form would also have specifics of the intervention plan, the countermeasures for behavior, persons responsible for implementing the plan and a specific date for review of the plan.

Best Practice Recommendations for School Threat Assessment Process for *ALL* Schools

While schools throughout Colorado and the country have been using threat assessment processes for years, this arbitration allowed the reviewers to look into specific implementation of the process in one district and one school. The following best practice recommendations are made after review of information provided in this arbitration and are provided for *all* schools regarding the process of threat assessments in schools (the best practice recommendations for all schools have also been compiled in Appendix C as a reference). *All* school districts and schools are encouraged to use the lessons learned and the information provided in this report to review their process.

1. The foundation for the threat assessment process involves raising awareness about detection of potential behaviors of concern and about the timely reporting of those concerns. Training in awareness must occur across school employee groups, students, parents, and others in the community. Multiple reporting methods for concerns are encouraged, as long as the vortex for information is established. See Section II of this report.
2. Each district is encouraged to review the training and experience of its administrators and other personnel for implementation of the multi-disciplinary site-based 3-person threat assessment team model, as recommended by the CSSRC.
3. Given the potential difficulty of assuring the training and, in some cases, the limited experience of site based administrators and practitioners, it is suggested that a designated district level subject matter expert or review team provide consultation and participation in difficult cases, as needed.
4. The process should be consistent between a district level review team and school based threat assessment teams. The process should also be consistent across schools in each district.
5. A vortex for information reporting and consolidation should be established at each school. It is considered best practice if the vortex is a team, to reduce unilateral decision-making regarding the significance of behavioral data and threat assessment. The use of electronic information systems should be consistent across schools.
6. An outline of key considerations in the process includes:
 - a. Securing safety should be a priority.
 - b. Notifications should be made about the need for a threat assessment and the multi-disciplinary threat assessment team should be convened.
 - c. Information should be obtained from a variety of sources, including:

- Searches of the person, as appropriate,
 - Searches of social media, as allowed,
 - Reviews of all school and other available records,
 - Information or observations from teachers or others at the school who know the student,
 - Information from parents, and
 - Information from community treatment providers or other agencies providing intervention.
- d. Special Education considerations should be reviewed and appropriate staff included in the process.
 - e. Interviews should be conducted with the student of concern, parents of the student of concern, and witnesses (if relevant). This is best done outside of a meeting and should be conducted *prior* to the meeting where a plan is developed. This is an important step of information gathering.
 - f. Organization and analysis of the information should occur.
 - g. Behavioral data and indicators should all be evaluated and considered.
 - h. Decision-making should take place regarding the seriousness of the behavior by reviewing *all* the data sources. The foundation for the level of risk should be based on all the behaviors and the detail for the determination of risk should be recorded. Decision-making can be assisted by a system for behavior analysis and coding and the Secret Service 11 Key Questions.
 - i. Appropriate action and intervention planning (countermeasures) should be commensurate with level of concern. Identify strengths or relationships that can be developed, and include specific steps of plan, details of monitoring, and people responsible for the action items (including the parent and student).
 - j. Monitoring of the student and review of the plan should be clear – Identify personnel who are the points of contact and establish a firm date for review of the effectiveness of the plan.
 - k. A documentation form should be completed, in detail, with the foundation for the level of risk. Records should be maintained, as directed by the district.
 - l. Review the effectiveness of the plan, student progress, and document the follow up and review meeting.
 - m. Central office review by an individual with expertise, and/or a team is also recommended.
 - n. Central district record keeping should also be maintained.

III. Training of School Employees in Threat Assessment Procedures

Despite its effectiveness as a prevention tool, problems still arise in how to best reach out and train educators to ensure that the best practices of threat assessment are employed. As Allen, et al., (2008) points out, educators are clearly burdened with other primary responsibilities and

concerns, and therefore may have difficulty focusing on continuing education in the threat assessment field. While it has been noted that the majority of students who make threats of violence have behaviors that are familiar to experienced educators and mental health professionals, it takes training and experience for those completing threat and risk assessments to recognize the key factors in behavior patterns and to be comfortable and competent to use a model effectively (Cornell, 2014). Informal phone interviews conducted by the primary author in November 2014 with a small sample of select Colorado school districts with established threat assessment procedures, and the experience of the experts reviewing this case, indicate there is variation in how training is conducted at Colorado school districts, topics covered, who is required to attend trainings, and how often they must be trained.

One common concern of people who have identified a potential threat is that they are overreacting or engaging in a false positive. Protectors, which include teachers, administrators, parents, and even fellow students, become concerned about the ramifications of false positives, or incorrectly labeling someone as a threat. In other words, what if someone is identified as a potential threat but never intended to harm anyone? This has important considerations as a student's reputation may be harmed, the family may become angry and confused, and time and resources may be wasted. It is important to note that, in reality, protectors may never know if they overreacted or if it was in fact their reaction that prevented violence from occurring. Protectors must be trained to better understand the significance of threat making and disruptive behavior, in order to make the best informed decision possible regarding a student's risk level and to design appropriate interventions or countermeasures.

While it is clear that training of school officials is increasingly necessary as part of an initiative to proactively address school violence prevention, there are unfortunately no currently established best practices in this area. The recommendations included here are based on the experience of these school safety subject matter experts who currently provide training and continuing education, conduct risk assessments, and are committed to providing suggestions to help protect schools.

Preventing violence from occurring in schools will first require that students, teachers, coaches, and other staff be trained to serve as detectors, as emphasized in Section II of this report. They will be the ones that hear or see threats or other concerning behaviors, which means they will be the ones to first detect the warning signs and signals of impending violence. According to the Safe School Initiative Findings (U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, 2002) incidents of targeted school violence are rarely sudden, impulsive acts. Prior to most incidents, other people, including students, knew about the attacker's thoughts of violence or plan to attack. Awareness of the signs of troubled students and violence potential can lead to effective prevention of violence. Threats, for example, serve as an indication of violence potential, yet are one of the behaviors most often minimized by detectors.

Those who are to be trained as a member of a threat assessment team must understand that threats can be written or verbal and fall into four categories, as defined by the FBI: direct,

indirect, conditional, and veiled (O'Toole, 2000). A direct threat is a statement of clear intent to harm someone such as, "I'm going to kill you." Generally, the more specific the threat, the more concerned the protectors should be (Nicoletti, 2010). In other words, if the individual identifies types of weapons, names of targets, or an exact time or place of the violent act, immediate action should be taken. An indirect threat tends to be more vague, unclear, and ambiguous. The plan, the intended victim, the details are masked or more equivocal. Such as "If I wanted to, I could kill everyone at this school". While violence is implied, the statement may be phrased tentatively and suggests a violent act could occur, not will occur. A conditional threat is made contingent on a certain set of circumstances, such as "you better listen to me or you're dead." The fourth category of threat, known as a veiled threat, is the hardest type to address because they are often vague and subjective to interpretation. The perpetrator easily minimizes this type of threat by refuting the receiver's interpretation. For example, "I can understand why kids shoot up their school" or "I'm beginning to get tired of being nice." In the aftermath of a violent incident, witnesses have admitted to hearing the perpetrator make threatening statements; however, it is often assumed that the individual was "just joking" or "just having a bad day" when they made the threat. Training is critical to help detectors learn that ignoring threats serves to communicate that the behavior is either acceptable or is not being taken seriously (Nicoletti, 2010, 2013, 2014). Either way, inaction allows the behavior to continue. As mentioned in the Prevention section of this report, training must also address how threats can and should be reported once they are detected.

It has been established that there is no accurate "profile" of students who engage in targeted school violence in terms of demographic characteristics (mental health diagnosis, ethnicity, gender, etc.); but, however, it should be noted that no one just "snaps". Rather, violence should be viewed as an evolutionary process and there are behavioral indicators that should consistently be viewed as potential warning signs. That is why behaviors over time are important to consider, not just the behavioral incident in question. Once a person of concern has been identified and is now on the school's radar, the threat assessment process begins. It is that process that requires specific training, not just the training to complete a documentation form.

To maximize the effectiveness of the Threat Assessment Team, those on the team must train together well before a violent incident occurs and must routinely engage in review to determine any shortcomings in their system that need to be addressed. The team must have a well-understood structure and protocol. There must be clear understanding about who is to lead the team process and who will lead in the absence of the designee, there must be agreement on the threshold for activation of the team, their roles in the process of gathering information, and who has final authority of decision-making. While large schools have designed systems for site-based teams to include those personnel who directly work with the student, it is important for each team to have training, experience and consultation available for difficult cases.

Littleton Public Schools and AHS Training in Threat Assessment 2013

1. LPS training slides from 2009-2015 were reviewed in preparation of this report. Training slides were fairly consistent until 2011, when the title and content was changed to Danger Assessment and the format changed to a Prezi presentation. In 2013, the training was about 2 hours and included other topics such as suicide and bullying.
2. The training provided prompts for the steps of the process and completion of the form. Training included slides to describe the process including those outlining sources of information, partnering with parents, asking about weapons, evaluating information with the 11 Key Questions from the Secret Service, and a slide for developing an “action and supervision plan”. Examples were provided as to the use of the process in real time and using written examples of threats (Depo. Exhibit 4).
3. All LPS mental health staff, psychologists, counselors and social workers were required to attend threat assessment training.

Identified Gaps in LPS and AHS Training 2013

1. The Prezi format for training was somewhat difficult to read as an exhibit in this case, and would be as a reference source for training attendees (Depo. Exhibit 45). More detail and time devoted to adequate training are important.
2. School site administrators and those providing discipline are an integral part of the threat assessment team. They should be required to attend training and documentation should be kept. In 2013, LPS administrators were not required to attend training.
 - a. Depo. Exhibit 9 (2015) provides evidence that the school psychologist involved in the KP threat assessment had attended district training in February 2011 and she also stated during deposition that she had previous training from her other school district (Song, 2015).
 - b. During deposition, the Assistant Principal stated that he remembered being trained in LPS Threat Assessment during the Spring of 2012, but acknowledged that he had not signed in since it wasn't mandatory. District sign-in documentation has no record of his attendance. He also recalled having some explanation of threat assessment when he was employed in the Jefferson County Schools when he was involved in a threat assessment of a student there (Kolasa, 2015, p. 13-15).
3. School Resource Officers that are involved in threat assessment meetings should also have training in threat assessment.

- a. The School Resource Officer reported he had approximately a half-hour to one hour overview training of the threat assessment process, but no documentation was requested or made available (Englert, 2015, p. 46-47).

Littleton Public Schools and AHS Training in Threat Assessment 2015

1. LPS training on threat assessment has been increased, and is now one-half day (4 hours). The training continues to include additional topics such as suicide, bullying, child abuse and sexual offenders. The format has returned to the more readable version of a PowerPoint Presentation. This is seen as helpful for clarity of reference by the attendees, as the slides were distributed as part of a training packet.
2. District Administrators are now required to attend training, and training is required of all involved personnel at least every other year (Thompson, 2015, p. 200).
3. Additional guidance documents are also now provided during training and on the district's intranet site. The LPS Threat Assessment Guidance Document (Littleton Public Schools, 2015; Depo. Exhibit 7, 2015) now specifies the following:
 - a. Encourages that school staff, students and parents need to know warning signs and how to report concerns;
 - b. Encourages the use of a single vortex for information;
 - c. Suggests that behavior patterns are better indicators of risk than words or diagnoses;
 - d. Encourages examination of a student's response to interventions;
 - e. Encourages inter-agency partnership;
 - f. Specifies training expectations;
 - g. Specifies triggering events for when a threat assessment is to be conducted;
 - h. Specifies that a district administrator must be contacted when the Threat Assessment process is initiated;
 - i. Directs that a school site administrator (principal or assistant principal) should lead the assessment process at the school;
 - j. Clarifies use of suspension during the threat assessment process;
 - k. Requires specific interviews to be conducted;
 - l. Requires specific information gathering, including reviewing patterns of behavior;
 - m. Clarifies that searches of electronic devices can be made if "reasonable suspicion";
 - n. Requires reporting and involvement of law enforcement officer;
 - o. Suggests suicide screening every time a threat assessment is conducted;
 - p. Clarifies emergency transport to hospitals;
 - q. Provides guidelines for when a district level review should occur;
 - r. Specifies documentation and storage of records;
 - s. Discusses the "need to know" or "need to act" communication regarding threat assessment;
 - t. Describes the district-level monitoring of a student after a threat assessment.

4. The 2015 LPS Threat Assessment Help Sheet (Depo. Exhibit 7, 2015) provides useful information that should be used as part of training and added to the documentation form, as detailed in Appendix A of this report. Detail in the Guidance Document and Help Sheet now provide more direction for school staff. However, it is suggested that the district consider consolidation of information into one guidance document with other items moved directly onto the documentation form.
5. Attendance at the training in October 2015 and review of the most recent training materials indicates that the LPS training now includes two slides on the six principles of threat assessment developed by the U.S. Secret Service (Fein et al., 2002, 2004). LPS threat assessment training includes opportunities for discussion and revised and improved slides include:
 - a. Legal and ethical considerations,
 - b. Use of suspension and expulsion,
 - c. Involving law enforcement,
 - d. Increased information about data sources,
 - e. Interviews are specified and discussed in 3 slides,
 - f. Information about asking specifically about access and ability to weapons,
 - g. Behavior coding, using the model suggested in this review is also now included;
 - h. Use of the 11 Key Questions from the Secret Service is included; and
 - i. Roles of the team members were discussed, but could be included in a slide for reference.
6. Case examples were provided in 2015 with both an Elementary School example and a Secondary School example. This is a good addition to training, but adequate time should be allowed for the discussion of those examples. They can also be used as site-based role-play examples for practice.

Recommendations for Continuing Improvement in LPS Threat Assessment Training

1. Brief discussion of FERPA provisions and exceptions was provided, but that discussion could be expanded as FERPA is identified as confusing for many school staff around the country.
2. It is recommended that training also include review of triggering events for conducting a threat assessment (the threshold) to encourage consistent implementation of the process.
3. The review of the sample of AHS threat assessments in Exhibit 39, indicates a need for added training on identifying some of the key behavioral indicators, the detail to be included on forms, and the correct coding of behaviors.

- a. In approximately 5 of the 17 reports reviewed in Exhibit 39, a direct threat is miscoded as a veiled threat, and in the majority of the reports, no specific explanation is provided related to what the threat was and how the information was verified.
- b. The form addresses the student's ability to carry out an attack plan; however again, review of the selected sample of forms shows some difficulty correctly identifying access and ability. This should be clearly addressed in training.
- c. For example, in one particular case marked as having "no ability or access" the student had threatened to murder a locker mate by tying her to a car and driving slowly. Rope and a vehicle appear to be fairly easy items to obtain, therefore it is unclear why they were not considered to have ability or access.

Best Practice Recommendations for Training School Employees in Threat Assessment for *ALL* Schools

The following best practice recommendations are made after review of information provided in this arbitration and are provided for *all* schools regarding the training of school employees in threat assessment. They are included in Appendix C of this report in summary format.

1. The foundation of threat assessment relies on the awareness and reporting of concerning behavior by all school employees, students, parents, law enforcement, community treatment providers, and community members (CSSRC, 2010-2015).
 - a. School employee groups should be trained for awareness of violence or concerning behavior and the importance of timely reporting.
 - b. All students should also be trained about the importance of reporting.
 - c. Parents should also be educated and reminded about the importance of reporting behaviors of concern, for the safety of their child and the safety of others. Schools must continue efforts to partner with parents for early intervention for kids exhibiting concerning behaviors.
 - d. Multiple methods of reporting are encouraged, as long as the vortex for information is established and used.

2. All school district employees acting as part of a threat assessment team should be trained, including administrators and SROs. Updated training should be required at regular intervals (every 2-3 years). Attendance at trainings should be documented.
3. Sufficient time should be dedicated to training on the important topic of threat assessment and supported by district and building leadership. Covering many related topics in one training session may be efficient and help to make connections of learning for staff, but the topic needs dedicated training time and school and district leadership should support that training.
4. Law enforcement officers acting as part of a school based threat assessment team should also participate in the district threat assessment training process or similar training.
5. When possible, teams should train or practice together. Much as schools are encouraged to drill and practice other types of emergency response procedures, threat assessment teams can benefit from case practice.
6. Support documents are seen as a great addition of resources for use in review of training, but face-to-face training should cover those topics as well. Limiting the number of support documents may be helpful to school staff. The effectiveness of support documents can be evaluated by gathering information from those users.
7. Best practice components to threat assessment training should include:
 - a. Information content about the history of school related violence incidents and lessons learned.
 - b. Clarity about *when* to do a threat assessment as stated in district information and policy.
 - c. Clarity about the composition of a Threat Assessment Team, including attendance by a Special Education representative, if the student has an identified disability. The CSSRC (2010-2015) has recommended at least three trained members to a team.
 - d. Six principles of threat assessment from the Secret Service recommendations (Fein, et al., 2002, 2004) to remind participants of the need for a skeptical mindset, basing information on facts, using integrated systems.
 - e. Training and *emphasis* on relevant FERPA exceptions to confidentiality, as misperceptions still exist regarding this law and relevant exceptions (CSSRC, 2010-2015).
 - f. Training for awareness of and *appropriate use* of warning sign indicators (Dwyer et al., 1998; CSSRC, 2010-2015; and others).
 - These warning signs are for awareness of troubled students, and not necessarily students who are dangerous or pose a risk for violence. They should not be used as a checklist for violence as they not all equal in importance or as indicators (Dwyer et al., 1998; Cornell, 2014).

- g. Key Findings from the Safe School Initiative (Fein, et al., 2002), as this information still applies, and can be useful in awareness training. These findings relate to information that should be questioned during a threat assessment process. information for awareness of avenger violence (Nicoletti, 2013, 2014)
- h. Teach and give examples of how to evaluate written material (Kanan, 2010, 2011, 2013).
- i. Teach how to identify each type of threat for correct coding of behaviors (direct v. indirect v. conditional, veiled, etc.) (O’Toole, 2000, Nicoletti, 2010).
- j. With regard to the “Access to Weapons” question, those completing these forms should be trained to only mark “none known” after taking reasonable steps to ascertain the information. Document the attempt to gather information related to an armament.
 - Training should specify that both the student and their guardian should be asked directly if there are weapons in the home, if the student has access to weapons, and if they have had training. Specific responses should be noted.
- k. Train for evaluation of materials obtained. If the form directs the decision to assign a category for level of concern, examples and explanation should be provided.
- l. Teach about the identification and coding of behavior as “normal”, “boundary probing” “attack related” or “attack” for use in determining level of concern.
- m. Use of the 11 Key Questions for the Secret Service should be reviewed.
- n. Teach how to create effective intervention plans commensurate with the level of concern and provide suggestions for monitoring.
- o. Examples of effective intervention planning (countermeasures) should be provided. All students who engage in behavior that prompts a threat assessment should be monitored over time.
- p. Train for each step of the district process, in addition to reviewing the form.
- q. Teams should use case studies for tabletop practice in threat assessment.
- r. Participants in trainings should be asked to complete a short evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the training, the presentation materials and format and to provide suggestions for future training. This will help assess which topics may need more information or additional training.

IV. Documentation of a Threat Assessment and Intervention Plan

As previously mentioned, a threat assessment documentation form must provide as much detail as possible about the incident and student. Recording of specific information is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention plan and experience has shown that there will be some students who come to the attention of school authorities a second time. Instead of merely checking boxes, as observed in many school district forms, a narrative should be included for any “yes” item. For example, rather than simply checking a box indicating a student has a history of violence, there needs to be a summary of the specific behaviors of the student (i.e. fights, vandalism, fire-setting, etc.). Merely checking a box provides very little helpful information,

rather, it is the specific details that contribute unique and valuable information to a student's threat assessment, threat management, and ongoing monitoring.

A Review of the Littleton Public Schools Threat Assessment Documentation Form 2013

For this report, the authors reviewed and compared the documentation form utilized in 2013 (Depo. Exhibit 47, 2015; dated 2011) and compared it with the current form utilized in the Littleton Public Schools (Depo. Exhibit 48, dated 2014). In addition, a review was conducted of 17 threat assessment forms completed by staff at Arapahoe High School during the years 2011-2015 (Depo. Exhibit 39). Some of those assessments used the 2011 version of the form, and others used the 2014 version. The reviewers did not examine forms from other schools, so the comments included are general to the form itself and specific to observations of the completed AHS forms.

Identified Gaps in the LPS and AHS Documentation Form 2013

Review of the AHS Threat Assessment forms in Deposition Exhibit 39 included some completed with the 2011 version and some with the 2014 version. For purposes of the review of the form itself and recommendations by the authors given the time constraints, the review is summarized by looking at changes made to the form in the 2014 version. That full review completed on the elements of the form is found in Appendix A of this report, with some general changes noted below.

Littleton Public Schools Threat Assessment Documentation Form 2015

There have been some changes made to improve the Threat Assessment documentation form of the Littleton Public Schools in a revision completed in 2014.

1. In general, the 2014 Threat Assessment Form reviewed and utilized by Arapahoe High School (Depo. Exhibit 39, 2015) addresses many of the behavioral indicators consistent with best practice recommendations.
2. More detail has been provided to the summary information section.
3. Prompts have been increased related to making immediate notifications, such as notifying the building administrator immediately, notifying district administration when a threat assessment process is started, and notifying parents of the intent to start the process.
4. There is also specification that the SRO should be notified.

5. The LPS Help Sheet provided as part of training in 2014 now has a list of searches and interviews for information gathering.
6. More specificity has been added to the sections on threat and at-risk behavior factors in the 2014 revision.

Recommendations for Continuing Improvement to the LPS Threat Assessment Documentation Form

1. While the revisions have been good additions to the form, continuing improvement is suggested, as there remain several areas that could be further developed. Specific recommendations for the Littleton Public School District's form have been outlined and provided to the district (Appendix A).
2. Other school districts that are considering possible revisions to their forms may also benefit from additional suggestions that have been made.
 - a. For instance, multiple-choice prompts within check boxes should be removed on all forms, or instructions should be provided to circle which descriptor applies.
 - b. All school districts are encouraged to see the best practice recommendations below and to use the review of the LPS forms to consider if improvement is needed to their own forms.
3. Many schools have questions regarding the "Access to Weapons" questions and assurance from students or parents. Certainly, the information in this case indicates that there was no sharing by KP's parents with the school about the extent of KP's training related to weapons (ASCO_001797-2051, ASCO_0001894). It is recommended that those completing these forms be trained to only mark "none known" after taking reasonable steps to ascertain the information and document the data sources. Document the attempt to gather and record specific information related to access, training, ability, and steps to acquire an armament that supports the team's conclusion of "none known".
 - a. Both the student and their parents or guardians should be asked directly if there are weapons in the home, if the student has access to weapons, and if the student has had training, and their responses should be noted.
4. The LPS Help Sheet provided as part of training in 2014 now has a list of searches and interviews for information gathering. This list should also be included as part of the form to document data sources.
5. The LPS Help Sheet has three (3) prompts related to online or social media searches. The review of the forms provided in Depo. Exhibit 39 indicated that some AHS assessments had this information attached when the threat had been posted online, but most did not have evidence that social media had been checked.

6. Additionally, some additional errors were noted on completion of several prompts of the forms that may be corrected with additional training.
 - a. Added training related to properly identifying direct, indirect, conditional, and veiled threats will be beneficial.
 - b. Misidentification of threats was noted in approximately five of the 17 AHS reports reviewed in Exhibit 39.
 - c. The form addresses the student's ability to carry out an attack plan; however again, this may represent a current training gap as mentioned above.
 - d. The form also addresses whether a student has communicated ideas of intent to attack. In four of the cases reviewed in Exhibit 39 this was left unchecked despite a direct threat having been identified in a previous area of the form.

Best Practices Recommendations in Documentation of Threat Assessment and the Intervention Plan for *ALL* Schools

The specific recommendations to the LPS form are provided in Appendix A of this report. The following best practice recommendations are provided for *all* schools regarding the documentation of threat assessments and resulting intervention plans. Best practice recommendations for all schools in the documentation of a threat assessment and intervention plan are also included in Appendix C of this report.

1. All school district documentation forms should be reviewed to assure the form helps to guide less experienced school personnel through the district's process of threat assessment.
2. All school district Threat Assessment documentation forms should be reviewed for single prompts and contain sufficient additional space after each prompt for addition of clarification and/or evidence of the box checked.
3. A section for all the recommended data sources to be used in the assessment should be added to LPS and other documentation forms, if not already included.
 - a. A search of social media activity should be included as standard practice as part of the threat assessment process. Social media should consistently be searched and screenshots of any concerning posts, pictures, quotes, etc. should be included in documentation.

- b. Students can be asked to show their social media directly, parents should also be involved, and law enforcement should be involved, as needed. Consultation with school district attorneys can provide more guidance on this type of search.
4. Documentation forms need to include a step to evaluate available information before any decision-making and intervention planning.
 - a. The concept of examining and coding of behavior as “normal”, “boundary probing”, “attack-related”, and “attack planning” is useful for evaluation over time.
 - b. Available guidance for school threat assessment continues to advocate for the use of the 11 Key Questions to be considered as part of a threat assessment in schools (CSSRC, 2015).
5. The intervention or action plan developed as part of a threat assessment should be detailed, with appropriate steps, persons responsible to follow-up, and a date established for review of the plan before the meeting is concluded.
 - a. All threat assessments should have intervention or action planning, including monitoring of the student. More examples of items to be used and blanks for other interventions the school-based team may create could be added to documentation forms.
 - b. A Point of Contact (POC) should be identified and assigned to any student requiring a threat assessment and whenever possible, the POC would ideally be a school psychologist or other mental health staff member uniquely qualified to provide ongoing behavioral assessment and monitoring.
 - c. Initially, a student that has engaged in behavior requiring the completion of a threat assessment should be required to complete daily or weekly check-ins to assess their willingness and ability to comply. Some suggestions for check-ins should be provided.
 - There should be specificity to the check-in with students. Specify if the backpack, notebooks, locker, or social media pages will be checked or if check-in consists of verbal confirmation that things are going well. Document the check-in and specify what will happen if a student misses a check-in.
 - If the student does not comply with the required check-in or action steps (countermeasures), this may indicate a higher risk, as the student is demonstrating they are choosing to disregard rules or is incapable of controlling his or her impulses.

V. Threat Assessment: Key Findings and Recommendations

LPS has made continuing improvement to their threat assessment process, training and forms since 2013. Some of the gaps identified for LPS and AHS in the process, training and documentation in 2013 have been mitigated. Additional clarification to the process has been provided on a Help Sheet and Guidance documents. All training items and the support information are on the district intranet site for staff. The addition of the three-person review team is an excellent additional step to the process. Such a subject matter person or team can provide consultation, training, coaching and review of site-based assessments.

Some recommendations have been made specifically for continuing improvement for LPS. Some of those remaining areas needing improvement may be similar to those that may exist in other districts across Colorado. The recommendations in this report (Appendix A and C) are designed to help *all* districts evaluate the practices and procedures related to school safety and threat assessment.

Schools and districts can easily become overwhelmed by the multitude of components and immense responsibility that is included in threat assessment and violence prevention. However, it is important for districts across the state to understand the wealth of knowledge and resources available in Colorado related to violence prevention and school safety.

1. The foundation of threat assessment relies on the awareness and timely reporting of concerning behavior by all school employees, students, parents, law enforcement, community treatment providers, and community members (CSSRC, 2010-2015). School and community safety should be *everyone's* responsibility. Multiple methods of reporting are encouraged and promotion of Safe2Tell also plays a key role.
2. There should be some consistency as to the process, training and documentation forms for best practice in Colorado schools. It may be helpful for the Colorado School Safety Resource Center to reconvene a work group of subject matter experts and school practitioners (including those from LPS who have learned from their experience) to further identify key components and training recommendations for Colorado schools. A work group from the CSSRC, as mentioned above, could also further study and make recommendations regarding the key elements to be included in *all* documentation forms. This work group may begin by using the recommendations outlined in this report and in appendix C of the report.
3. A district subject matter person or team should be established to provide review, consultation, training, coaching related to school-site based assessments.
4. All members of a threat assessment team should be trained in threat assessment. The key members: school administrators, school disciplinary personnel, school mental health team

members and school resource officers must be trained in best practices and the district's process for documentation. Training should be updated regularly.

- a. During phone interviews conducted in the Fall of 2015 with a small sample of metro area districts, there appears to be much variation in personnel required to attend training on threat assessment.
5. Recommendations for threat assessment process, training and documentation forms in Colorado schools can best be provided by inclusion of the core content components and key elements suggested by the experts in this review.
6. Continued training, both statewide and provided by school districts, could benefit from additions of an E-Learning program complete with helpful hints, suggestions of content for threat assessment training, a best practice sample form, and recommended action or intervention plan components (countermeasures). Availability of such resources will provide more consistency with best practices and aid smaller districts that have limited resources to develop these best practice procedures on their own.
7. Community mental health providers may also need additional professional development and resources related to threat assessment and threat management. The safety of our communities is dependent on all people who have opportunities to serve as detectors or disruptors and to provide needed interventions for people who may pose a risk to others in the community. It is important to note that a threat assessment is very different from a psychological assessment. A threat assessment cannot be considered as valid without the gathering and integrations of multiple data sources.
8. Moving forward, it is strongly recommended that the state and the Colorado School Safety Resource Center continue its work to develop and coordinate school violence prevention best practice procedures and provide resources and training to stakeholders. This work will also help ensure that all Colorado school administrators, school staff, students, school resource officers, and parents across the state are aware of best practice procedures when students make threats or have concerning behaviors and can employ effective measures to address those behaviors.

Section V

Threat Assessment Trend Analysis And Case Review

I. Overview of Case Review and Data Sources

Appendix B of this report provides a summary and review of the events related to the incident on December 13, 2015. A retrospective view was provided of the general timeline of events related to KP's disruptive behaviors as well as other significant life events, as best known *at the time this report was completed*. Due to the length of the timeline and information summarized, it is provided as Appendix B of this report. This synopsis timeline of events was constructed from available information from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Investigative Report and supporting documents, the depositions of the eleven Littleton Public School District employees, and the School Resource Officer from the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office that were taken during July-November 2015, and various other materials in the arbitration proceedings. It should be noted that the source materials for this timeline *is not complete*, as the questioning in the depositions was limited in scope and limited to those employed in LPS or working there during December 2013 and subject to recall of events after significant time has passed. KP's mother declined to waive client-therapist privilege on behalf of her son; therefore community mental health providers who evaluated and treated KP were unable to participate in the process. Additionally, no depositions were taken from members of KP's family. As part of the discovery process the LPS attorney posed written questions to KP's mother for non-privileged information. Her affidavit did not answer all of these questions, specifically, the dates and times that KP consulted with his psychologist after September 3, 2013. Students, other staff or other persons who knew him also were not deposed, but some related information was taken from the Sheriff's Investigative report.

The synopsis timeline identifies some of the disparities in information gained from interviews conducted by officers after the shooting and deposition recall of events. With that in mind, the purpose of the timeline is to provide background information for review about what was known then and provide information about what is currently known about KP and his behavior to the best extent possible, with the goal of furthering the general knowledge base.

In addition to the synopsis timeline of events in Appendix B, this section also includes a threat assessment trend analysis completed by the reviewers from Nicoletti-Flater Associates. The trend analysis provides an examination of KP's behaviors that were deemed relevant to the school threat assessment and threat management process, including information that continued after the threat on September 3, 2013 and after the threat assessment was completed at AHS on September 9, 2013. The behaviors are then coded using the system explained below. The information is to

provide “lessons learned” and not to assign blame, as no person or persons are ultimately responsible for the tragic event on December 13, 2013 except KP. This review was developed to assist in future learning about the importance of an information “vortex” related to threats and risk of violence and to point out key behaviors that might serve as valuable lessons for those assessing future risk of violence.

II. The Developmental Trajectory of an Avenger

To provide the appropriate context for the trend analysis, it is essential to review which key behavioral variables are important in the process of threat assessment. Of particular importance are the known characteristics of individuals who engage in mass shootings within schools and other settings (hereafter referred to as “Avengers”). Those who perpetrate this type of violence can be identified by several characteristics:

- 1) The Avenger experiences a perceived injustice. Keep in mind the key word here is “perceived.” The injustice may seem inconsequential or even nonsensical to others; however, because of its importance to the Avenger, it cannot be ignored.
- 2) The Avenger feels victimized by individuals associated with the school community (i.e. students, administrators, teachers, coaches, etc.).
- 3) The Avenger tends to externalize responsibility for his or her own actions, instead projecting blame onto others.
- 4) The Avenger begins to ruminate on the perceived injustice, which then leads to the development of a grudge, causing the Avenger to become obsessed with revenge.
- 5) Given this obsession, there is often physical evidence of threats or attack planning that can be found in three key areas:
 - a. School property (locker, backpack, desk, and car);
 - b. Bedroom at home
 - c. Stored through technology (cell phone, computer, social media)

While taken individually, each of these characteristics may appear innocuous; it is the combination of these factors that is important to view as a potential indication of concerning behavioral escalation. Additionally, individuals who engage in this type of violence will always broadcast their intention in some form, often in the form of a veiled or direct threat. Therefore, it is extremely important to take seriously any direct or veiled threats that are made. Given that individuals may have access to different information, it is extremely important to have a vortex to which all information will be disseminated. The information vortex ensures larger patterns can be seen, rather than each behavioral indicator appearing as an isolated incident. It is

important to note that if the Avenger is not disrupted, the potential for him or her to engage in violence increases sharply; therefore when a concerning behavior is identified the detector must be willing to confront the behavior or, at a minimum, report the behavior to the threat assessment team for further review.

Avengers also are defined by their pattern of engaging in practice sessions, involving what are known as boundary probes, which allow an Avenger to gauge the school's response to behaviors that are inappropriate. For example, KP demonstrated a lengthy history of such boundary probes, for example showing up to Speech and Debate after he was removed from the team. All too often, bad behavior is ignored with the excuse that the individual is "just obnoxious" or "just venting." The word "just" serves to minimize boundary-probing behavior. Minimizing, excusing, or ignoring boundary probing behavior signals to the Avenger that if and when he or she acts badly, it will be tolerated. It is essential that behaviors be disrupted at this level because if they are not, they will almost always lead to escalating disruption to include attack behaviors.

III. Threat Assessment Trend Analysis

The purpose of a threat assessment trend analysis is to evaluate behaviors and/or written or verbal statements that have created concern, feelings of being intimidated or emotional distress in others, whether intended or not. The threat assessment trend analysis also includes information from multiple sources in order to arrive at a current risk determination. It is not intended as a medical or psychiatric evaluation and as a result, no mental diagnosis is provided. The analysis must focus on behavioral data gathered from multiple data sources and provides an assessment of three categories of risk including proactive attack behaviors, reactive behaviors, and behaviors that create social and psychological disruption.

- 1) **Proactive Attack Behaviors Towards People or Property** - defined as violent behaviors that are premeditated and involve weapons of choice and are directed towards either people or property.
- 2) **Reactive Behaviors Towards People or Property** - defined as behaviors or verbalizations that occur in the moment as a reaction to a perceived triggering event and are directed towards either people or property. These behaviors can either be non-violent or violent. In the event the behavior is violent it will involve weapons of opportunity such as body parts or items that are available in the vicinity of the incident.
- 3) **Behaviors That Create Social/Psychological Disruption** - defined as actions that interfere with the functioning of an organization and/or cause other people (employees, members of the community, etc.) to feel intimidated, bullied, harassed, fearful, etc.

The data used in the threat assessment trend analysis of the AHS incident review was provided through the sources that were used to create the Timeline Synopsis of Events (Appendix B). Unlike the Timeline Synopsis of Events, which provides a general overview of what is known, the threat trend analysis focuses specifically on data relevant to the threat assessment process. The data table below summarizes the data that would have been available to the threat assessment team had best practices been followed by a variety of individuals (i.e. administrators, teachers, other students, and KP’s family members) with an informational vortex being used, reports been made to the vortex over time, and all available data sources being utilized during the threat assessment process.

Data Used for Trend Analysis

DATE	AVAILABLE BEHVIORAL DATA AND DATA SOURCE	CODING	COUNTERMEASURE
11.24.03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 2nd grade: KP hit 2 students with lunchbox because they “weren’t moving fast enough” (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015). 	Reactive Attack Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conference with principal. ● Apology letter to both girls. ● Conversation with parents about incident.
12.18.03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● LPS 2nd grade: Kicked student in stomach, hit another student in head. Sandberg Elem (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015). 	Reactive Attack Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Wrote apology letter ● Given consequence of sitting on wall during recess for one week. ● Same counter-measure, not effective from a month earlier
11.16.11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In teacher JP’s class, teacher overhears KP mutter to another student to “just go cut himself”. After class, KP tells JP about being someone’s “bitch” and kids being mean to him. “Why wouldn’t I make him my bitch after what he has done to me?” ● KP also stated that other kids were mean to him and he feels justified doing it to them. 	Reactive Verbal Attack Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● JP calls father (Depo. Exhibit 11). ● JP alerts counselor T about incident.
11.28.11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Counselor KT meets with KP regarding incident on 11/16, he seems “angry”, 	Perceived Injustice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KT calls father. Father reported that he already talked to KP and told him he needs to “let past

	tells her kids are picking on him and no one does anything		go” (Depo. Exhibit 19, ACSO_0000199). ● KT makes entries in contact log.
Spring 2012	● KP gave a 2 min. speech for captain, approached as a “joke”, exact content not recalled.	Social and Psychological Disruption	● Debate coach TM says spoke with KP about his concerns about it. Reaction was almost “dismissive”. KP was told team wasn’t unanimous in support (Murphy, 2015)
2012-13 KP Junior year	● TM and KP would talk in library sometimes; TM says library clerk noted KP was argumentative and disrespectful to TM.	Social and Psychological Disruption	● Not reported (Murphy, 2015) ● No action taken
Possibly February 2013	● Finals of Speech-Debate tournament, KP says “I woke up this morning and my penis had fallen off”, reported to TM by students. ● When asked about it at meeting, KP re-enacted it. (Murphy, 2015). ● KP responded to TM by saying he was trying to “find boundaries of what he could get away with”, for shock value in his competition, to make him “stand out”.	Social and Psychological Disruption	● TM does not report any of this to administrators or parents, only to assistant coach. ● TM met with KP & told him others might be offended or view it as sexual harassment.
3.15.13	● Teacher DS reads KP’s grade out loud. KP responded, “fuck” and then said “fuck you” to two other students when they laughed at KP. ● DS takes KP out of class and takes him to AHS Assistant Principal KK. ● KP provides written statement to KK describing “two classmates, the	Social and Psychological Disruption Dehumanization Veiled Threat	● KK questioned “Ides of March” and “decades of hell” comments on his statement, says KP wouldn’t explain much. KK told Assistant Principal DM (Kolasa, 2015). ● 1 school day suspension for obscene language. KK forgets to report incident on Behavior Log (Kolasa, 2015). Written documentation exists of KP’s written statement and

	<p>combined IQ of a cantaloupe” “one outburst for a decade of hell is unfair”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Writes “Ides of March” in date space. KP says “all the teachers are out to fucking get me” (Depo. Exhibit 32). 		<p>notification to parents about suspension (Depo. Exhibit 32).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KK conferenced with parents that day, KK suggests anger management therapy (Kolasa, 2015). ● No evidence of therapy for KK at this time
8.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP totaled his car after leaving work at McDonald’s angry. (ACSO_0001958) 	Reactive Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No countermeasure ● Shared by mom at threat assessment meeting on 9.9.13 (Song, 2015).
Summer 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● During Sheriff’s investigation dad reported that “As far as dad knew, KP did not own any weapons and he did not believe that KP was old enough to legally purchase a shotgun. Dad stated KP participated in in the Venture Crew Program, which runs a program called RAMS (Rifle Archer Muzzleloader and Shotgun). Those who participate in RAMS get together one time a year to shoot guns. The participants camp out at Chatfield Reservoir and shoot at a Lockheed Martin facility. Dad believed that KP had become a proficient shooter”. ● After the shooting. Sheriff’s investigation discovered certificates were found for KPs marksmanship training (ASCO_001797-2051, 	Skill Enhancement Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Parents do not disclose to school at meeting on 9.9.13.

	ASCO_0001894).		
Last week of August 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom “got a call from a male who said he received a call from her home phone number and that a male said he was going to kill his daughter”. ● Mom said she also received a phone call from the School Resource Officer (SRO) of West Middle School (not LPS school) advising her that the girl who KP threatened to kill went to West Middle School (not LPS school) (ACSO_0001958-59). 	Direct Threat/Attack Related Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom said that she spoke to KP about this and KP said he lost his phone and was calling his phone number but misdialed and called a 7th grade girl and he said he was going to kill her (ACSO_0001959) ● Not communicated to Arapahoe High School by parents or West Middle School SRO ● No action taken
Fall 2013 1 st week of school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher JC class (International Relations): “Tell me” form on first day of class. ● JC reported that KP made “bizarre” statement that seemed as “red flag” to JC. Thought it was unusual and that he wanted attention. Describes him as “cocky kid”. Statement was something like “I won’t stop talking in class, I won’t stop, or I’m relentless” something like that (Corson, 2015). ● KP says, “That’s stupid” to girl in class. 	Social and Psychological Disruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No documented follow up ● KP did not stay after class when requested to do so. JC called it “insubordination” and said it just doesn’t usually happen. (Corson, 2015) ● JC sought out other teachers to find out more about KP and was told to go to Debate coach TM (Corson, 2015). ● No report made of this incident to administration.
Fall 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP doesn’t show up to Back-to-School night for Speech and Debate fundraiser 	Social and Psychological Disruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TM does not confront KP or report it to mom until meeting on 9.3.13 (Murphy, 2015).

9.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher MC gives math test back, KP received 46% on test – wrote “KMFDM” on returned test. (Depo. Exhibit 16, ACSO 0001951) ● At some point, MC reported that she Googled to find out it was a German band. “No pity for the Majority” (Depo. Exhibit 16, ACSO_0001951) 	Social and Psychological Disruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not reported to administration until later date. ● Unknown at the time, but this is a reference related to the Columbine shooting.
9.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● After TM removes KP from the Speech and Debate Team (Murphy, 2015) TM meets with KP and mom. TM discussed reasons for removal from captain, describes KP as “angry”. KP started screaming at TM. KP stayed in his seat. TM was “taken aback”. He threatened to shut down Dropbox and take that away from the Extemp. team, threatened to go to Pramenko about me” (Murphy, 2015). KP screaming “he couldn't believe it” “What would Pramenko think about demoting the only member of team who made nationals?” (Murphy, 2015). ● After meeting, TM reports KP walking down hall with mom, waving hands, screaming, but he couldn't understand the words 	Reactive Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No counter measure for reactive verbal attack behavior. ● Mom wanted KP to apologize, he dismissed her. Mom wanted KP to shake hands with TM. He gave left hand shake kind of backwards. (Murphy, 2015) ● No referral form or documentation from TM. Said it was an “extracurricular activity”. Didn't seem to know if it was normal procedure with activities (Murphy, 2015).

	<p>(Murphy, 2015, p.82).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom remembers him being angry but says he “kept it together” until he got to parking lot (ACSO_0001958). ● After school, teacher ML overhears KP in parking lot “I’m going to kill that guy” or something to that effect. Observes that KP was with mom and female. (ACSO_0001923; Murphy, 2015, p.83) 		
9.4.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A student tells teacher JC about KP being upset in the parking lot without specifics. Student didn’t hear threat, just knew he was angry (this was reported somewhere between 9/4-9/6) ● About 2:15-2:30, staff meeting after school. Teacher ML tells TM about overhearing threat in parking lot (Murphy, 2015). ● ML and TM tell Principal NP. 2-3 minute conversation. TM didn’t say he was fearful (Murphy, 2015, p.105-107). ● Principal NP refers TM to KK. ● Teacher ML and Debate coach TM tell KK about incident. 	Direct Threat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Incident coded on Behavior Detail Log as “threatened staff”. ● Behavior Detail Log shows time of 2:31 p.m. “After demoted from captain of S&D, KP left school yelled in the east lot that he would kill TM, the S&D sponsor”(Depo. Exhibit 24). (Incident occurred to 9.3.15 but wasn’t reported until late in day on 9.4.15). ● KK contacted mom. She decided to keep KP out of school 3 days and seek outside assistance with psychologist (Depo. Exhibit 24; Kolasa, 2015).
9.5.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Assistant Principal KK told SRO on 9.5.15 about incident that occurred on 	Direct Threat (same incident as above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KK spoke with mom again on the phone. She said she would keep KP out of school until

	<p>9.3.13.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● SRO spoke to Debate coach TM and teacher ML, was told that KP had been demoted from being captain. ML confirms threat (Englert). ● SRO told TM to notify him if anything happens in future. SRO said KK “didn’t ask me to talk with KP or mom” (Englert, 2015). ● SRO talked with boss, decided threat was no crime (Englert 2015). ● Police report prepared by SRO (Depo. Exhibit 18). 		<p>Monday.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No interviews were conducted with KP or parents. ● SRO decided there was no crime. (Englert 2015). ● KK tells School Psychologist ES about incidents, including history of teacher DS incident with KP in March 2013 and that re-entry meeting to take place on 9.9.13. ● She agrees threat assessment is needed (Song, 2015). KK looks up LPS materials on intranet (Kolasa, 2015). ES looks at Behavior Detail Log and Contact log (Song, 2015).
9.9.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Threat assessment/re-entry meeting was held in the morning at AHS before first class. Assistant Principal KK, School Psychologist ES, KP and parents meet to determine level of threat and ability to return to school. (Depo. Exhibit 35, 2015; Depo. Exhibit 19). ● (Depo. Exhibit 19; Depo. Exhibit 24): Behavior Detail Log record “Student remorseful about reaction but still admits being angry. No understanding of impact of threat on staff member”. ● Threat assessment conclusion is low level threat (Depo. Exhibit 35). ● ES wrote on Contact Log 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom says at the meeting that KP was assessed at Highlands Behavioral Health and was told he was “not a threat to himself or others”. ● Parents indicated he would see private therapist once a week. ● Parents did not sign release of information form for school to obtain information (Depo. Exhibit 35, 2015). ● Threat assessment has box checked that there was “no known access to weapons” (Depo. Exhibit 35). ● Document verifying KP seen at Highlands Behavioral Health System, date reads 9.9.15 (Highlands Ranch Behavioral Health, 2013). ● The document has no reason for the assessment, but advised that KP was not recommended for inpatient care. No foundation

	<p>KP was apologetic for what he said, but not remorseful, didn't see need to apologize to TM (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015; ASCO_0000200).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KK enters on Behavior Detail Log (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015) "Determined not high level, would go back to classes". ● Action plan: KK, parents, TM and KP will meet in 2 weeks to discuss plan of action with speech and debate (Depo. Exhibit 35). Wraparound services were offered noted on form. 		<p>provided for this determination.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom reported he'd been seen on 9.6.13 (ACSO_001396, ACSO_0001425)
9.10.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP shows up at Speech and Debate practice despite not being allowed to go. (Murphy, 2015) 	Social and Psychological Disruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TM tells KP to leave and he leaves without more. ● TM tells KK (Murphy, 2015). ● KK told TM he'd make sure KP was clear that he was supposed to stay away from practice. No documentation to confirm this.
9/17/13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Diary KK: "Tuesday September 17, 2013, enter project saguntum, a 10 year subconscious project from me to exact revenge, not on individuals who perpetrated wrong, but instead by those I believe have done me wrong. I will shoot up my school, Arapahoe high school before the year is over. I hope to choose a date with the following criterion Finals week- everyone is at school, and it will be winter during finals week, 	Proactive Attack Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not discovered

	I hope I can find a day it is actually snowing, or just incredibly cold. I am a psychopath with a superiority complex.” (ACSO, 2014, p. 29)		
Early October	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campus supervisors CR and CK tell Assistant Principal DM and their co-workers they saw on school surveillance video that KP was looking at guns on personal computer in cafeteria (Meredith, 2015). 	Attack Related Behavior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DM thinks information was “vague” and that he does “not have reasonable suspicion” to search KPs computer or ask him any questions (Meredith, 2014). • DM says he told “security” to “keep and eye out for KP” after this report (Meredith, 2015). • Recollections vary. CK reported that she told “coworkers” (ACSO_0001919). SRO denies he was told about this gun viewing (Englert, 2015). RM does not recall being told about gun viewing (Mauler, 2015). • DM did not tell KK or other AHS administrators. • No other action taken.
10.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KP Diary entry: “Thursday, October 3, 2013, Since day 1, my job has been to conspire to shoot up the school. Every semester, I had a class I despised, and it was on the list. Now I have the means to achieve this diabolical end, and I am excited. The date is set for mid-November, I need time to build my arsenal.” (ACSO, 2014, p. 30) 	Proactive Attack Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not Discovered
10.15.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KP Diary Entry: “Monday, October 15, 2013, I had an interesting 	Proactive Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not Discovered

	idea today. In first hour, I thought about shooting up the asylum or whatever the fuck it was that my mother took me for that psych evaluation. Let the records show I lied through my teeth through the test.” (ACSO, 2014, p. 30)		
10.26.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary Entry: “Saturday, October 26, 2013, the 13th of December is a great date, as the 347th (47 is a great number) date of the year, there are 18 (my age) days left. It is a day of gore, filled with murder, suicide.” 	Proactive Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not Discovered
November 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Heckling comment to unidentified students during their presentations RH class (ASCO 001396-1596, 0001404) 	Social and Psychological Disruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not reported to school
11.1.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP fails Spanish quiz. ● KP reportedly using “F bombs” in VL’s class (Lombardi, 2015; but not in her email or ACSO statement). ● Teacher VL email to mom re: grades dropping, failed quiz, “lately having trouble with his behavior”, and inappropriate tequila comment, “When do we get to drink tequila?” (ACSO_0001418; ASCO_001396-1596; ASCO_0001418) 	Social and Psychological Disruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No report to AHS administration. No response from mom.

11.24.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary Entry: “Sunday, November 24, 2013, It’s weird going through life knowing that in 19 days, I am going to be dead. That makes school more boring, work torture and everything I love to do a little less fun. The hardest part is not being able to tell anyone. I can’t just say fuck it, I’m going to shoot up my school soon. I need to make sure that kind of stuff doesn’t show up.” (ACSO, 2014, p. 30) 	Proactive Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not Discovered
11.26.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary Entry: “Friday, November 26, 2013, I can't believe in a fortnight, I'll be dead. I went to the library to see if they had NBK. They didn't but ---- had highly recommended Perks of being a wallflower. I HATED it. Personally, I saw me, freshman year. No, I had never been sexually abused, but I had no friends at Arapahoe, and I was trying to fit in.” (ACSO, 2014, p. 31) 	Proactive Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not Discovered
12.8.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary Entry: “Sunday, December 8, 2013, it was a productive weekend. I bought my Stevens 2013. It was not the initial gun I was expecting, but I think it will work better. I like the pistol grip. It was quite the process to buy, it was waiting, and waiting, 	Proactive Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not Discovered

	but I loved it. Mom does not know about it.” (ACSO, 2014, p. 31)		
12.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Incident in VL’s Spanish Class. KP left room to go to bathroom. Door was locked, student refused to open it for him. KP pounded on door. VL lets him in. Then sends him out of class because of inappropriate comments and behavior. (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015; ACSO_0000185, ACSO_0000200). ● KP calms down in cafeteria, then is taken to KK’s office. VL calls KK. KK comes to classroom to talk to VL (Kolasa, 2015.) ● VL says that KP “scared” her “that day” and it was “unsettling”, was not “physically afraid” (ACSO_0001400; Lombardi, 2015). Statements differ. ● VL recalls telling KK that KP scared her (Lombardi, 2015). KK does not recall VL telling him she was scared (ACSO_0001409, Kolasa, 2015). ● Campus security CK reports she was told by KK to “watch KP” because he had left class very angry (ACSO_0001919). 	Social and Psychological Disruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KK called parent. ● KP was sent home for rest of day.
12.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● After school KP attends private chess club at 	Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No documentation, no questioning of KP.

	<p>Highlands Ranch Library. Chess Club coordinator, an adult, later reported to ACSO that KP told him he wouldn't need recommendation for military school, as he was "no longer planning on going". (ASCO_001396-1596, ASCO_0001402)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KP showed the coordinator picture of shotgun he had bought from his phone or electronic device. The coordinator said behavior was not different than any other night. (ACSO_0001402) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No action taken.
12.12.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mom said KP text messaged her saying he took \$800 out of bank account to give to a friend for flying lessons.. (ACSO_0001959) • Money was taken out of the account (ACSO_0001959) • Purchased shotgun shell belts, sling, etc. at Cabelas 	Proactive Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mom told KP he needed to put the money back. (ACSO_0001959) • Not known at time
12.6.13 - 12.12.13 (specific dates unclear	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various student reports are provided in ACSO report (ACSO Sheriff's Report, p. 11-12). • KP showed picture of machete to another kid. • Was seen pacing near library by a student. • Had lunch with another student who knew he had purchased a gun at Cabelas. 	Proactive Attack Related	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not reported and no action taken

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Another student said KP showed him picture of shotgun. They had discussed school shootings. • Showed another student a picture of the machete he bought at Sports Authority. • Girl he dated said KP showed her shotgun in his trunk on 3rd date. (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, pp. 11-12). 		
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General Observations and Summary of Findings

A significant amount of the available data summarized on the trend analysis was not made available to the school threat assessment team, recognized by detectors as representing a behavioral concern, nor utilized appropriately during the decision making process at the school on September 9, 2013. Clearly, additional behaviors of concern were reported to others after the threat assessment on September 9, 2013 that were also not reported in any way to law enforcement, Safe2Tell, or the school administration or threat assessment team. The information is also provided to emphasize the need to look at behavior over time and in combination, and not just as isolated events.

Based on the combined results of the collateral data review, it does appear that KP was engaging in Proactive Attack Planning, Reactive Behaviors and Verbalizations, and Social and Psychological Disruption and that he had not responded positively to countermeasures by change in his behavior (verbal reminders about inappropriate language or behavior, limit setting, previous suspension). This would indicate that he represented an ongoing and significant risk for behavioral escalation. This demonstration of coding can be useful for school personnel.

Several other events were not listed in this trend analysis, as they would have likely not been accessible to the threat assessment team at the time they occurred. This includes a video of KP purchasing a gun at Cabela's on December 6th, 2013 and an ammunition purchase KP made at Wal-Mart on December 13th, 2013 at 7:24 am. Both of these events would be coded as proactive attack related behaviors.

IV. Identified Gaps

These steps and gaps were identified in the review of the process of the AHS 2013 threat assessment that was the focus of the arbitration discovery. These gaps are based on both the

review of the threat assessment trend analysis and overall review of the KP case from depositions and documents.

Communication Gaps

1. Teachers appeared to engage in unilateral risk assessment where they would observe concerning behaviors and would either not discuss it or just discuss it with other teachers instead of documenting or reporting it to the administration.
2. There did not appear to be a formalized vortex to which all information should have been communicated. Unilateral decision-making must be avoided.
3. Teachers, students, parents, community partners, and other community members did not report all known incidents to school administration or other reporting method (such as Safe2Tell) and information known, but not recognized as significant, was not taken on to the threat assessment team for additional review (the KMFD comment on his math paper).
4. There did not appear to be a standardized definition of concerning behaviors. For example, one teacher would not consider actions by KP as concerning whereas other teachers would view the behaviors as not so concerning.
5. There appeared to be some deficits in communication between law enforcement officers from different agencies (SRO at West Middle School did not report KP threat to Arapahoe High School).
6. The SRO did not receive notification about nor did he attend the threat assessment meeting that was reviewed, even though he had documented a report about the incident. The SRO as part of the AHS process was documented at a previous threat assessment meeting in 2012.

Threat Assessment Gaps

1. The composition of the threat team appeared to be limited to two persons.
2. No designated threat assessment vortex for general purposes, although the limited team was assigned based on this student. Members of the team completing a threat assessment need to have the same information.
3. There were multiple untapped data sources that would have been valuable in the determination of risk. For example, other students, teachers, and there was no release of information received from parents to speak to therapist.

4. It is difficult to determine which data sources were used for assessment and determination of risk. There is no documentation of that on the form. Depositions indicate electronic behavior and contact logs were checked (Song, 2015). Suggestions have been made to improve the form to guide data collection (Appendix A). However, it did not appear that additional teacher information was gathered and non-behavioral statements made by teachers were not clarified.
5. No personal interviews were conducted with KP and parents outside the meeting processes.
6. There was missing and incomplete data in Infinite Campus to be reviewed as part of the threat assessment.
7. Many of KP's concerning behaviors were not followed up on and were never presented to the team. For example, KP showing up at practice when he was directed not to, inappropriate comments to students and in classes, suspected to be viewing guns, and the SRO did not interview parents or KP.
8. Additional data sources outside of the school campus were not utilized. Parents did not sign permission for communication with outside evaluators or therapists.
9. All steps of the threat assessment process outlined by LPS do not appear to have been completed in the case in question.
 - a. The KP threat assessment form was not sent to the Director of SEB Services, as the process would have indicated.
 - b. The threat assessment team did not review relevant threat assessment materials during the case, despite existing guidelines to do so.
 - c. The behavior was miscoded as an indirect threat, when in fact, it was a direct threat involving a specific target.
 - d. There was no explanation of the reasons for KP being given a low risk rating when he had made a direct threat and other concerning behaviors were available to the threat team.

Threat Management Gaps

1. There did not appear to be a standardized protocol for development and implementation of actions (countermeasures) in the follow-up plan that was developed. For instance, monitoring should always occur for students who make threats, check-in as a follow-up measure, when and how the plan would be reviewed for effectiveness, etc.

- a. A meeting was held on September 26, 2013 as indicated on the documentation form created September 9, 2013.
 - b. There did not appear to be a specific step built in the plan to monitor the effectiveness of the plan (countermeasures), nor development of contingency plans if the interventions (countermeasures) did not sufficiently change the concerning behaviors.
 - c. Additional people were not assigned to implement or review any steps of the plan (countermeasures).
2. Many of the earlier and post assessment meeting countermeasures appeared to be ineffective.
 3. The countermeasures were not coordinated with family and other community stakeholders, such as therapists, due to the inability to obtain a release from parents to exchange information.
 4. There appeared to be a circular logic regarding the threat management and data gathering for the assessment: KP was deemed low risk using insufficient data that was gathered, and the additional data was not gathered because KP was deemed low risk.

V. Threat Assessment Trend Analysis and Case Review: Key Findings and Recommendations

As has been the case in other instances of school violence around the country and in our own state, there are lessons to be learned from this tragedy. Some of the most important lessons from this tragic incident are related to the process of threat assessment and threat management in schools. It is also important to note that these lessons learned are not only for school officials but also represent missed opportunities on the part of other individuals that witnessed concerning behaviors. It really comes down to this: “if you see something or hear something, say something”. All schools and school districts in Colorado and across the country must recognize the need to educate about this important principle to *all* those associated with the school community. It is apparent that in the area of threat assessment and threat management school districts are challenged to maintain a 100% success rate in violence prevention.

1. Faculty and staff need to be trained on a standard protocol for detecting and reporting concerning behaviors as recommended in Section II of this report.
2. Students also need to receive training on what to look for regarding concerning behaviors and how to report concerns, as in Section II.

3. There should be a variety of options for reporting concerns such as Safe2Tell, the district safety and security number, notifying the school administration, the school resource officer, counselor, school psychologist, teachers, parents or others. However, all of these options need to filter to the centralized vortex.
4. Unilateral risk assessment should be avoided. If you see something or hear something, say something, and always consult with others to avoid unilateral assessments.
5. Data should be collected from multiple sources within and outside of the school to include parents and caregivers, mental health professionals, and social media sources.
6. Concerning behaviors need to be appropriately documented in behavioral terms that make it clear what specifically was said or done that was of concern. Vague statements such as “he was awkward” or “his statement’s were bizarre” should be avoided. Record specific language use and save concerning writings or drawings for a record of *exact* content.
7. Threat assessment forms should be standardized and guide personnel, especially less experienced ones through the process of data gathering, consideration of risk, and the creation of an intervention plan. Behavior must be looked at over time. A specific review date should be established to review the effectiveness of the plan.
8. Threat assessment team members should avoid diagnosing emotions and focus on the behavioral indicators.
9. Any concerning behavior should be met with an intervention (countermeasure) and each countermeasure should be monitored for effectiveness. Again, reviewing behavior over time and the effectiveness of the countermeasures over time can be helpful to determine a pattern.
10. Cases reviewed by the threat assessment team at the school and district should be classified according to some follow up system such as:
 - a. Currently active and under review
 - b. Active with proactive monitoring of behavior and countermeasures
 - c. Inactive with reactive monitoring, as needed

Section VI

Crisis Recovery Efforts After the Tragedy

I. Overview of Crisis Recovery in Schools

Once a crisis event has occurred in a school and the community, there are many levels of intervention that may be required to reaffirm to the students, staff, and parents that the school environment is secure and safe and to support the psychological recovery process. The ultimate goal of recovery after a tragic event in schools is to return to learning with a restored infrastructure as soon as possible (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). This return to school helps students and families begin to cope after a crisis and reconnects students and staff with their naturally occurring social support systems that can help to facilitate the recovery process (Brock, et al., 2009). There are also some basic principles that have been identified that can help as first steps to facilitate positive adaptation after traumatic events, such as promoting the sense of safety and calming, promoting a sense of self and community efficacy and connectedness, and instilling hope.

Schools have also been offered specific strategies through training and numerous publications made available over the last years (Brock, et al., 2009; Brymer, et al., 2012, Brymer, et al., 2012). Some of those strategies are developed from the knowledge that different individuals will require different intervention, depending on variables such as physical and emotional proximity to the event and depending on their own histories and coping mechanisms (Brock, et al., 2012). Schools have been encouraged to provide some interventions universally (to all students and staff) and other interventions to selective groups or individuals, depending on circumstances and needs. The stabilization of emotions, linkages with collaborative services, information on coping, practical assistance, as well as the provision of individual skills and counseling are all seen as important elements in crisis recovery.

One of the stated purposes of this arbitration was to share “lessons learned” from the AHS tragedy with others who can learn from the sad event. For that purpose, the authors felt it was important to summarize some of the range of recovery activities that were seen in documents provided from LPS and AHS. Since information was somewhat limited on this topic during the discovery process, and questioning on this topic area was not included during the depositions, this section does not attempt to be a complete account or a comprehensive review in any way. Rather, it is an overview of some of the efforts and activities that were provided by LPS, AHS and many others during the immediate and ongoing crisis recovery efforts in the school and community. It is summarized here for the benefit of lessons learned. It can also provide other schools and districts an overview of the range of the planning and provision of services needed to provide the best support to all impacted members of a school and community during the crisis recovery phase. This is not meant to be a summary of the thousands of hours of crisis recovery

efforts that were provided by LPS district staff, school staff, and numerous other community partners to students, staff and families of the community. Their combined efforts on behalf of all those impacted are recognized by the authors as crucial to the ongoing recovery of this school, the district, and the LPS community.

II. Littleton Public Schools Crisis Recovery Efforts

Provision of Information Related to Recovery

Provision of information related to the crisis and crisis recovery is seen as an important first step, especially related to the provision of services and support (Brock, et al., 2012; Brymer, et al., 2012). Communication from the school and LPS began soon after the incident was over and the school was secured on the afternoon of December 13, 2013. After the emergency notifications from the district and notifications through the media, communication was sent to the parent community and to the staff by the AHS administrative team regarding the tragedy and the close of school.

1. Information continued to be provided to staff regarding the schedule for the opening of the school the following week and including the schedule for return after the holiday break. Staff guidance was provided for the return of students and classroom discussions. Other communication from the superintendent included updates as to the investigation process.
2. LPS had an established district Mental Health Crisis Team of 11 people who had been previously trained in the PREPARE Model for School Crisis Intervention (Brock, et al., 2012). That team began preparation for the resources, documentation, and information needed at the crisis centers the next day.
3. The media, the district website and social media began providing information to the school community about the crisis recovery sites that would be available on Saturday, December 14th.

Identification and Triage of Needs

1. Both systematic and informal methods can be used to identify students and staff who require additional support and services (Brock, et al., 2012; Brymer, et al., 2012). For LPS, this assessment and triage of needs began with the LPS Crisis Team at the reunification sites.
2. Records were kept of students at the reunification sites, and the LPS district crisis team began to actively seek out students and staff who were acutely impacted.

3. That identification and triage of needs continued daily at the crisis centers by all those providing support at the Counseling Centers on Saturday, December 14th and continued daily in formal debriefings with the LPS Crisis Team.
4. Records were kept of each student, staff or family member seen by supporting partners at the Counseling Center(s), and what services were provided, concerns noted, or intervention that was recommended.
5. Group interventions were provided for students in the library and those with proximity to the event in additional ways. Individual support was also provided to students and staff by LPS and AHS mental health staff and other partnering organizations. Individual support and monitoring continued in the following weeks for up to 30 students who were not feeling ready to return to school.

Counseling Support and Counseling Centers

The LPS Mental Health Crisis Team determined immediately that additional support would be needed from community agencies and other school districts and that counseling centers should be opened the day following the event (Thompson, personal communication, October 5, 2015).

1. Beginning steps included a call to the Child and Family Service Director at Arapahoe Douglas Mental Health Network (ADMHN). In addition, support was provided by the Colorado School Safety Resource Center (CSSRC) Director, who provided a connection with the Colorado Society of School Psychologists Statewide Crisis Team (Thompson, personal communication, October 5, 2015). LPS was able to make use of strong existing relationships with the supporting community health center, ADMHN, with the CSSRC and with leaders of mental health services in neighboring school districts.
2. Community counseling centers were established the next day by district personnel, using an existing relationship with Shepherd of the Hills (SOTH) Church and another school as a designated site. The people contacted, and others who offered support personnel with training, began offering services at Shepherd of the Hills (SOTH) Church and Powell Middle School on Saturday, December 14, 2013.
 - a. Roles of various service providers needed to be navigated, and direction and materials were provided to responders at those centers.
 - b. Materials were provided to crisis responders with information and with “quick help” lessons for immediate crisis response strategies.
3. The counseling center at SOTH continued open from December 16, 2013 to December 20, 2013. That center was also open during the school winter break for adjusted hours. Approximately 150 people from 24 organizations including 7 different school districts,

various organizations and community agencies, assisted with the mental health crisis recovery efforts during the first week alone.

4. There was daily ongoing assessment of needs and debriefing about the concerns for students, staff and, parents completed at the end of each day, both at the counseling center and at the school during the first few weeks. The counseling center at SOTH opened again in October 2014 upon the release of the Sheriff's Investigative Report.
5. A list of supporting organizations and agencies provides an overview of the variety of community mental health support that was requested, offered, used, and should be recognized for the services they provided. Other schools and districts can view the list as an example of the coordinated efforts that are needed in such a response.
 - a. 18th Judicial District Juvenile Diversion Counseling Program
 - b. Academy 20 School District
 - c. Adams 12 School District
 - d. Adams 50 School District
 - e. Adams County Victim Services
 - f. Arapahoe County Sheriff's Victim Services
 - g. Arapahoe Douglas Mental Health Network
 - h. Aurora Mental Health
 - i. Aurora Public Schools
 - j. Castle Rock Police Victim Services
 - k. Cherry Creek School District
 - l. Children's Hospital of Colorado
 - m. Colorado School of the Healing Arts
 - n. Colorado Society of School Psychologists
 - o. Community Reach Center
 - p. Denver Public Schools
 - q. Douglas County School District
 - r. Greenwood Village Victim Services
 - s. Insight School of CO
 - t. Jefferson Center for Mental Health
 - u. Jefferson County Schools
 - v. Shepherd of the Hills Lutheran Church
 - w. Tennyson Center for Children
 - x. Westminster Police Victim's Assistance
6. Continued staff and community meetings were provided in February 2014 in partnership with ADMHN.

Return to School

The return to school was planned and gradual, with staff convening on Monday, December 16th at another site. The administrative staff returned to AHS for planning and support on Tuesday, the 17th, and the full staff returned to AHS on Wednesday, the 18th. On Thursday, December 19th, 11th and 12th grade students returned to school in 2-hour blocks. Personal contacts or calls

were made to students who did not attend that day. On Friday the 20th, the 9th and 10th grade students returned, with personal calls being made again to those who did not attend.

1. Recovery efforts continued after winter break. The AHS return to school included an all-school assembly with participation of representatives of the Arapaho Nation of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming who lent their support. Help sheets and information handouts were provided for AHS staff and students.
2. Continued crisis recovery intervention at the school was supported by some of the community partners, other mental health support personnel from other LPS schools and the district, and certainly by the administrative staff, and counseling mental health staff at AHS.
3. Continued information on coping, crisis recovery, and services available were provided to students, staff, and parents in numerous handouts and information sheets that were developed by LPS and AHS staff over the following weeks, months, and at the year anniversary of the tragedy.

Record Keeping, Debriefing and After Action Evaluation

Record keeping, debriefing, and after action evaluations are considered best practice after crisis events or exercises. A hotwash can be defined as the "after-action" discussions and evaluations of an organization's performance that is recommended following an exercise, training session, or major event (U.S. Department of Education, et al., 2013).

1. Documents provided by LPS showed evidence of record keeping actions by the Emergency Management Team working as a Crisis Command Center at LPS and the LPS Mental Health Crisis Team. Records were also kept by AHS counseling staff of students seen, parents contacted, and ongoing review of needs.
 - a. Command Center actions were logged, reviewed, evaluated for needs and for future training issues with a structured recording log.
 - b. Documents showed efforts to debrief using a structured hotwash activity with leadership staff in secondary and elementary schools in January 2014 and to learn from incident.
2. Documents also showed continued efforts to support and assess needs with AHS staff, in June 2014 and October 2014. Those efforts continued in the fall and winter of 2015 with visits from the new Superintendent to the school on at least 2 occasions.
3. Documents showed ongoing efforts to debrief with crisis responders at the counseling centers and at the school (Thompson, personal communication, October 5, 2015).

Project SERV Grant

Project SERV (Schools Emergency Response to Violence) is a federally funded grant program designed to assist with short-term and long-term education-related services for local schools, colleges and universities, to help them recover from a violent or traumatic event in which the learning environment has been disrupted.

1. The Littleton Public Schools applied for a SERV grant in March 2014 and received \$121,200 in award monies used to provide additional funds for increased security needs and mental health services at Arapahoe High School through June of 2014. The grant helped to staff the counseling centers for the three weeks following the incident (December 14, 2013 to mid-January 2014) and for counseling staff that needed to work on weekends and over the winter break period.
2. The grant paid for supplies and materials were used at the counseling centers and made available to all students and staff who visited the counseling centers. Additional mental health support staff was added to AHS for the remainder of the 2013-14 schools year, increasing the support staff therefrom 5 to a total of 8.

Additional Mental Health Needs and Provision of Staffing

1. As previously mentioned in Section II of this report, the district requested an increase in mental health staffing in 2014 and 2015 and that increase was approved by the Board of Education. Some of the goals of the increases were to build multi-disciplinary teams, increase the targeted interventions provided to students in the middle level of the framework and to increase direct counseling and case management. The district indicates that about \$850,000.00 has been contributed to the increases in staff and security since the 2013 incident.
 - a. LPS mental health staffing has increased since 2013 to twenty-four (24) psychologists, twenty (20) school social workers and twenty-seven (27) counselors. That represents about a 22.5% increase for mental health support staff since 2013. Increases were first made to secondary school support in 2014 and to elementary school support in 2015.
 - b. Specifically, at AHS, mental health support has increased over the last two years from one school psychologist to two and four (4) counselors to six (6).

IX. Crisis Recovery: Key Findings and Recommendations

The mental health crisis recovery efforts needed after a violent tragedy in a school or community are multi-faceted and can best be provided through the coordinated efforts of school, district and community based services.

The short summary here only highlights some selected examples of the varied tasks and the emotional challenges required to care for students, staff and the community and the multiple people required to provide those efforts in the aftermath of a crisis. The LPS district crisis team and ADMHN has already provided workshops to school practitioners on at least a couple of occasions about their partnerships and coordinated efforts, including lessons learned along the way of crisis recovery since December 13, 2013 (March 2015, October 2015). They are encouraged to continue their sharing efforts and providing continued opportunities for learning by other school.

Section VII

Conclusion

The shooting incident at Arapahoe High School on December 13, 2013 was a tragedy for the Davis family, and also had a tremendous impact on the students and staff at Arapahoe High School and in the Littleton Public Schools, other school districts, the larger community, as well as the family of the attacker.

Communities who have experienced school shootings have worked diligently to analyze those incidents and to share lessons learned with others in hopes of assisting in the prevention of additional school violence. This investigative arbitration serves to distribute lessons learned from the Arapahoe High School shooting to all those who work to keep our schools and communities safe. Preventing violence and enhancing school safety is not achieved with a single program, a single added step to a school's emergency preparedness plans, or a piece of security equipment. Rather, reasonable school security and physical safety efforts must be combined with psychological safety efforts that promote a positive school climate and trusting relationships. It is important that students, staff, and parents can feel responsible and empowered to recognize and report any safety concerns.

Schools and districts can easily become overwhelmed by the multitude of components and immense responsibility that is included in effective violence prevention and threat assessment. This report was not designed to review all the multitude of components in comprehensive planning or in this arbitration. Instead, we provided practical threat assessment and threat management recommendations to the Littleton Public Schools, Arapahoe High School and to all school districts. In addition, this report highlights components of district driven coordinated prevention planning in addition to well-designed emergency management planning. The report strongly recommends the use of behavioral data to assist in threat assessment decision-making, the effectiveness of safety efforts, and the effectiveness training school personnel. This report also emphasizes the immense importance of awareness and timely reporting. All school districts and schools are encouraged to develop a school safety team (safe schools planning team) that can help to review the recommendations presented here and in other reports of this event to determine what their strengths and needs are and what works best for them based upon availability of resources, staffing, and community partnerships.

The Littleton Public Schools (LPS) and Arapahoe High School (AHS) have shown continued and ongoing efforts to improve prevention planning, coordination of services, provide increased reporting awareness, increased mental health services at AHS, and to train disciplinary staff. In addition, the threat assessment process, training, and documentation forms of the Littleton Public School District have been improved since the incident in 2013. Many of the gaps identified in the

prevention, threat assessment process, training, and documentation in 2013 have been mitigated. Some specific recommendations have been made to LPS for continuing their improvement going forward. Some of those remaining gaps may be similar to those that exist in other districts and communities across Colorado. With that in mind, the recommendations in this report were also designed to help *all* school districts evaluate and improve their practices and procedures related to school safety and threat assessment.

In an attempt to better identify the elements of the situation in this arbitration and review actions to identify the gaps that may have existed prior to December 2013, the reviewers, created both a synopsis timeline of related events, as best known *at this time*, and a threat assessment trend analysis. These synopsis timeline and trend analysis charts were not created to highlight blame in any way, but to provide to the knowledge base that can work toward prevention of future tragedies. The synopsis timeline provides information related to a range of events and behaviors associated with the attacker's history. The threat assessment trend analysis documented those concerning behaviors that were either known to the school threat assessment team or *should have been known to the school* threat assessment team. In other words, disruptive behaviors that a detector (teachers, administrators, other students, parents, law enforcement, therapists, etc.) was aware of are examined in the trend analysis as to whether or not the behavior was appropriately reported. The purpose of the trend analysis is to highlight the importance of consistent and timely reporting for ensuring individual student needs are being addressed and also to help ensure ongoing school safety. In addition to documenting these events, actions taken by the school, representing countermeasures, were also coded from a threat assessment perspective.

The threat assessment trend analysis found that in 2013 there were significant gaps in the reporting process of behaviors of concern, the knowledge base and experience of individuals tasked with recognizing the behaviors of concern, and the process used for mitigating behavioral concerns. In addition, the actual threat assessment team composition and procedures also indicated gaps in both determining risk and effective use of interventions or countermeasures. It is important to note that these gaps are not only attributed to school officials but also represent missed opportunities on the part of other individuals that witnessed concerning behaviors. It really can be summarized as: "if you see something or hear something, say something". All schools and school districts in Colorado and across the country must recognize the need to educate about this need for awareness and reporting to *all* those associated with the school community. The report also provided specific countermeasures for the gaps and issues present at Arapahoe High School as well as a toolbox of items for all schools in Colorado and around the country to consider. School and community violence prevention is the responsibility of every teacher, school employee, parent, student, administrator, law enforcement officer, or therapist that comes into contact with students of concern.

It is apparent that in the area of threat assessment and threat management school districts are challenged to maintain a 100% success rate in violence prevention. However, if a district has a false positive in that they identify a risk where perhaps none truly exists, the school will face controversy and be criticized for overreacting. It is incredibly difficult for schools to find a

balance between protecting the rights of individual students while maintaining a safe environment. This report was designed to identify those elements that could lead to either a false negative or a false positive and provide specific recommendations and countermeasures to help districts increase the chances of “getting it right.”

The circumstances that led to the Arapahoe High School shooting may be, unfortunately, all too common in schools across the country. To this end, this report serves to assist in preventing additional tragedies through analysis and recommendations that address prevention and threat assessment response. The challenges to school safety are varied, and can come both from outside and from within the school itself. No one wants schools to resemble fortresses or to be unwelcoming for students and staff; however, creating a comfortable environment must be balanced with creating a safe learning environment, which is also essential to student wellbeing and to learning.

Securing the safety of schools requires an institutional and personal commitment from every member of the school community. Effective school safety starts with prevention, provides for student’s mental health, integrates physical and psychological safety, and engages schools, families and communities as partners. All members of the community, the schools, school staff, the student body, parents, law enforcement, and the community considered to be threat detectors as well as disruptors of concerning behaviors and are then considered to be part of the solution. They all need to know what behaviors are noteworthy for alerting authorities for potential action to prevent a dangerous or violent outcome.

Schools and districts can easily become overwhelmed by the multitude of components and immense responsibility that is included in effective violence prevention, threat assessment and management, and other components of school safety. Colorado has developed some excellent resources to assist school districts with the challenges of school safety and threat assessment and management. The state has created the Colorado School Safety Resource Center (CSSRC) and Safe2Tell, and also has the expertise of others in the community with the range of resources, training, and consultation. It is recommended that the Colorado School Safety Resource Center reconvene the work group on threat assessment to further define the core components for all Colorado schools to use in training and documentation of threat assessment and threat management. Those state entities have the responsibility to continue their marketing and provision of resources to schools, especially smaller districts and ones with limited resources. It is then the responsibility of schools to seek out and use those excellent resources. It is all of our combined efforts that will increase the likelihood of success in preventing school violence.

Section VIII

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Section IX
Appendices A, B AND C

Appendix A

LPS Threat Assessment Form Review and Suggested Changes

This review was conducted by the subject matter experts for this report by examination of the Littleton Public Schools Threat Assessment documentation from 2011 (Depo. Exhibit 47, 2015) and the 2014 revision to the documentation form (Depo. Exhibit 48, 2015). In addition, information contained in this review was also gained from a review of the 17 completed Arapahoe High School Threat Assessment forms provided from the District as Deposition Exhibit 39 (2015). The reviewers did not examine forms from other schools, so the comments included are general to the form and specific to observations of the reviewed AHS forms.

Summary Information

- Changes show that form has more detail now: Gender, IEP, 504, space for 2 parents name & contact information.
- **Recommendation:** Date of threat assessment form completion should be provided, not just the date of the incident.

Brief Description of Reason for Concern

- Perhaps a few more lines could be included for summary. Each one reviewed took more space of writing when completed by hand.
- **Recommendation: Addition:** Detail how the concern was brought to the attention of staff. In other words, who reported concern?

Step 1: Make Sure All Students & Staff are Safe

- **Recommend addition of “search” prompt.** This is on LPS Threat Assessment Help Sheet. Form should match.
- **Recommend adding a box: Other action taken for safety:** (per the LPS training slide).
- **Additional observations for consideration:**
 - Under what conditions would box 1 be checked without also leading to box 2 being checked? In other words, if the student requires “constant adult supervision” they should not be able to access their coat, backpack, or locker without these first being searched.
 - Related to “Step 1” there appear to be a number of assessments where item 1 is checked (“locate and detain the student under constant adult supervision”) however, “do not allow student access to his/her coat, backpack, or locker” is not always checked. Is that a reminder or an action step box?

- In a review of Deposition Exhibit 39, four reports indicate that they did not allow the student to access their belongings; however, there is no clear explanation for why these four cases were prevented from accessing their belongings while this was not deemed necessary in other cases. It does not appear related to the identified risk level as some students with high and medium level risk were not prevented from accessing their belongings while several students deemed to be a low risk were prevented from accessing their belongings.

Step 2: Make Immediate Notifications

- Prompts have been increased to 6 prompts
- Additions include:
 - Notify school building administrator *immediately*, establish need for TA process
 - SRO notification and involvement is now specified
 - District Administrator notification now specified *when process is started*.
 - Parent prompt is now: *Contact parent and advise them of intent to start TA process*.
- The completed forms in Exhibit 39 included 2011 forms and 2014 forms.
 - Step 2 addresses making immediate notifications and the Exhibit 39 review suggests some variation in the form.
 - More specifically, nine of the reviewed forms have emergency responders and the school resource officer combined in one box. Of these, seven have the box checked; however, no clarification is provided regarding whom specifically was contacted.
- **Recommendation:** Who contacted parent? If parent was not notified, state reason: _____. Perhaps a line added to each prompt: for name of person who did these steps?
- **Recommendation:** It is recommended that those completing the form indicate whether direct (face-to-face) or indirect (message left) contact is made with each contact person.
- Given that the school resource officer should be part of the threat assessment team, they should always be contacted when a threat assessment is undertaken. That prompt has now been added in the 2014 revision.
 - In two of the reviewed cases (Depo. Exhibit 39, 2015), the school resource officer was not indicated as having been notified. If the officer is not notified, explanation should be provided.

Step 3: Assemble Team & Review the Threat Assessment Factors

- **RECOMMENDED REVISION of the title to this section: Assemble the Team and Gather Information**
 - Rationale: There should be an information-gathering step **BEFORE** reviewing the factors.

- The **2014** LPS Help Sheet has some interviews and searches specified, but we suggest these prompts should be on the form. Data source prompts should be included in addition to interviews (i.e. review of school district records, information gathering from student’s teachers, search of social media, other searches),
- A meeting is not a threat assessment, information gathering **MUST** occur before factors are reviewed. The team should have these prompts on form, not just on the Help Sheet.
- Document the list of sources utilized during the Threat Assessment process (interviews, social media review, Safe2Tell/Police reports, etc.)
- Conducting interviews is now specified on the LPS form in 2014: Students, staff/teachers, administrators, parents, private providers, others. **This should be in the information Gathering Step Suggestions to form. Add line for name of person(s.)**

New Step 4 Suggested: Review Available Information

- **Recommendation:** Revision to the titles in this next section (Threat, Warning Signs, Other Risk, & Protective Factors) a new Section 4: Review Available Information

Threat Factors:

- More specificity has been added in this section in 2014 revision. Identified target has specificity now.
- **Recommendation:** Need to have an attached comments box for each checkmark and information provided needs to be as specific as possible and in behavioral terms. For example, for “Method of Threat”, if it is “Written” provide an exact quote of the written threat in the comments box.
 - **NOTE:** *This recommendation about space for additional comment applies to each section of the form.
- Access to Weapons-“none known” this should be checked only after taking reasonable steps to ascertain this information from the student/guardian-document that they were asked/what their response was.
 - Documentation of the attempt to gather information related to an armament. Both the student and their guardian should be asked directly if there are weapons in the home or if the student has access to weapons and their responses should be noted.
- **Recommendation:** Remove all multiple-choice prompts within one check box, Each prompt needs its own box.
- **Recommendation:** Consider revision to type and method of threat: written or verbal for each type.
- **Recommend these prompts, with definitions, be on the form for reminder to staff:** Add to definitions where needed for clarity and provide more training and examples.
 - Direct Threat - statement of clear intent to harm; threatening a specific act or to specific target;

- Indirect Threat - violence is implied - threat is phrased tentatively; could occur, may be ambiguous as to person, method, etc.;
- Conditional Threat - made contingent on set of circumstances, “if” or “or” statements, certain demands or terms must be met
- Veiled Threat - vague & subject to interpretation; implies, does not threaten directly
- Another item included in this section addresses whether a student has communicated ideas of an intent to attack. In four of the cases reviewed in Exhibit 39 this was left unchecked despite a direct threat having been identified in a previous area of the form.
- The form addresses the student’s ability to carry out an attack plan; however again, this appears to represent a training gap or learning deficit when these forms were completed.
 - In one particular case marked as having “no ability or access” the student had threatened to murder a locker mate by tying her to a car and driving slowly. Rope and a vehicle appear to be fairly easy items to obtain therefore it is unclear why they were not considered to have ability or access.

Early Warning Sign Factors: Remember, these “signs” are not specifically a checklist for violence potential. Consider a rename to this section.

- One box was added to this section for specificity in 2014.
- **Recommendation: Remove all multiple-choice prompts within check boxes.** Make each a check box for data gathering clarity. Or instruct user to circle which prompt applies (i.e. violent themes in stories, letters, diaries, essays, songs, drawings or videos).
- Check all of the warning signs on form, which should be added or changed? Are there behavioral indicators of these signs? Specify those indicators to be provided on the form.
 - **Recommended Addition:** Has experienced a perceived injustice
 - Social withdrawal
 - Excessive feelings of isolation and being alone
 - Excessive feelings of rejection
 - Being a victim of violence
 - Feelings of being picked on and persecuted
 - Low school interest and poor academic performance.
 - Expression of violence in writings or drawings.
 - Uncontrolled anger.
 - Patterns of impulsive and chronic hitting, intimidating, and bullying behaviors.
 - History of discipline problems.
 - Past history of violent and aggressive behavior.
 - Intolerance for differences and prejudicial attitudes.
 - Drug and alcohol use.

- Affiliation with gangs.
- Inappropriate access to, possession of, and use of firearms.
- Threats of violence or suicide.
- Serious physical fighting with peers or family members.
- Severe destruction of property.
- Severe rage for seemingly minor reasons.
- Detailed threats of lethal violence (time, place, method).
- Possession and/or use of firearms and other weapons.
- Other self-injurious behaviors or serious threats of suicide.

At-Risk or Other Behavioral Factors:

- History of school discipline/legal issues has expanded.
- **Recommendation:** Add “student externalizes blame” and “externalizes responsibility”. How is this evidenced?
- **Recommended Additions:** Reacts to discipline: Complies - ongoing, short-term compliance, escalation, non-compliance (no change in behavior pattern)

Protective Factors:

- **Recommendation:** Add prompt for responsiveness to previous intervention. What was that intervention?
- **Recommendation:** Add: Currently receiving mental health services/name of treating clinician (specify to request Release of Information to talk with this individual, and parents response)

Step 4 Becomes New Step 5: Recommended Rename of Section: Evaluate Information, Review Findings with Team: Determine Level of Concern

- **Recommendation:** Add the concepts of examining and coding of behavior as “normal”, “boundary probing”, “attack-related”, and “attack planning”. These could be useful for evaluation.
- **Recommendation:** Review the 11 Key Questions of Secret Service before determining level of threat. This complies with CSSRC recommendations (2010-2015). See CSSRC for sample.
 1. What are the student’s motives and goals?
 2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?
 3. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in school attacks or attackers, weapons, and/or incidents of mass violence?
 4. Has the student engaged in attack related behaviors?
 5. Does the student have the capacity to carry out the threat?
 6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation or despair?
 7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?

8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable or desirable way to solve problems?
 9. Are other people concerned about the student's potential for violence?
 10. Is the student's conversation and "story" consistent with their actions?
 11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of violence?
- **NOTE:** Check definitions on the form for concern levels of Low, Medium, High for clarity and correctness. Add to your definitions where needed for reference by staff completing the form. This must match your training, review training slides, or add additional guidance.
 - Ensure those on the team have a proper amount of training and practice to confidently determine current level of concern.
 - There may be an increased sensitivity within LPS at this time, after highly publicized events elsewhere, or at any school who has experienced a significant event. All schools need to be aware that these assessments need to balance the rights of the individual student with the rights of the school community.

Step 5 Becomes New Step 6: Action Plan

- **Recommendation:** Remove all multiple-choice prompts within check boxes. Make each a check box for data gathering clarity. Or instruct user to circle which descriptor applies.
- **Mental Health Measures (This is a new section added in 2014).** Good addition.
 - A district Point of Contact should be identified for any student requiring a Threat Assessment and whenever possible, this individual should be a school psychologist/individual able to provide ongoing behavioral assessment/monitoring. The POC should be named on the form and contact information should then be provided to the student/guardians.
 - **Suggest:** training and form should match on intervention options for action planning
- **Safety Measures**
 - **Recommendation:** If a police report is made, provide the case # and contact information in a comments box
 - Law Enforcement Intervention options are now on Threat Assessment Help Sheet. Consider adding them as prompts so training and form match.
- **Discipline and Monitoring**
 - Safety & Supervision Plan is mentioned - is there a specific form for this? If it is developed, it should be attached.

- Any student that engaged in behavior qualifying for a Threat Assessment should be required to initially complete daily or weekly check-ins to assess willingness and ability to comply. Whenever possible, this should be done with the POC or in teaming with the school administrator.
- Is there a monitoring (daily or weekly check-in) form that the POC completes if this box is checked? Who is typically responsible for these check-ins and what training is provided regarding what to assess/look for during a check-in?
- **Parent/Guardian Follow-up Steps (changed in 2014)**
 - **Recommendation:** A change to parent permission prompt. **Suggestion:** Permission given by parents to receive and share information with community partners (e.g. therapists, agencies) ____ Signed ____ Refused
 - **Recommendation:** Change “Community resources and interventions have been reviewed with parents/caretakers”. Change to “Guardians” for consistent language in the form.
 - **Recommend a bit more clarity needed on some new 2014 prompts.**
 - Building administration has discussed “need to know” issue of informing community (Needs clarification. What does this mean? Teachers? Wider community?)
 - Confidential building location and contact for document and plan: Blank completed. Where should these forms be kept? Forms seem to vary.
 - Enter in Infinite Campus (Medium and High Level Threats only) Why not entering low level so there is a record?
 - Who is responsible for ensuring the parent/guardian is following through with identified interventions? How often are parents contacted for updates? How is it documented? Is there a parent/guardian follow-up form that is completed?

In Attendance

- Suggest that participants print name as well as sign. It was difficult to read signatures of participants on forms for review.
- All those in attendance at the meeting should sign they were in attendance.

Appendix B

A Reconstruction and Synopsis Timeline of Known Events: Summarized From Various Sources

Appendix B of the report provides a synopsis summary of the now known events related to the incident on December 13, 2013. This retrospective view of the general timeline of events related to KP's behaviors and other events and was constructed in a good faith effort by the authors, from available information from the Sheriff's report and supporting documents, the depositions of the eleven Littleton Public School District employees and the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office School Resource Officer taken during July-November 2015, and other materials in the arbitration proceedings. It should be noted that the source materials for this timeline were not complete, as the questioning in the depositions was limited in scope and based on recall of events after significant time has passed. No depositions were taken of members of KP's family, community mental health providers who evaluated KP or provided mental health treatment for him, primarily because KP's mother said she would invoke the psychologist-therapist privilege. As part of the discovery process the LPS attorney posed written questions to KP's mother for non-privileged information. Her affidavit did not answer all of these questions, specifically, the dates and times that KP consulted with his psychologist after September 3, 2013, apparently on the basis of the assert privilege. Students or other staff or persons who knew him also were not deposed, but some information was taken from the Sheriff's Investigative report.

The synopsis identifies some differences in information gained from interviews conducted by officers after the shooting and deposition recall of events. Also, recall of events differs by subject being interviewed and questions asked. With that in mind, the purpose of the event summary timeline is to generally provide information for the review and to answer questions about what was known then and what is currently known about KP and his behavior to the best extent possible, with the goal of furthering the general knowledge base.

DATE	AVAILABLE BEHAVIORAL DATA AND DATA SOURCE
11.24.03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Attended Sandberg Elementary 02-04 ● 2nd grade: Hit 2 students with lunchbox because they “weren’t moving fast enough” (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015). ● Conference with principal. Apology letter to both girls. Conversation with parents about incident.
12.18.03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● LPS 2nd grade: Kicked student in stomach, hit another student in head. Sandberg Elem (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015). ● Wrote apology letter. Given consequence of sitting on wall during recess for one week.

2004-2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Attended Douglas County School District, Cresthill M.S. in Highlands Ranch for 7-9th grade years (no records). ● Won essay contest and savings bond from Sertoma Club in December 2009 (LPS Cumulative Record, LPS 04132 and 04141; Scouting record 2006-09 (KP Cum. Record, LPS 04139-40).
1.15.10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Letter from previous principal stating no behavior or attendance concerns (KP Cum. Record, LPS 04133). ● Letter from former AHS principal re: acceptance of enrollment for 2010-11. ● Open enrollment form completed, living with both parents, reason for open enrollment marked: “Fresh start” (KP Cum. Record, LPS 04131).
2.11.11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● AHS AP (DM) talks with KP and mom re: open enrollment status and the no credit for withdrawing from Mythology class (Depo. Exhibit 19, ACSO_0000199).
11.16.11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In teacher JP’s class, teacher overhears KP mutter to another student to “just go cut himself”. After class, KP tells JP about being someone’s “bitch” and kids being mean to him. “Why wouldn’t I make him my bitch after what he has done to me?” ● KP also stated that other kids were mean to him and he feels justified doing it to them. ● JP calls father (Depo. Exhibit 11). ● JP alerts counselor T about incident.
11.28.11 -	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Counselor KT meets with KP regarding incident on 11/16, he seems “angry”, tells her kids are picking on him and no one does anything. She calls father. Father reported that he already talked to KP and told him he needs to “let past go” (Depo. Exhibit 19, ACSO_0000199). ● KT makes entries in contact log.
12.7.11 12.14.11 8.21.12 1.8.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Schedule change ● Schedule change ● Dropped class ● Question about class from Freshman yr. ● Typical contact in counseling office (Depo. Exhibit 19).
2011-2012 school year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● AHS Debate Coach TM met w/mom at beginning of year. Also had interaction with mom at judge’s training in Oct. Saw mom as “trying to build up her kid”. ● TM described no particular emotional-behavioral problems KP sophomore year. Described as “unsure of himself, socially awkward”, “easily embarrassed”, sometimes “frustration, not anger”. Never saw KP being bullied, “if anything, it

	<p>was probably more the other direction, belittling kids, picking on them”, “attempting to show his superiority”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom told TM that KP had attended speech camp that summer, but didn’t want other kids to know (Murphy, 2015). ● Observations not shared with parents or others.
Spring 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP gave a 2 min. speech for captain, approached as a “joke”, exact content not recalled. ● Debate coach TM says spoke with KP about his concerns about it. Reaction was almost “dismissive”. KP was told team wasn’t unanimous in support (Murphy, 2015)
Summer 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP attended speech camp.
2012-13 KP Junior year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TM is aware that parents divorced in Fall 2012, but he thought it was of no particular consequence. Describes KP “transformation” as “substantial” between the 2 school years, working relationship starts to deteriorate, “unwilling to accept guidance or constructive criticism” (Murphy, 2015) ● TM and KP would talk in library sometimes; TM says library clerk noted KP was argumentative and disrespectful to TM. ● Not reported to administration (Murphy, 2015).
Possibly February or early March 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Finals of Speech-Debate tournament, KP says “I woke up this morning and my penis had fallen off”, reported to TM by students. ● When asked about it at meeting, KP re-enacted it. (Murphy, 2015). ● TM reports being “shocked”, did not report any of this to administrators or parents, only to assistant coach. ● TM met with KP & told him others might be offended or view it as sexual harassment. KP responded by saying he was trying to “find boundaries of what he could get away with”, for shock value in his competition, to make him “stand out”, TM told him “well, you crossed it”. ● No report was made of this incident to administration.
3.15.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher DS reads KP’s grade out loud. KP responded, “fuck” and then said “fuck you” to two other students when they laughed at KP. ● DS takes KP out of class and takes him to AHS Assistant Principal KK. ● KP provides written statement to KK describing “two classmates, the combined IQ of a cantaloupe” “one outburst for a decade of hell is unfair”. ● Writes “Ides of March” in date space. KP says “all the teachers are out to fucking get me” (Depo. Exhibit 32). ● KK questioned “Ides of March” and “decades of hell” comments on his statement, says KP wouldn’t explain much. KK told Assistant Principal DM

	<p>(Kolasa, 2015).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 1 school day suspension for obscene language. KK forgets to report incident on Behavior Log (Kolasa, 2015). Written documentation exists of KP's written statement and notification to parents about suspension (Depo. Exhibit 32). ● KK conferenced with parents that day, KK suggests anger management therapy (Kolasa, 2015). ● No evidence of therapy for KP at this time.
April 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP qualifies for nationals as an alternate. Went on to compete in Birmingham. ● Debate coach TM does not congratulate KP.
8.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP totaled his car after leaving work at McDonald's angry. (ACSO_0001958) ● Shared by mom at threat assessment meeting on 9.9.13 (Song, 2015).
Summer 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● During Sheriff's investigation dad reported that "As far as dad knew, KP did not own any weapons and he did not believe that KP was old enough to legally purchase a shotgun. Dad stated KP participated in the Venture Crew Program, which runs a program called RAMS (Rifle Archer Muzzleloader and Shotgun). Those who participate in RAMS get together one time a year to shoot guns. The participants camp out at Chatfield Reservoir and shoot at a Lockheed Martin facility. Dad believed that KP had become a proficient shooter". ● After the shooting. Sheriff's investigation discovered certificates were found for KP's marksmanship training (ASCO_001797-2051, ASCO_0001894). ● Parents do not disclose to school at meeting on 9.9.13.
Possibly last week of August 2013 (?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom "got a call from a male who said he received a call from her home phone number and that a male said he was going to kill his daughter". ● Mom said she also received a phone call from the School Resource Officer (SRO) of West Middle School (not LPS school) advising her that the girl who KP threatened to kill went to West Middle School (not LPS school) (ACSO_0001958-59). ● Mom said that she spoke to KP about this and KP said he lost his phone and was calling his phone number but misdialled and called a 7th grade girl and he said he was going to kill her (ACSO_0001959). ● Not reported to AHS by the WMS SRO or parents.
Fall 2013, perhaps 1 st day of school	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher JC class (International Relations): "Tell me" form on first day of class. ● JC reported that KP made "bizarre" statement that seemed as "red flag" to JC. Thought it was unusual and that he wanted attention. Describes him as "cocky kid". Statement was something like "I won't stop talking in class, I won't stop, or I'm relentless" something like that (Corson, 2015). ● KP says, "That's stupid" to girl in class. Did not stay after class when requested to do so. Teacher JC called it "insubordination" and said it just doesn't usually

	<p>happen (Corson, 2015).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● JC sought out other teachers to find out more about KP and was told to go to Debate coach TM (Corson, 2015). ● No report made of this incident to administration.
2 nd day of school or so	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher JC and Debate coach TM talk about KP, tells TM about incident in class of verbal statement (Corson, 2015). ● TM stated “I told him good luck”. Both TM and JC described themselves as somewhat “exasperated”. ● JC decided to ask KP to help in his class. JC later thought things were going “great” (Corson, 2015). ● Neither JC nor TM report this to administration.
No exact date	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP doesn’t show up to Back-to-School night for Speech and Debate fundraiser ● TM does not confront KP or report it to mom until meeting on 9.3.13 (Murphy, 2015).
8.30.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Debate coach TM talks to Assistant Principal BJ about general concerns with S&D team, said he was planning on demoting KP. Also, told assistant coach GG. ● TM said he’d already had 2 negative incidents with KP this year. Fundraiser and JC reported incident. ● BJ was supportive of TM decision (Murphy, 2015).
9.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher MC gives math test back, KP received 46% on test – wrote “KMFDM” on returned test. (Depo. Exhibit 16, ACSO 0001951) ● At some point, MC reported that she Googled to find out it was a German band. “No pity for the Majority” (Depo. Exhibit 16, ACSO_0001951) ● Not reported to administration until later date.
9.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Debate coach TM stated he sent a text message to the team about meeting. TM sends private text message to KP and mom about wanting to meet after the meeting (Murphy, 2015). ● TM meets with KP and mom. TM talked with KP and mom about nationals in Birmingham. TM told mom KP wasn’t reflecting positively on team or school with poor behavior and decision-making” (Murphy, 2015). ● TM discussed reasons for removal from captain, describes KP as “angry”. KP started screaming at TM. KP stayed in his seat. TM was “taken aback”. He threatened to shut down Dropbox and take that away from the Extemp. team, threatened to go to Pramenko about me” (Murphy, 2015). KP screaming “he couldn't believe it” “What would Pramenko think about demoting the only member of team who made nationals?” (Murphy, 2015). ● TM stated that mom was trying to calm things down. Asked TM about specific incidents. Told KP he should have texted TM about fundraiser. Wanted him to

	<p>apologize, he dismissed her. Mom wanted KP to shake hands with TM. He gave left hand shake kind of backwards. TM told KP he hoped he would continue to compete, prove me wrong, be a good leader, etc. ” (Murphy, 2015).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● After meeting, TM reports KP walking down hall with mom, waving hands, screaming, but he couldn’t understand the words (Murphy, 2015). ● Mom remembers him being angry but says he “kept it together” until he got to parking lot (ACSO_0001958).
9.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Debate coach TM goes to Principal NP: reports about meeting with KP and mom. Told her about KP screaming, threatening to go to her because she “wouldn’t be happy”. NP reportedly said “let him”. ● TM did not tell NP he was fearful. Didn’t think KP should be suspended, but, TM said he continued to be more concerned as night went on and had conversations with his wife (Murphy, 2015). ● No referral form or documentation from TM. Said it was an “extracurricular activity”. Didn’t seem to know if it was normal procedure with activities (Murphy, 2015).
9.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● After school, teacher ML overhears KP in parking lot “I’m going to kill that guy” or something to that effect. Observes that KP was with mom and female. (ACSO_0001923; Murphy, 2015). ● ML tells ACSO after the incident that KP was failing his class, would use foul language when he lost his temper, but seemed to have “good emotional state” and “never saw or heard anything suspicious since then” (ACSO_0001923). ● Not reported to AHS Administration that day.
9.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom sent email to teacher JC at 4:30 (after meeting with TM) saying she had heard KP acted out in his class and that mom wanted to talk with him (ACSO_0001529).
9.4.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP does not come to school because mom keeps him home. ● Debate coach TM tells Counselor AT about incident with KP on 9.3 and concerns about violence. ● TM goes to main office again to talk to NP who is not available. TM speaks to BJ (Murphy, 2015).
Perhaps 9.4.13 – 9.6.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A student tells teacher JC about KP being upset in the parking lot without specifics. Student didn’t hear threat, just knew he was angry. ● JC sees TM at drinking fountain who says yesterday’s meeting with KP did not go well. JC thought TM response “didn’t feel right” (Corson, 2015). ● At some point, JC later goes to see Assistant Principal DM, sees TM in DM’s office (Corson, 2015).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● JC tells DM about KP, very brief interaction. ● No other action taken.
9.4.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● About 2:15-2:30, staff meeting after school. Teacher ML tells TM about overhearing threat in parking lot (Murphy, 2015). ● ML and TM tell Principal NP. 2-3 minute conversation. TM didn't say he was fearful (Murphy, 2015). ● Principal NP refers TM to KK.
9.4.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher ML and Debate coach TM tell KK about incident. ● Behavior Detail Log shows documentation 2:31 p.m. "After demoted from captain of S&D, KP left school yelled in the east lot that he would kill TM, the S&D sponsor"(Depo. Exhibit 24). (Incident occurred to 9.3.15 but wasn't reported until late in day on 9.4.15). ● TM said KK seemed to be taking it seriously, wanted to gather more info and also contact mother (Murphy, 2015). ● Incident coded as "threatened staff" on behavior log. ● KK contacted mom. She decided to keep KP out of school 3 days and seek outside assistance with psychologist (Depo. Exhibit 24; Kolasa, 2015).
9.4.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TM stated KK called him at home to tell him he has talked to mom, and that she had decided to keep KP home rest of week, wanting to get "some help" (Murphy, 2015).
9.5.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Principal NP follows up with TM to make sure KK had communicated he called mom. ● TM stated he asked NP for follow up and viewing of security footage. She referred him to DM secretary (Murphy, 2015; Pramenko, 2015,).
9.5.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Assistant Principal KK told SRO on 9.5.15 about incident that occurred on 9.3.13. ● SRO spoke to Debate coach TM and teacher ML, was told that KP had been demoted from being captain. ML confirms threat (Englert,). ● SRO told TM to notify him if anything happens in future. SRO said KK "didn't ask me to talk with KP or mom" (Englert, 2015). ● SRO talked with boss, decided threat was no crime (Englert 2015). ● Police report prepared by SRO (Depo. Exhibit 18). ● No contact by SRO to KP and mom.
9.5.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KK spoke with mom again on the phone. She said she would keep KP out of school until Monday. ● KK tells School Psychologist ES about incidents, including history of teacher DS incident with KP in March 2013 and that re-entry meeting to take place on 9.9.13.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● She agrees threat assessment is needed (Song, 2015). KK looks up LPS materials on intranet (Kolasa, 2015). ES looks at Behavior Detail Log and Contact log (Song, 2015).
9.5.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP is seen by therapist at Advanced Integrative Medicine (AIM). “Issues: Mood” (ACSO 0002038). AIM Treatment Plan prescribes for him various supplements “GABA and calm powder”. Follow-up appointment noted in 2 weeks. ● Mom reports afterwards to ACSO that KP was seen 4-5 times by this therapist (ACSO-0001929, ACSO_0001958). ● No verification of these appointments was provided by KP’s mom in response to a request for an affidavit during discovery process.
Possibly 9.4.15 – 9.6.15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher JC finds out about dismissal from leadership of debate. Goes to TM again. They go to DM. (Corson, 2015) ● JC calls mom back in response to Sept 3rd email. About 20 minute call. ● JC stated that mom started to vent, tell JC KP is “different, has anger issues”. Calls him “lizard brain”. Parent didn’t really seem to have suggestions on how best to handle KP (Corson, 2015).
Sometime around 9.6.13 – 9.9.13 date unclear	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher MC incident with KP reported to Assistant Principal KK, date unclear. ● MC says it was after the threat (Depo. Exhibit 16, ACSO_0001951). ● KK checks the band website. He talks to KP when he’s back in school. (Kolasa, 2015) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not reported to others.
9.9.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Threat assessment/re-entry meeting was held in the morning at AHS before first class. Assistant Principal KK, School Psychologist ES, KP and parents meet to determine level of threat and ability to return to school. (Depo. Exhibit 35, 2015; Depo. Exhibit 19). ● (Depo. Exhibit 19; Depo. Exhibit 24): Behavior Detail Log record “Student remorseful about reaction but still admits being angry. No understanding of impact of threat on staff member”. ● Threat assessment conclusion is low level threat (Depo. Exhibit 35). ● ES wrote on Contact Log KP was apologetic for what he said, but not remorseful, didn’t see need to apologize to TM (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015; ASCO_0000200). ● KK enters on Behavior Detail Log (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015) “Determined not high level, would go back to classes”. ● Action plan: KK, parents, TM and KP will meet in 2 weeks to discuss plan of action with speech and debate (Depo. Exhibit 35). Wraparound services were offered noted on form.

9.9.15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom says at the meeting that KP was assessed at Highlands Behavioral Health and was told he was “not a threat to himself or others”. ● Parents indicated he would see private therapist once a week. ● Parents did not sign release of information form for school to obtain information (Depo. Exhibit 35, 2015). ● Threat assessment has box checked that there was “no known access to weapons” (Depo. Exhibit 35).
9.9.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Document verifying KP seen at Highlands Behavioral Health System, date reads 9.9.15 (Highlands Ranch Behavioral Health, 2013). ● The document has no reason for the assessment, but advised that KP was not recommended for inpatient care. ● Mom reported he’d been seen on 9.6.13 (ACSO_001396, ACSO_0001425)
9.10.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Email at 6:01 a.m. from mom to ES and KK, with copies to dad and KP. Re: possible IEP to help work together with strategies for KP. Mom mentions resources they are seeking outside of school. ● ES responds by email at 7:40 a.m. Requests release again to talk to mental health providers and explains IEP process and needing to talk with his therapist (ACSO 0000227_001). ● No further response from parents on IEP or wraparound services.
9.10.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP shows up at Speech and Debate practice that afternoon. TM tells KP to leave and he leaves without more. ● TM tells KK (Murphy). KK told TM he’d make sure KP was clear that he was supposed to stay away from practice.
9.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Late start day at AHS. 8:00 a.m. KP is in hall. TM says “hi” to KP in hall and KP walks by without speaking to him. ● TM called KK to say what happened (Murphy, 2015). ● No further contact by KP and TM until 9.26.13 follow up meeting.
After 9.9.13- date unknown	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Debate coach TM spoke to School Psychologist ES. TM talked ES about upcoming meeting with KP, told her he was concerned and considering leaving the school. (Song, 2015; Murphy, 2015).
9.9.13 – 9.26.13 date unknown	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP came into counseling office to request an IQ test- ES told him no, usually testing was for special education kids. (Song, 2015)
9.16.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Weekly AHS Administrative Team ● Agenda shows KP discussed at meeting: “no remorse or guilt” (Depo. Exhibit

	<p>12).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Fact sharing about Threat Assess and outcome and follow-up meeting. (Kolasa, 2015).
9.17.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's Diary entry*: "Tuesday September 17, 2013, enter project saguntum, a 10 year subconscious project from me to exact revenge, not on individuals who perpetrated wrong, but instead by those I believe have done me wrong. I will shot up my school, Arapahoe high school before the year is over. I hope to choose a date with the following criterion Finals week- everyone is at school, and it will be winter during finals week, I hope I can find a day it is actually snowing, or just incredibly cold. I am a psychopath with a superiority complex." (*KP's diary entries are quoted directly from the ACSO Sheriff's report, who has stated that he did not publish all of KP's diaries (ACSO Sherriff's Report, 2014, p. 29)
9.22.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's Diary entry: "I am filled with hate, and I love it. The serotonin supplements I am taking don't do jack-shit....." (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, p. 30). ● Mom later told investigators that when KP was seen by private psychologist BT at AIM he received a powder to put in his drink that was supposed to calm him. (ACSO_0001959).
9.26.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Follow up meeting occurs 2 weeks after the threat and meeting on 9.9.13. ● Counselor AT documents the follow-up meeting with parents, KP, KK and TM. KP be allowed to participate in Speech & Debate meets, but not to participate in practice at AHS (Depo. Exhibit 19). ● KK, AT and TM debriefed after meeting. TM says they thought KP was insincere, mom treated him like younger child "say this, etc.", father didn't say anything (Murphy, 2015, p. 158). KK thought he was sincere, but recalls asking KP to answer the questions instead of mom (Kolasa, 2015).
9.30.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Weekly AHS Administrative Team Meeting ● On agenda under "discipline": "KP discussed". No more details are available (LPS 02049; LPS 02058).
9.30.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's Diary entry: "Monday, September 30, 2013, I feel like a bomb. My head has happy, anger and confusion hormones. I feel like an aneurism could happen at any second. Besides constantly being pissed off, I doubt the medication is working. I need a real doctor, one who doesn't give me medication that has the disclaimer not approved by the FDA. The serotonin is a joke, it makes my bowels upset, doesn't effusively make me happy, and I hate taking them. It is important to note that I rarely take my meds for this reason." (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, p. 30). ● In her affidavit, mom says KP was taking NO medication.

10.3.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's Diary entry: "Thursday, October 3, 2013, Since day 1, my job has been to conspire to shoot up the school. Every semester, I had a class I despised, and it was on the list. Now I have the means to achieve this diabolical end, and I am excited. The date is set for mid-November, I need time to build my arsenal." (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, p. 30)
October 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Parent-teachers conferences ● Teacher JC meets dad – tells him KP was doing well in his class. ● Teacher VL meets dad "What horrible things do you have to tell me about my son?". Teacher VL tells father she did not have a lot of concerns about KP (Lombardi, 2015) ● Teacher MC in ASCO interview said dad called his son a "jack-ass", seemed "exasperated" about KP about bad grades. (ASCO_0001951)
10.7.13 – 10.13.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Lockdown Drill at AHS ● Reviewed at Administrative meeting on 10.14.13 (LPS 02064)
10.9.13 – 10.15.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Email exchange between MC and mom related to grade in class
10.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary Entry: "Friday October 11, 2013, I had a shrink appointment at 4, which was a massive waste of time. She doesn't know about saguntum, nobody does" (ACSO, 2014, p. 30) ● Per Mom: Psychologist BT at Advanced Integrative Medicine saw KP 4-5 times. (ACSO_0001957). ● Mom declines to provide verification of the dates of psychologist visit in her affidavit.
Early October	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Campus supervisors CR and CK tell Assistant Principal DM and their co-workers they saw on school surveillance video that KP was looking at guns on personal computer in cafeteria (Meredith, 2015). ● DM thinks information was "vague" and that he does "not have reasonable suspicion" to search KPs computer or ask him any questions (Meredith, 2015). DM says he told "security" to "keep an eye out for KP" after this report (Meredith, 2015). ● Recollections vary. CK reported that she told "coworkers" (ACSO_0001919). SRO denies he was told about this gun viewing (Englert, 2015). RM does not recall being told about gun viewing (Mauler, 2015). ● DM did not tell KK or other AHS administrators. ● No other action taken.

10.15.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's Diary Entry: "Monday, October 15, 2013, I had an interesting idea today. In first hour, I thought about shooting up the asylum or whatever the fuck it was that my mother took me for that psych evaluation. Let the records show I lied through my teeth through the test." (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, p. 30)
10.23.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP had wellness check-up at Dr. RN (ACSO_0001957)
10.26.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's Diary entry: "Saturday, October 26, 2013, the 13th of December is a great date, as the 347th (47 is a great number) date of the year, there are 18 (my age) days left. It is a day of gore, filled with murder, suicide."
11.1.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP fails Spanish quiz. ● KP reportedly using "F bombs" in VL's class (Lombardi, 2015; but not in her email or ACSO statement). ● Teacher VL email to mom re: grades dropping, failed quiz, "lately having trouble with his behavior", and inappropriate tequila comment, "When do we get to drink tequila?" (ACSO_0001418; ASCO_001396-1596; ASCO_0001418) ● No report to AHS administration. No response from mom.
11.6.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary entry: "Wednesday, November, 6, 2013, I am ecstatic right now. That December 13 date I chose is perfect. It is 38 days after the fifth of November. I love that date, that number, everything about it." (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, p. 30).
First week of Nov.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's grades would make him ineligible for S&D activities. ● Debate coach TM tells KK to tell him about grades "taking a nosedive". ● TM said KK was aware of it and said counselors were aware (Murphy, 2015) ● KK says he remembered KP's grades were poor, but specific recall was difficult (Kolasa, 2015). ● No one addressed dropping grades with KP.
Nov. 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Heckling comment to unidentified students during their presentations RH class (ASCO 001396-1596, 0001404) ● Not reported to school.
11.20.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Faculty meeting at AHS about safety following lockdown practice. ● TM describes requesting cameras in the library to NP, says it wasn't related to KP incident (Murphy, 2015, Pramenko, 2015).
11.20.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TM talks to one of KP's teachers KG after faculty meeting, expressed concerns about KP doing something violent, told her briefly about incident and threat in Sept. (Murphy, 2015).

11.24.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP’s Diary Entry: “Sunday, November 24, 2013, It’s weird going through life knowing that in 19 days, I am going to be dead. That makes school more boring, work torture and everything I love to do a little less fun. The hardest part is not being able to tell anyone. I can’t just say fuck it, I’m going to shoot up my school soon. I need to make sure that kind of stuff doesn’t show up.” (ACSO Sheriff’s Report, 2014, p. 30)
11.26.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP’s Diary Entry: “Friday, November 26, 2013, I can't believe in a fortnight, i'll be dead. I went to the library to see if they had NBK. They didn't but ---- had highly recommended Perks of being a wallflower. I HATED it. Personally, I saw me, freshman year. No, I had never been sexually abused, but I had no friends at Arapahoe, and I was trying to fit in.” (ACSO Sheriff’s Report, 2014, p. 31)
Early December	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP fails big test in Spanish. VL urged him to study and re-take. ● KP makes “c’est la vie” statement, “lackadaisical”. (Lombardi, 2015) ● KP came in next day and failed test.
12.6.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP purchases shotgun at Cabela’s. Gun purchase is legal because KP is 18 years old. (ASCO_002576-2595, ASCO_0002578) ● Note: Video reviewed after the fact (ASCO_000786-986, ASCO_0000861)
12.8.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary Entry: “Sunday, December 8, 2013, it was a productive weekend. I bought my Stevens 2013. It was not the initial gun I was expecting, but I think it will work better. I like the pistol grip. It was quite the process to buy, it was waiting, and waiting, but I loved it. Mom does not know about it.” (ACSO Sheriff’s Report, 2014)
12.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Incident in VL’s Spanish Class. KP left room to go to bathroom. Door was locked, student refused to open it for him. KP pounded on door. VL lets him in. Then sends him out of class because of inappropriate comments and behavior. (Depo. Exhibit 24, 2015; ACSO_0000185, ACSO_0000200). ● KP calms down in cafeteria, then is taken to KK’s office. VL calls KK. KK comes to classroom to talk to VL (Kolasa, 2015). ● VL says that KP “scared” her “that day” and it was “unsettling”, was not “physically afraid” (ACSO_0001400; Lombardi, 2015). Statements differ. ● VL recalls telling KK that KP scared her (Lombardi, 2015). KK does not recall VL telling him she was scared (ACSO_0001409, Kolasa, 2015). ● Campus security CK reports she was told by KK to “watch KP” because he had left class very angry (ACSO_0001919). ● KK calls mom, she wants to know what will be done with student who locked

	<p>him out. KP was sent home for rest of day. KP asked to apologize to VL, and was told to do it the next day.</p>
12.11.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP attends private chess club at Highlands Ranch Library. Chess Club coordinator, an adult, later reported to ACSO that KP told him he wouldn't need recommendation for military school, as he was "no longer planning on going". (ASCO_001396-1596, ASCO_0001402) ● KP showed the coordinator picture of shotgun he had bought from his phone or electronic device. The coordinator said behavior was not different than any other night. (ACSO_0001402)
12.12.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Principal NP and DM tour library as follow up to discussion about security cameras ● KP apologizes to VL in the morning (ACSO_0001400). VL accepts the apology and "forgives him".
12.12.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Mom said KP text messaged her saying he took \$800 out of bank account to give to a friend for flying lessons. Mom told KP he needed to put the money back. (ACSO_0001959) ● Money was taken out of the account (ACSO_0001959) ● Purchased shotgun shell belts, sling, etc. at Cabelas.
12.12.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP Diary entry: "Thursday, December 12, 2013, I went to Cabelas and I bought a sling, ammo belts, and of course, ammo. It included 5 sabot slugs! I think I'll need more. Luckily, I'll take off tomorrow." (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, p. 31)
12.6.13 - 12.12.13 (specific dates unclear)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Various student reports are provided in ACSO report (ACSO Sheriff's Report, p. 11-12). ● KP showed picture of machete to another kid. ● Was seen pacing near library by a student. ● Had lunch with another student who knew he had purchased a gun at Cabelas. ● Another student said KP showed him picture of shotgun. They had discussed school shootings. ● Showed another student a picture of the machete he bought at Sports Authority. ● Girl he dated said KP showed her shotgun in his trunk on 3rd date. (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, pp. 11-12).
12.12.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher JC says KP gave presentation in class and that KP "seemed well" (Depo. Exhibit 13, ASCO_001001).
12.13.13 7.24 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Ammo purchase at Walmart ● Notation in school planner "Get Pumped" (ACSO, 2014, p. 27)

12.13.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● KP's Diary entry: "Friday, December 13, 2013, today is going to be fun. I dropped ---- off at school today, and went to WalMart, bought some ammo. I then dressed my weapons, loaded my belts, got my backpack ready. I then went to Brunswick, bowled, got some mountain dew (I bought it for the glass bottles). I am going to make some Molotov cocktails-shaken not stirred. Update 45 minutes I built my Molotov cocktails, and I think they look great. I only had oil for three, but I think 3 will be more than enough. I am dressed to kill, long underwear, then cargo pants, under armor shirt, CCCP shirt. I have my machete on my belt, but I may re-attach that in the car." ● "The plan: 5th hour starts at 1214. I would want to strike 15 minutes into the hours, everyone is settled in. 1230: Initial strike on ----. Enter through the trophy hallway, waltz into ----. Shoot up ----, toss a Molotov cocktail, reload. 1235: Assault ---- 1240: Assault ---- 1245: Assault ---- 1250: Assault on ---- (ACSO Sheriff's Report, 2014, p. 31)
12.13.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Day of the shooting, 12:33 p.m. ● KP enters the school through what appeared to be unlocked door (Sheriff's report, 2014, p. 32).

Appendix C

A Summary of Best Practice Threat Assessment Recommendations

While most schools throughout Colorado and the country have been using a threat assessment process for years, this arbitration allowed the reviewers to look into specific implementation of the process through an examination of a select sample in one district and one school. The following best practice recommendations are made after review of information provided in this arbitration and are provided for *all schools* regarding the process, training, intervention planning and documentation of threat assessments in schools. All school districts and schools are encouraged to use the lessons learned and the information provided in this report to review their process, training and documentation of threat assessments and interventions for threat management.

Best Practice Recommendations for School Threat Assessment Process

1. One of the key elements in identifying a student in crisis or interrupting a potential school attack situation is early detection. The foundation for the threat assessment process involves raising awareness about detection of potential behaviors of concern and about the timely reporting of those concerns. Training in awareness must occur across school employee groups, students, parents, and others in the community. Multiple reporting methods for concerns are encouraged, as long as the vortex for information is established. See Section II of this report.
2. Each district is encouraged to review the training and experience of its administrators, mental health personnel, and others who might be members of a threat assessment team to determine if the multi-disciplinary site-based 3-person threat assessment team model, as recommended by the CSSRC can be implemented at their schools, and gaps should be remediated.
3. Given the potential difficulty of assuring the training and, in some cases, the limited experience of site based administrators and mental health personnel, a designated district level subject matter expert or review team is recommended to be available for review, consultation, training, and participation in difficult cases, as needed.
4. The process should be consistent between a district level review team and school based threat assessment teams. The process should also be consistent across schools in each district.
5. The vortex for information reporting and consolidation should be established at each school. It is considered best practice if the vortex is a team, to reduce unilateral decision-making regarding the significance of behavioral data and threat assessment.

6. An outline of key considerations in the process includes:
 - a. Securing safety should be a priority.
 - b. Notifications about the need for a threat assessment should occur and the threat assessment team should be convened.
 - c. Information should be obtained from a variety of sources, including:
 - Searches of the person, as appropriate,
 - Searches of social media,
 - Reviews of school and other available records,
 - Information or observations from teachers or others at the school who know the student, and
 - Information from community treatment providers or other agencies providing intervention.
 - d. Special Education considerations should be reviewed and appropriate staff included in the process.
 - e. Interviews should be conducted with the student of concern, parents of the student of concern, and witnesses (if relevant). This is best done outside of a meeting and should be conducted prior to the meeting where a plan is developed.
 - f. All data should be reported in behavioral terms, when possible, and all data should be considered and evaluated.
 - g. Organization and analysis of the information should occur.
 - h. Decision-making should take place regarding the seriousness of the behavior by reviewing all the data sources. The foundation for the level of risk should be based on all the behaviors and the detail for the determination of risk should be recorded. Decision-making can be assisted by a system for behavior analysis and coding and the Secret Service 11 Key Questions.
 - i. Appropriate action and intervention planning (countermeasures) should be commensurate with level of concern.
 - j. Identify strengths or relationships that can be developed, include specific steps of plan, details of monitoring, and people responsible for the action items (including the parent and student).
 - k. Monitoring of student and review of the plan should be clear – Identify personnel who are the points of contact and establish a firm date for review of the effectiveness of the plan.
 - l. A documentation form should be completed, in detail, with the foundation for the level of risk. Records should be maintained, as directed by the district.
 - m. Review the effectiveness of the plan, student progress and document the follow up review meeting.
7. Central office review by an individual with expertise, and/or a district level team is also recommended.

8. Central district record keeping should also be maintained.

Best Practice Recommendations for Training School Employees in Threat Assessment

1. All school employee groups should be trained for awareness of violence or concerning behavior and the importance of timely reporting.
 - a. All students should also be trained about the importance of reporting.
 - b. Parents should also be educated and reminded about the importance of reporting behaviors of concern, for the safety of their child and the safety of others.
 - c. Schools must continue efforts to partner with parents for early intervention for kids exhibiting concerning behaviors.
 - d. Multiple methods of reporting are encouraged, as long as the vortex for information is established and used.
2. All school district employees acting as part of a threat assessment team should be trained, including administrators. Updated training should be required at regular intervals (every 2-3 years). Attendance at trainings should be documented.
3. It is also suggested that law enforcement officers (SROs) acting as part of a school based threat assessment team participate in the district threat assessment training process or similar training.
4. When possible, teams should train or practice together. Much as schools are encouraged to drill and practice other types of emergency response procedures, threat assessment teams can benefit from case practice.
5. Support documents are seen as a great addition of resources for use in review of training, but face-to-face training should cover those topics as well. Support documents should also be available on the district intranet.
6. Sufficient time should be dedicated to training on the important topic of threat assessment. Covering many related topics in one training session may be efficient and help to make connections of learning for staff, but the topic needs dedicated training time and school and district leadership should support that training.
7. Best practice threat assessment training should include:
 - a. Information content about the history of school related violence incidents and lessons learned.
 - b. Clarity about *when* to do a threat assessment as stated in district information and policy.

- c. Clarity about the composition of a Threat Assessment Team, including attendance by a Special Education representative, if the student has an identified disability. The CSSRC (2010-2015) has recommended at least three trained members to a team.
- d. Six principles of threat assessment from the Secret Service recommendations (Fein, et al., 2002, 2004) to remind participants of the need for a skeptical mindset, basing information on facts, using integrated systems.
- e. Training and *emphasis* on relevant FERPA exceptions to confidentiality, as misperceptions still exist regarding this law and relevant exceptions (CSSRC, 2010-2015).
- f. Training for awareness of and *appropriate use* of warning sign indicators (Dwyer et al., 1998; CSSRC, 2010-2015; and others). These warning signs are for awareness of troubled students, and not necessarily students who are dangerous or pose a risk for violence. They should not be used as a checklist for violence as they not all equal in importance or as indicators (Dwyer et al., 1998; Cornell, 2014).
- g. Key Findings from the Safe School Initiative (Fein, et al., 2002), as this information still applies, and can be useful in awareness training. These findings relate to information that should be questioned during a threat assessment process.
- h. Teach information for awareness of avenger violence (Nicoletti, 2013, 2014)
- i. Teach and give examples of how to evaluate written material (Kanan, 2010, 2011, 2013).
- j. Teach how to identify each type of threat for correct coding of behaviors (direct v. indirect v. conditional, veiled, etc.) (O'Toole, 2000, Nicoletti, 2010).
- k. With regard to the "Access to Weapons" question, it is recommended that those completing these forms be trained to only mark "none known" after taking reasonable steps to ascertain the information. Document the attempt to gather information related to an armament.
 - Training should specify that both the student and their guardian should be asked directly if there are weapons in the home, if the student has access to weapons, and if they have had training. Specific responses should be noted.
- l. Train for evaluation of materials obtained. If the form directs the decision to assign a category for level of concern, examples and explanation should be provided.
- m. Teach about the identification and coding of behavior as "normal", "boundary probing" "attack related" or "attack" for use in determining level of concern. (Nicoletti, et al., 2010; Nicoletti & Spencer-Thomas, 2002).
- n. Use of the 11 Key Questions for the Secret Service should be reviewed.
- o. Teach how to create effective intervention plans commensurate with the level of concern and provide suggestions for monitoring.
 - Examples of effective intervention planning (countermeasures) should be provided. All students who engage in behavior that prompts a threat assessment should be monitored over time.
- p. Train for each step of the district process, in addition to reviewing the form.
- q. Teams should use case studies for tabletop practice in threat assessment.

- r. Participants in trainings should be asked to complete a short evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the training, the presentation materials and format and to provide suggestions for future training. This will help assess which topics may need more information or additional training.

Best Practices Recommendations in Documentation of Threat Assessment and the Intervention Plan

1. All school district documentation forms should be reviewed to assure the form helps to guide less experienced school personnel through the district's process of threat assessment.
2. All school district Threat Assessment documentation forms should be reviewed for single prompts and contain sufficient additional space after each prompt for addition of clarification and/or evidence of the box checked.
3. A section for all the recommended data sources to be used in the assessment should be included.
 - a. As mentioned in the process above, a search of social media activity should be included as standard practice as part of threat assessment process. Social media should consistently be searched and screenshots of any concerning posts, pictures, quotes, etc. should be included in documentation. Students can be asked to show their social media directly, parents should be involved, and law enforcement consulted, as needed. Consultation with school district attorneys can provide more guidance on this type of search.
4. Documentation forms need to include a step to evaluate available information before any decision-making and intervention planning.
 - a. The concept of examining and coding of behavior as "normal", "boundary probing", "attack-related", and "attack planning" is useful for evaluation.
 - b. Available guidance for school threat assessment continues to advocate for the use of the 11 Key Questions to be considered as part of a threat assessment in schools (CSSRC, 2015).
5. The intervention or action plan developed as part of a threat assessment should be detailed, with appropriate steps, persons responsible to follow-up, and a date established for review of the plan before the meeting is concluded.
6. All threat assessments should have intervention or action planning, including monitoring of the student. More examples of items to be used and blanks for other interventions the school-based team may create could be added to documentation forms.
 - a. A Point of Contact (POC) should be identified and assigned to any student requiring a threat assessment and whenever possible, the POC would ideally be a school

- psychologist or other mental health staff member uniquely qualified to provide ongoing behavioral assessment and monitoring.
- b. Initially, a student that has engaged in a behavior requiring the completion of a threat assessment should be required to complete daily or weekly check-ins to assess their willingness and ability to comply. Some suggestions for check-ins should be provided.
 - c. There should be specificity to the check-in with students. Specify if the backpack, notebooks, locker, or social media pages will be checked or if check-in consists of verbal confirmation that things are going well. Document the check-in and specify what will happen if a student misses a check-in.
7. If the student does not comply with the required check-in or action steps (countermeasures), this may indicate a higher risk, as the student is demonstrating they are choosing to disregard rules or is incapable of controlling his or her impulses.

Key Findings and Recommendations From the Trend Analysis and Specific Case Review

1. Faculty and staff need to be trained on a standard protocol for detecting and reporting concerning behaviors as recommended in Section II of this report.
2. Students also need to receive training on what to look for regarding concerning behaviors and how to report concerns, as in Section II.
3. There should be a variety of options for reporting concerns such as Safe2Tell, the district safety and security number, notifying the school administration, the school resource officer, counselor, school psychologist, teachers, parents or others. However, all of these options need to filter to the centralized vortex.
4. Unilateral risk assessment should be avoided. If you see something or hear something, say something, and always consult with others to avoid unilateral assessments.
5. Data should be collected from multiple sources within and outside of the school to include parents and caregivers, mental health professionals, and social media sources.
6. Concerning behaviors need to be appropriately documented in behavioral terms that make it clear what specifically was said or done that was of concern. Vague statements such as “he was awkward” or “his statement’s were bizarre” should be avoided. Record specific language use and save concerning writings or drawings for a record of *exact* content.
7. Threat assessment forms should be standardized and guide personnel, especially less experienced ones through the process of data gathering, consideration of risk, and the

creation of an intervention plan. Behavior must be looked at over time. A specific review date should be established to review the effectiveness of the plan.

8. Threat assessment team members should avoid diagnosing emotions and focus on the behavioral indicators.
9. Any concerning behavior should be met with an intervention (countermeasure) and each countermeasure should be monitored for effectiveness. Again, reviewing behavior over time and the effectiveness of the countermeasures over time can be helpful to determine a pattern.
10. Cases reviewed by the threat assessment team at the school and district should be classified according to some follow up system such as:
 - a. Currently active and under review
 - b. Active with proactive monitoring of behavior and countermeasures
 - c. Inactive with reactive monitoring, as needed